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Cover
USS Laboon (DDG-58) on Port Visit
Toulon, France #2, by Commander
Monica Allen Perin, USNR, watercolor
on paper, 2004, Navy Art Collection,
2004-101-4. The Arleigh Burke–class
guided-missile destroyer Laboon enters
Toulon after operations in the Mediterranean in support of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM. Commander Perin, who
served on active duty as a Supply Corps
officer for twelve years, today paints, exhibits, and teaches in France and Italy.
She has produced numerous paintings for
the U.S. Navy’s Combat Art Program
and the Navy Art Collection since being
recalled in 1995 for duty in Zagreb,
Croatia. Courtesy of the Navy Art
Collection.
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FROM THE EDITORS
Over the last several months, the strategic environment has been profoundly altered by the financial crisis that has engulfed Wall Street and continues to spread
throughout the American as well as the global economy. The implications of this
crisis for the defense strategy and programs of the United States under the new
administration of President Barack Obama remain unclear, but it seems increasingly obvious that they will be substantial, and in some respects perhaps game
changing. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has warned of leaner budget
times ahead and indicated that all major defense programs will be subject to
challenge in the course of this year’s accelerated Quadrennial Defense Review
(now due to be completed by August). He has also made it clear that he plans to
take a personal interest in fixing the defense acquisition process. This larger context needs to be kept in mind as we wrestle with the question of the future force
structure of the U.S. Navy. In our lead article in this issue, “The Navy’s Changing
Force Paradigm,” Robert C. Rubel, dean of the Naval War College’s Center for
Naval Warfare Studies, attempts to advance the discussion of this vital issue in
the light of the Navy’s recently promulgated maritime strategy document as well
as the evolving strategic and technological landscape. Rubel suggests that we
have entered a period of transition from the carrier-centric navy of World War II
and the Cold War to a new era of more distributed and diversified naval platforms, critically supported by a new global command-and-control architecture.
But the Navy’s ability to operate effectively in the world of today and tomorrow will depend not only on its platforms and weaponry. The conflicts in which
this country has been continuously engaged for over seven years have demonstrated the importance of cultivating a generation of naval officers fully proficient in joint, interagency, and combined operations; further, the Navy’s new
maritime strategy has emphasized the vital role of international security cooperation at sea. In the view of Admiral James Stavridis, currently commander of
the U.S. Southern Command, and Captain Mark Hagerott of the U.S. Naval
Academy, the emerging requirements levied on naval officers call for a broad rethinking of the system of officer education, assignment, and promotion. In their
article “The Heart of an Officer: Joint, Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career Development,” Stavridis and Hagerott argue that it is
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time to move beyond the current model of a single line-officer career toward a
more diversified model that makes greater room for the preparation demanded
by these new operational requirements.
“Gunboats for China’s New ‘Grand Canals’? Probing the Intersection of
Beijing’s Naval and Oil Security Policies” is the latest contribution of the Naval
War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute to understanding evolving
Chinese views concerning naval and maritime security. Professors Andrew
Erickson and Lyle Goldstein examine the geostrategic context for China’s current oil security–related actions and the role of oil in China’s recent turn to the
sea; analyze Chinese perceptions of the roles of China’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and potential threats to them; explore the implications of a more
assertive Chinese naval presence driven by oil-security concerns; and examine
Chinese arguments in favor of international SLOC security cooperation. They
find reason to conclude that cooperation may triumph over the possibility of
conflict, given the common interests the Chinese share with the United States
and other maritime powers. This has been starkly demonstrated in recent weeks
as China has—for the first time—deployed naval forces in distant waters, to help
counter the growing threat of piracy off the coasts of Somalia.
Two historical pieces round out this issue. In his “The Naval Battle of Paris,”
Professor Jerry W. Jones tells the little-known story of the contentious diplomacy between representatives of the United States (including President
Woodrow Wilson himself) and Great Britain over naval and maritime issues at
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. This is an instructive example of how differing national perspectives on naval power, if not sensitively managed, can jeopardize relationships even among close allies, and it underscores the need to keep
such perspectives firmly in mind today as we seek to build an expanded regime
of maritime security cooperation in the face of current global challenges. Finally, in a look at some of our own institutional history, Professor Scott A.
Boorman revisits the thought of Henry D. Eccles, a distinguished naval officer in
the Pacific War who left a strong imprint on the Naval War College through his
incisive views on strategy and, especially, the importance of logistics to naval
warfare.
OUR NEWEST NEWPORT PAPERS
Newport Paper 32, Major Naval Operations, by Milan Vego, of the Naval War
College’s Joint Military Operations faculty, is available both in print and on our
website. Professor Vego has published widely on the history of German and Soviet
military doctrine; he is also the author of Operational Art, an authoritative textbook. This new work looks back to the richly instructive experience of the U.S.
Navy in World War II (as well as in more recent operations during the Korean
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1
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5

and Vietnam wars and in the Persian Gulf) to develop a taxonomy of naval operational art that can help inform the thinking of the Navy as a whole today.
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents, edited by John B.
Hattendorf (the College’s Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History) and
Peter M. Swartz (of CNA), is also available, both in print and on our website; it is
Newport Paper 33. It is the latest in the series wherein Professor Hattendorf has
collected and annotated the U.S. Navy’s key strategic documents of recent decades. The series also includes, to date, Newport Papers 27 (the 1990s) and 30
(the 1970s); Newport Paper 19 collected writings relating specifically to the
Maritime Strategy of 1986.
OUR WEBSITE AND E-MAIL ADDRESSES
In fall 2008 the Naval War College was granted permission to transfer from the
“mil” electronic domain to the “edu.” That change has now been implemented,
with immediate and beneficial effects. For the Press, the practical impact is in
electronic addresses—see page ii for our new website and staff contact addresses
(the old “mil” addresses will continue to work, indefinitely). The change is by no
means cosmetic: for instance, it puts the College in a close and potentially fruitful electronic relationship with major northeastern civilian universities. For the
Press, release from the security and space constraints of the “mil” domain has
made our website dramatically more accessible than it was in the last two years
and now allows us to post articles individually once again. The site (in fact, the
College’s entire Web presence) is in transition, but we’re optimistic that it will be
a convenient and useful resource for readers, students, and researchers.

RECEIVING THE REVIEW
The journal can be mailed to any address convenient to you, whether office
or home. The editors sometimes hear of structural difficulties or delays in
delivering mail to an address we’ve been given. If changing to a home address
or to an office address, as the case may be, would help, please let our circulation manager know.
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Rear Admiral James “Phil” Wisecup became the
fifty-second President of the U.S. Naval War College on
November 2008. He most recently served as Commander, Carrier Strike Group 7 (Ronald Reagan Strike
Group), returning from deployment in October 2008.
A 1977 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Rear
Admiral Wisecup earned his master’s degree in international relations from the University of Southern California, graduated from the Naval War College in 1998,
and also earned a degree from the University of Strasbourg,
France, as an Olmsted Scholar, in 1982.
At sea, he served as executive officer of USS Valley Forge
(CG 50) during Operation DESERT STORM. As Commanding Officer, USS Callaghan (DDG 994), he was
awarded the Vice Admiral James Stockdale Award for
Inspirational Leadership. He served as Commander,
Destroyer Squadron 21 during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM after 9/11.
Ashore, he was assigned to NATO Headquarters in
Brussels, Belgium; served as Force Planner and Ship
Scheduler for Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces,
Pacific; and served as action officer for Navy Headquarters Plans/Policy Staff. He served as a fellow on the Chief
of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group; as Director, White House Situation Room; and as Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces Korea.
Rear Admiral Wisecup’s awards include the Defense
Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star,
and various unit, service, and campaign awards.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

Challenge!

in the pages of the Review as the
fifty-second President of the Naval War College, and I’m writing
this at the ninetieth day of my service to this fine institution, so I intend to keep
this brief and simply devote my remarks to the personal sense of mission and
commitment I bring to this challenging new position.
Each of the professional military education schools has a purpose and a relationship with its parent service and officer corps. Some focus on producing capable staff officers, others on creating effective advocates for their services’
capabilities. The Naval War College has—historically—been a catalyst for new
thinking within the Navy. Its ability to perform this role today is absolutely vital.
No great institution can afford to become static. In an era of growing responsibilities and diminishing resources, I consider it imperative for the Naval War
College to be a dynamic, responsive, innovative center of creative scholarship
1
and thought. If this sounds familiar, it was Admiral Stansfield Turner’s opening
paragraph to his first column (in a department that later became the “President’s Forum”) in the fall of 1972, which has certainly stood the test of time and
provides a pretty good “true north” for the compass of the Naval War College.
When he wrote these words, there were 188 students in the College of Naval
Warfare (Senior Course) and 232 in the College of Command and Staff (Junior
Course), as well as forty-six international officers, representing thirty-five navies—a total of 466 students. There are today 609 students on campus, which includes eighty international officers from forty-eight different countries, and
there are many more in our extensive fleet seminars and distance education
programs.
THIS IS MY FIRST APPEARANCE
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In 1972 family housing had just been built on Fort Adams, and Spruance Hall
was nearing completion. The student body that year was hand selected, rigorously screened, and smaller than normal. Most important, Admiral Turner
made radical improvements in the curriculum, based on his experience at Oxford. In fact, this change, with its emphasis on academic freedom and, above all,
excellence in scholarship, placed high demands on the faculty and students. He
told the students that “if you are inclined to shy away from a challenge, you are
not the kind of officer we want here.” Admiral Turner also said that these
changes actually represented a “return to our great traditions.” He was right on
both counts.
If you look at the early days of the Naval War College and the rising U.S. Navy
of the early twentieth century, you will find that some of our greatest officers
were also prolific writers. Not content to stand on the sidelines, some—like Alfred Thayer Mahan—made significant contributions to the analysis of naval history and advanced the strategic thinking of the day. There were also the tactical
and operational studies of men like William Sims, Raymond Spruance, and Kelly
2
Turner. These men were no courtiers—for example, Bradley Fiske’s writings
about vulnerabilities of the battleship years before Pearl Harbor was to cost him
eventually; their common thread was a deep sense of integrity, purpose, and caring about their navy and their country, placing these considerations above their
personal prospects.
We are well into the twenty-first century now and are fast approaching the
125th anniversary of the Naval War College. The tapestry of issues arrayed before us is vast and complex, and all the questions are hard ones, with no “school
solutions.” It’s now about how adaptable we are and how much brainpower we
can bring to bear on behalf of the Navy and the nation, here at the U.S. Navy’s
“home of thought.”
Think about some of the challenges facing a new U.S. administration and the
U.S. Navy. In no particular order, off the top of my head: the Arctic, piracy, levels
of warfare, future naval forces, naval warfare, the global economic slump, environmental and energy security and open sea lines of communication, joint and
interagency issues, avian flu, officer career development, significant domestic
and international legal issues, regional tensions (and in some cases open conflict), command and control, cyber issues, the changing character of war, diplomacy, ballistic-missile defense, terrorism, nuclear deterrence, and proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction—all on top of two wars in progress. This list
sounds exactly like the kinds of challenges the Naval War College is designed for,
and for which it stands ready to prepare its students and future leaders to tackle.
3
The leadership of the Navy and the nation awaits your recommendations.
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This issue of the Naval War College Review deals with some of these issues,
and I would like to thank the authors for their timely contributions.
Every generation thinks its situation is unique and that its problems are the
most insurmountable; ours is probably no exception. That said, the dizzying
speed with which information flows around the world today gives a sense of acceleration of change, and our ability as leaders to cut through the chaff to the really important issues becomes more and more critical, and more difficult. What
the teaching and research faculty do here in Newport is serious scholarship—but not for its own sake. They are working to stay ahead of the trends, anticipating the nation’s concerns, and providing a context to our students (and,
we hope, to the Navy and the nation for issues like these)—as well as the tools for
analyzing and critically thinking about them. So it is time to roll up your sleeves
and get at it. If anyone thinks that we have it especially difficult now, take a look
at life in the fourteenth century—I recommend Barbara Tuchman’s A Distant
Mirror.4
Soon, many members of our senior class will most likely be thrust into major
staff positions and forced to analyze these complex issues and provide recommendations to people in a position actually to do something about them. The
War College is a place where officers can come to think deeply about the issues of
the day. The College provides in Newport a unique opportunity to read broadly,
to ask questions of expert faculty, nationally known guest speakers, and officers
just returning from combat in your seminars; to listen to the views of officers
from many countries; and also to take some time looking out the window on the
Narragansett Bay to think about all of this—then write. In plain English. I promised the CNO when I took charge here that we would try to help the Navy speak
the truth to itself. This is my challenge to the naval officers in the student body. I
have urged them to just do it.
Shortly after my arrival here, someone asked me how many of our students
have what it would have taken to carry on a serious strategic conversation with
Ernest King or Chester Nimitz. I told them I was too new here to know but that
I would make it my business to find out—and there is not a moment to
lose. I hope that our students will let me know when they feel ready for that
assignment.

JAMES P. WISECUP

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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NOTES

1. Stansfield Turner, “Challenge!” Naval War
College Review 25, no. 1 (September–October
1972), pp. 1–2.
2. William Sims won the Pulitzer Prize for his
book Victory in Europe, an account of his operations in the First World War. He had previously published frequently in the U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, but most interesting was a pamphlet entitled The Practical
Nature of the Naval War College, which he
published in 1912 and distributed to all
officers in the U.S. Navy at his own expense
—you can read it online at www.usnwc.edu/
about/documents/SimsDoc.pdf. Rear Adm.
Albert Gleaves, for example, was the biographer of James Lawrence as well as of Stephen

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

Luce, among other books. Commodore William Ledyard Rogers (President, Naval War
College, 1911–13) was the recognized historian of ancient naval warfare under oars.
3. I would commend to your reading two articles: first, Secretary Gates’s article “A Balanced Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1
(January/February 2009); and Dr. Patrick
Cronin (of National Defense University),
“Barack Obama Faces 8 Global National Security Challenges,” U.S. News & World Report, 15 December 2008.
4. Barbara W. Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The
Calamitous 14th Century (New York: Ballantine Books, 1978).
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Professor Rubel is Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the
Naval War College. Before retiring from the U.S. Navy
in the grade of captain, he was an aviator, participating in operations connected with the 1973 Yom
Kippur War, the 1980 Iranian hostage crisis, and
DESERT SHIELD. He commanded Strike Fighter Squadron 131 and served as the inspector general of U.S.
Southern Command. He attended the Spanish Naval
War College and the U.S. Naval War College, where he
served on the faculty and as chairman of the War Gaming Department, in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, before his present appointment. He has a BS degree
from the University of Illinois, an MS in management
from Salve Regina University in Newport, Rhode Island, and an MA in national security and strategic
studies from the Naval War College (1986).
Naval War College Review, Spring 2009, Vol. 62, No. 2
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THE NAVY’S CHANGING FORCE PARADIGM
Robert C. Rubel

T

he recently issued Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower reflects an
institutional response to America’s changed strategic circumstances and
embodies a logic that suggests a significant change to the Navy’s force structure
1
paradigm. However, because the document is broadly worded, the service still
has a lot of work to do to achieve an internal consensus on the implications of
this logic for its future force structure. There is considerable intellectual “churn”
associated with this shift, and the Navy has yet to come fully to grips with its implications for force structure. This article will attempt to describe the broad outlines of the paradigm shift and assess some of the programmatic implications,
including the need for additional numbers of general-purpose surface
combatants.
A naval force paradigm is a theory of how various types of ships and weapons
available to a navy should be organized for warfare. The paradigm is governed by
the characteristics of the principal naval weapons of the day and by the maritime
strategy a nation pursues. In this nation’s early days, the principal weapon was
the naval cannon, which could hurl a twenty-four-pound shot about half a mile
with effectiveness. The strategy of early administrations not to be drawn into
European wars, coupled with their determination to protect American
merchant shipping, produced a force paradigm of a small fleet of highly capable
frigates, operating independently or in small squadrons. At the dawn of the twentieth century, as the United States elected to widen its strategic perspective and become a player on the world stage, its force paradigm shifted to a battleship-centric
fleet, reflecting the governing weapon of the day, the large-caliber naval gun.
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With the advent of the airplane and the impetus of the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, the battle-line paradigm shifted to one of circular formations centered
on fast aircraft carriers. In all of these paradigms there was a central ship type
that supported the principal weapon. Other ship types supported the central
type or performed such collateral, systemic duties as convoy escort, amphibious
operations, or minesweeping. As the Navy built budgets for submission to Congress, each type of ship, as well as its characteristics and numbers, could be justified based on its role in the existing force paradigm.
Of late, the Navy has come under fire from Congress and various pundits and
think tanks for its inability to provide adequate justification for the proposed
“DDG-1000” advanced destroyer, as well as for its decision to cut production of
that type to three ships. Much blame is laid at the feet of current Navy leadership,
especially as this issue is regarded as symptomatic of a larger problem with the
service’s shipbuilding plans. The call for a 313-ship navy by the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), Admiral Gary Roughead, is regarded in some quarters as
unaffordable and in others as based upon a number, be it too high or too low,
that is supported by insufficient analysis. Part of the Navy’s current difficulty
with programmatics may indeed be institutional and procedural, consisting, in
various degrees, of failures in concept development, cost estimation, and program management. However, the perceived credibility problem also stems from
the fact that the Navy is in the initial stages of a fundamental naval force paradigm shift, one with implications for force structure that are not unlike the shift
from a battleship-centric force to an aircraft carrier–centric force. Today, the increasing effectiveness of antiship missiles, along with the increasing lethality of
antiaircraft defenses, is about to make necessary a shift from a force centered
on “big deck” aviation platforms to one that is more distributed and oriented
around missile-firing platforms—most prominently, submarines and surface
combatants. In the process, the Navy will shift from a force paradigm it adopted
in 1942 and has employed in a refined version since the end of the Cold War.
THE “. . . FROM THE SEA” ERA
In September 1992 the Navy issued “. . . From the Sea,” a white paper that responded to the radical alteration in global strategic conditions caused by the
2
collapse of the Soviet Union. With its only competition on the high seas gone,
the U.S. Navy faced the prospect of losing its justification for being. As Samuel
Huntington pointed out in 1954, a military service requires a viable strategic
concept in order to generate the public support needed to secure funding for
3
it. “. . . From the Sea” represented that new concept: the Navy and Marine
Corps would focus on projecting power ashore in support of joint operations.
In a post–Soviet navy era, the United States was left as sovereign of the seas,
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and its navy, as the white paper asserted, “can afford to deemphasize some ef4
forts in some naval warfare areas.”
The area that was deemphasized was sea control. Gradually, over the course of
the next fifteen years, the Navy structured itself in alignment with the logic em5
bedded in “. . . From the Sea” and its two successors. However, this realignment
was rather easy, as the forces in existence at that time, especially the Navy’s aircraft carrier and amphibious forces, were, by and large, suitable for the execution of joint warfare in an uncontested littoral. The force drawdown of the 1990s
consisted mostly of disposing of various classes of sea control–focused surface
combatants; the force settled upon a set of carrier strike groups (CSGs) and expeditionary strike groups (ESGs), oriented around big-deck aviation platforms.
The transition was made all the easier because the Navy’s dominant community
at the time, carrier-based aviation, remained at the center of the new paradigm.
During the succeeding fifteen years, nearly to the present, the Navy could
concentrate geographically as well as functionally. Deployments gradually narrowed to two focal areas, the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, where “rogue
states” might commit conventional aggression against U.S. allies. The lack of serious naval threat and the emergence of precision-strike munitions in time allowed the Navy and Marine Corps to establish the idea of a “sea base” (a concept
that has since been raised to a quasi-paradigm status), whereby American operations ashore in hostile or undeveloped areas would be supported from the sea,
without the need for much infrastructure on land. Perhaps the apotheosis of
this concept was Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, whose initial phase was supported almost entirely by a naval task force some seven hundred miles from the
landlocked scene of operations in Afghanistan. Starting in the late 1990s,
advocates of network-centric warfare (NCW) added momentum to the Navy’s littoral focus by claims that dispersed, networked forces could generate higher levels
of combat effectiveness with smaller, cheaper platforms. Vice Admiral Arthur K.
Cebrowski, a key oracle of NCW, promoted “Streetfighter,” a small, fast, networked ship that eventually emerged as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This was
only part of the transformation. DDG-1000, starting life conceptually as an “arsenal ship,” was to be a survivable platform, mounting a high-tech gun, that would
provide significant naval gunfire support to forces deep inland. As “The Navy Operational Concept: Forward . . . From the Sea” said in 1997: “We will be able to deliver a large volume of firepower through new ways of achieving very high aircraft
6
sortie rates and new weapons and platforms for delivering joint fires.”
However, even as the Navy adopted this new force paradigm and aligned itself
institutionally to focus on joint warfare in the littorals, factors were emerging—technological, economic, and political—that would eventually force it to
reconsider. Among the factors most relevant for the present discussion were the
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progressive development and proliferation of ballistic-missile technology, potentially including antiship capability; the ability of American cruisers and destroyers to conduct midcourse intercept of some kinds of ballistic missiles; the
emergence of China as an economic power and its construction of a capable
navy; the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and their downstream effects; and the resurgence of an economically viable and potentially hostile Russia. As these factors
progressively manifested themselves, Navy admirals became increasingly uncomfortable with their service’s institutional vector. This discomfort culminated in 2006 with then-CNO Michael Mullen’s call for the development of a
new maritime strategy. When it appeared in October 2007, the new strategy,
while perhaps overly terse and virtually silent on the particulars of force design,
contained a new logic that ran counter to the force paradigm set by the “. . . From
the Sea” series of white papers.
The new strategy calls for “combat credible” forces (to be concentrated in Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf regions), “globally distributed, mission-tailored
forces,” and a global maritime-security network—all welded together to prevent
or limit regional conflict, render disaster relief, and provide other services necessary to foster and defend commerce and security. Viewed in the context of
emerging blue-water navies, terrorists bent on smuggling weapons of mass destruction into the United States and allied nations, increasing exploitation of
ocean resources, and interregional ballistic-missile threats, this new strategy
strongly suggests a navy very unlike the one that has emerged since the Cold
War.
A NEW FORCE PARADIGM
It is, therefore, as a result of a changed strategic environment and a new but
broadly worded strategy that the Navy is now attempting to accommodate a fundamental force-paradigm shift. In the past, years and much experimentation
with ship types have been required to make the transition. There have been blind
alleys. Whether battle cruisers or small aircraft carriers, these blind alleys were
functions of conceptual uncertainty as to what the new governing weapon
would be. That same uncertainty exists today; the Navy is struggling to find ways
to make its current force more secure against missile and submarine attacks
while at the same time its analyses are finding that a different approach may be
necessary. In order to make sense of what is occurring and to develop a level of
institutional confidence in its new direction, the Navy has reinstituted “Title X”
war gaming, an arena it abandoned in 2001, and has developed a new strategic
7
planning process meant to provide guidance to programmatic processes.
As has been the case for the past 120-plus years, the service has turned to its
war college to help think through the problem. Studies conducted at the Naval
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War College in Newport, Rhode Island, over the past few years have concluded
that the combination of emergent weapons technology, political realignments,
and economic trends points to a fleet that should possess different characteristics from the one in the water today—different even from some planned designs,
like DDG-1000. These studies suggest that Navy forces should adopt a different
style of war fighting, one that is more dispersed and flowing, not oriented to defensive bastions around sea bases of CSGs or ESGs. Moreover, the access-denial
problem is fundamentally different in the Persian Gulf from what it is in
Northeast Asia, suggesting that the Navy should tailor its force by region and
mission area. Further, studies suggest, the Navy does not necessarily need to design every ship for integration into a battle group. These findings are based, in
some cases, on more than five years of continuous, iterative, and highly detailed
war gaming, but even so they are still preliminary and must be subjected to
additional gaming and analysis.
One kind of force paradigm that can be inferred from the results of these
studies is a navy that consists of four principal segments. The first segment, an
“access generation” force, would focus on employing missiles. The targets for
these missiles would principally be opposing access-denial forces, whether ships,
submarines, aircraft, or ballistic-missile sites on the shore. Given the difficulty
of defending against modern missiles, this force would adopt a highly dispersed
and covert posture in order to prevent the enemy from targeting it and to maintain combat credibility even in the most difficult crisis and brink-of-war situations. The exact constitution and operational doctrine of this force would be
different in Northeast Asia from what it would in the Persian Gulf, due to the
fundamentally different natures of the opposing forces and the maritime terrains. Generally speaking, this force would be centered on submarines, especially the converted Ohio-class SSGNs (formerly SSBNs) and surface ships such
as the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) class of guided-missile destroyers and the Littoral
Combat Ship. The key will be generating targeting data for the missiles these
platforms carry, but that is a better combat problem to have to solve than the defense of a carrier battle group.
Currently, the Navy relies on carrier-based strike fighter aircraft to perform
the bulk of its sea-control and power-projection missions. The Chinese and others understand this and are working on ways to neutralize U.S. carriers and their
embarked tactical aviation. To date, the Navy’s response has been to focus on developing better defenses for carriers against submarines and cruise missiles.
Such an approach, while logical and understandable, has always been problematic. History has shown that tactical defense is the most disadvantageous type of
sea fight. If the Chinese are able to perfect an antiship ballistic missile, the problem could get worse. One solution is to disperse striking power among greater
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numbers of platforms that are hard to find and hit. The SSGN, with its ability to
house 155 strike missiles, is a promising candidate. A strategy employing a
“grid” populated with DDGs, submarines, and LCSs and using advanced missiles for both sea control and land attack might negate and neutralize investments in carrier-killing systems. Such an approach would make an overall naval
operation more robust, as there would be no key ship type, the loss of one or two
of which would unhinge the overall operation. Such an approach would also increase opportunities for deception, instilling doubt in the minds of potential
opponents. This would be especially valuable in crisis situations. Concentrated
and vulnerable naval forces can quickly turn into political liabilities, removing
instead of adding to options. A hard-to-target force packing lethal missiles
would be much more likely to provide the necessary deterrence and influence.
The second force segment would be the “power projection” force, which
would look much like what the Navy has today: CSGs and ESGs centered on
big-deck aviation ships. However, instead of being the ubiquitous arbiter of
naval power they are today, they would become a specialized role-playing
force, not unlike the U.S. Seventh Fleet in World War II, which in effect constituted General Douglas MacArthur’s “sea base” in his campaign up the
Solomons and New Guinea toward the Philippines. That force was capable of
anything but confronting the main Japanese fleet. The new power-projection
force would generally operate in permissive environments but could support
the access-generation force in certain instances.
The third force segment would be the “maritime security” force. Frequently
supported by elements of the first two segments, this force would have specialized units conduct patrols for terrorists and criminals and help to catalyze a
global maritime security partnership through extensive engagement. Other
units, such as hospital ships, high-speed vessels, and others, would conduct systematic operations to establish a stable political and economic environment
throughout the oceans and in the littorals. A recent Global War Game at the Naval War College that involved international naval officers as players revealed that
our potential partner navies, especially those in Africa, regard any kind of
grey-hulled ship as threatening. Therefore, new (and cheaper) types of vessels
should be considered for global maritime partnership missions. Another insight
gained from that game was that a broad cross section of international navies
consider their principal mission to be law enforcement. This might seem a U.S.
Coast Guard function, but because of severe limitations on the Coast Guard’s
size and because these partner services are navies as such, with defense missions
in addition to law enforcement responsibilities, the U.S. Navy will have to find ways
to engage in this arena. Therefore, this force segment is as much characterized by the
sailors who man it as by the nature of its platforms.
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The fourth force segment would be the series of maritime operations centers
(MOCs) that is now being established around the world. These centers represent
a force element in themselves, not simply command-and-control “overhead”
for afloat forces; they will carry out various kinds of information operations
that are critical to maritime security, power projection, and the screening of
access-generation forces. In today’s networked and media-saturated world,
information is a weapon, much more than it was in the past. Obtaining and denying information are central operational capabilities, as is the ability to process
and assess the meaning and significance of the avalanche of information available to naval forces. It is no longer sufficient for naval staffs to generate plans and
issue orders; they must function as information clearinghouses and as operational units in their own rights. As an indication of this changing warfare environment, the Navy is contemplating embedding task force commanders within
the MOC and standardizing its task force structure on a global basis to make
networked and interconnected staff operations more coherent. Another indication is the establishment of a maritime staff operators’ course to train the personnel who will operate the MOCs.
CALCULATING FORCE SIZE
Traditionally, the overall size of the Navy has been determined principally by
calculating the forces needed to fight the major theater wars that could most
likely occur (Iraq, Iran, Korea, etc.), with some additional forces for “presence.” Multipliers for maintenance and training cycles were added to arrive at
the total force. However, this force is focused on the Middle East and East Asia.
Its ability to generate engagement, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief
as well as ballistic-missile defense in other areas is marginal. However, the new
maritime strategy is supposed to provide for the defense of global commerce
and security on a continuous basis. Therefore, force-size calculations must now
shift to a different basis. Some writers have discussed “high/low” mixes and different “modes.” Under the new force paradigm, some traditional ship types,
such as amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, will be employed at various times
in operations undertaken by the access-generation and maritime-security elements. Thus it is neither accurate nor useful to talk about high- and low-end operations. The real question in terms of programmatics under the new paradigm
will be how much capacity is needed in each element of the force. To use an old
paradigm as an easy example, the Navy would not have wanted to overspend on
battleships if it was to be able to buy enough cruisers and destroyers necessary
for screening the battleships, let alone the logistic forces necessary for the fleet’s
successful forward operation. Moreover, there would have been a point of diminishing returns at which the incremental naval power generated by the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009

25

20

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 2, Art. 1

next new battleship would not be worth its marginal cost. In this new paradigm, a careful calculation must be made of how much access-generation,
power-projection, missile-defense, engagement, and disaster-relief capacity
is needed worldwide. Clearly, the traditional major combat scenarios (major
combat operations, or MCOs) will figure in the calculation of access-generation
forces, but the Navy will have to establish a defendable criterion for force sizing
outside this framework if the new force paradigm is to be achieved.
The new maritime strategy contains potentially useful logic for capacity calculations, even if that logic is as much implicit as articulated. The fundamental
premise is that defense of the global system under current strategic conditions depends more than ever on the collective and cooperative action of nations and their
navies. In order to catalyze and capitalize on this cooperation, the Navy must have
at its disposal certain capabilities—such as ballistic-missile defense, disaster relief,
and partner capacity building—in all regions of the world. Each region’s exact requirements would be a bit different from those of the others, but the steady-state
peacetime defense scenario in each would be treated like an MCO for force planning purposes. If we assume that a transformed access-generation force will require fewer power-projection capabilities for MCO purposes, trade-offs can be
made that would shape the force without much, if any, total growth in the overall
tonnage, or at least overall cost, of the U.S. Navy.
To some this may sound like the Navy would be blunting its sword, but in an
age of antiship missiles and advanced surface-to-air missiles, its current principal ship type, the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, and its principal weapon, the tactical strike fighter, may not constitute as sharp an edge as they used to. The cost
of keeping this ship type viable as an access-generation tool is probably all out of
proportion to investments by others in threatening it. Recognizing the shift to
the missile age is as difficult today for some officers as many officers in the 1930s
found it to recognize that the airplane had superseded the large-caliber gun. But
the last thing the Navy or the nation needs is a naval defeat like Pearl Harbor or
the sinking of HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales in 1941 to bring home the lesson
that times have changed.
THE CENTRALITY OF DDG 51
One potential connecting link among the elements of the new force paradigm
is the guided-missile destroyer. There are a number of reasons why the future
Navy should be populated with a relatively large number of these warships. First,
neutralizing ballistic missiles, whether they are aimed at shore or sea targets, is a
critical function worldwide. This notion is supported by increasing Navy component commanders’ calls for the stationing of ships with this capability in areas
outside normal naval-presence hubs. Since sea-based ballistic-missile defense is
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a proven capability, the Navy should procure enough ships that can do it, not only to
defend and support CSGs and ESGs but also to establish a viable ballistic-missile
defense posture in virtually every region of the world. The key is to have enough of
them to provide theater commanders flexibility in responding to emergent situations, including timeliness of response. For various tactical and technical reasons,
they should operate in this role in pairs. Arleigh Burke guided-missile destroyers
are also useful for signaling and other forms of naval diplomacy, as recently illustrated by the dispatch of USS McFaul (DDG 74) to deliver humanitarian supplies to Georgia. The logic of the move, as delineated by a Stratfor.com analyst,
reveals the utility of the ship type:
It is interesting, therefore, that a U.S. warship delivered humanitarian supplies to the
Georgians. The ship did not use the port of Poti, which the Russians have effectively
blocked, but Batumi, to the south. That the ship was a destroyer is important. It
demonstrates that the Americans have a force available that is inherently superior to
anything the Russians have: the U.S. Navy. A Navy deployment in the Black Sea
could well be an effective counter, threatening Russian sea lanes.
While it was a warship, however, it was only a destroyer—so it is a gesture, but not a
threat.8

One of the key aspects of U.S. maritime strategy since the end of the Second
World War has been the maintenance of naval forces forward, so as to keep them
available to support American interests quickly. Timeliness of response has been
a factor in a number of situations, ranging from the invasion of South Korea by
the North in 1950 to the arrival of aircraft carriers in the Red Sea and the northern Arabian Sea in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Significant
lag times in arrival of naval forces can lead potential aggressors to think in terms
9
of a “window of opportunity.” There is evidence that in 1982 the Argentine
junta made its final decision for invasion of the Falklands on the basis of a report
that the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror had just been dispatched
from the Mediterranean to the South Atlantic. Once it arrived, the junta felt,
nothing would be possible; therefore, it calculated, the interval between the
ship’s departure and its estimated arrival on the scene represented a window of
10
opportunity, one that could not be wasted. This logic suggests that U.S. naval
forces be positioned such that no potential aggressor can perceive an operationally useful interim before they can be on station. This kind of responsiveness defines the necessary capacity—that is, the numbers of ships—the Navy should
possess. Given the ship-by-ship superiority of U.S. Navy forces over their potential opponents, be they sea or shore based, the United States does not need to dispatch a fleet or battle group; in many cases a small, tailored squadron, even a
single DDG 51, would suffice.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009

27

22

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 2, Art. 1

In today’s world, inherently peaceful operations like humanitarian assistance may be threatened by cruise missiles. The fact that Hezbollah was able
to surprise and hit an Israeli patrol boat with an Iranian-provided C802
coastal-defense cruise missile should be a warning flare to all nations with navies that such weapons can be obtained by nonstate actors and secretly positioned almost anywhere. Thus, nonmilitary or auxiliary ships sent for peace
operations may require missile-defense escorts, at least until the security of the
operations area can be assured.
Assuming that the capabilities of DDGs would be useful enough in every
region for theater commanders to want at least two continuously available,
and also that most cruisers would be assigned to group defense, a minimum
of seventy-five DDGs would be needed for battle-group support, ballisticmissile defense, and independent missions. The Navy has programmed
sixty-two; a force growth of thirteen would be feasible. However, the total number needed may grow even more if the Navy adopts the new force paradigm outlined above in order to overcome the increasingly formidable antiaccess force
the Chinese are building.
The general tone of thinking laid out in this article has, in part, I believe,
caused senior Navy officers to revise their positions on DDG-1000 and the DDG
51 class. This sea change in the Navy indicates the early stages of a paradigm shift
away from a force centered on big-deck aviation platforms. Although assault
ships (LHDs) and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) will continue to
constitute a critical power-projection capability for the United States into the
foreseeable future, the Navy will increasingly shift to dispersed but integrated
surface and subsurface operations to constitute the credible combat power
required by its new maritime strategy.
CNO has justified DDG-1000 as a technology demonstrator, and this corresponds well with the decision to build only three of them. Despite the current
advantages of Arleigh Burke in system configuration and cost, and its projected
utility, it is still a gas-turbine-powered destroyer that employs chemical-based
weapons. As the technologies of rail guns, electromagnetic-discharge defenses,
and electric drive develop, there will come a time when a new class of vessel is
needed to take full advantage of them. DDG-1000s will provide the Navy and defense industry with valuable education in how to take some of these technologies to sea. In the meantime, the Burke class and the LCS will help make the
paradigm shift for the U.S. Navy.
FIGHTING FOR INFORMATION
The new naval force paradigm will also feature a doctrine of fighting first for information. Not only must it be able to overcome opposition to get information
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(that is, to conduct “opposed ISR”),* but it must be able to fight to deny information to the enemy. Future sea fights for information will not be localized (the
Chinese doctrine of “localized and limited wars under informatized conditions”
holds that although the direct combat space of wars will be limited, the “related
war space” will be expanded), and they will begin well before any overt outbreak
11
of traditional hostilities. The protective covertness that surface fleets have traditionally enjoyed is being threatened by new combinational arrays of ISR technologies including satellites, unmanned systems, over-the-horizon radars, the
Internet, etc. The reach of these systems and networks will be global, so the information fight will be global, even if the “kinetic arena” is geographically constrained. An indicator that the Navy is starting to understand this can be seen in
its initiative, mentioned above, to establish a network of interconnected maritime operations centers that will be capable of coordinating the information
fight on a global scale. Under the new force paradigm, the MOCs will be a
“screen” for naval forces. Given the immense advantages in range and endurance
of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), it is quite possible that aircraft carriers also
will be part of the protective screen for distributed surface and subsurface forces,
launching from safe distances arrays of UAVs that will scout, relay, deceive, and
even strike to help the subsurface and surface grid deliver its killing missile
power.
The information fight will affect all three elements of the new naval force. Beyond its effects on the access-generation force as just discussed, the information
fight is central to global maritime security. Maritime forces around the globe,
from all nations, must have information on what and who is out there—on, over,
and under the seas—in order to prevent terrorism, drug running, human trafficking, and poaching. Although current efforts are encountering political obstacles, eventually a global maritime picture will emerge. Here again, the
centrality of the Navy maritime operations centers becomes evident as they become clearinghouses for maritime situational awareness. When functioning as
staffs for joint force maritime component commanders, the MOCs will play a
key role in the information fight associated with joint power projection. Thus
the MOC represents a distinct element in the new naval force paradigm.
The new force paradigm described here is not a technological fantasy. It is
most fundamentally a conceptual shift, one that will be useful in steering experimentation and investment along more affordable, and ultimately more useful,
lines. We have in place a maritime strategy that can be used to establish a defensible basis for force-capacity calculations. The Navy has at its disposal, as it did in
* ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
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1992, forces that can be readily adapted to the new paradigm, and it has already
begun changing its command-and-control structure to accommodate the full
range of operations called for in the new strategy. What remains is for the Navy
to make the intellectual and emotional shifts to the new force paradigm.
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executive assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and the
senior military assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Admiral Stavridis earned in 1984 a doctorate in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is also a distinguished graduate of both the National and Naval war
colleges. He is author or coauthor of several books on
naval ship handling and leadership, including Command at Sea and Destroyer Captain.
Captain Mark Hagerott, a Surface Warfare Officer,
served on five ships and in multiple fleet and Pentagon
staffs. He served in the U.S. Department of Justice as a
White House fellow and as a military assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense. He commanded USS
Kauffman (FFG 59) from 2001 to 2003 and is a naval
nuclear engineer. He attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and earned degrees from the U.S.
Naval Academy, the University of Maryland, and Oxford University, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar.
He holds a PhD in the field of science, technology, and
military history. He is a military professor on the faculty
of the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.
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THE HEART OF AN OFFICER
Joint, Interagency, and International Operations and Navy
Career Development
Admiral James Stavridis, U.S. Navy, and
Captain Mark Hagerott, U.S. Navy

T

he attacks of 9/11 and the continuing conflicts with terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world stand as stark evidence that military commanders today face a changing world and an emerging set of challenges. Beyond
the conflicts with extremist organizations, the broad security challenges of the
twenty-first century are far more diverse—from counternarcotics to cyber warfare—all of which will unfold in an unforgiving 24/7 global news cycle. Because
the extant challenges are transnational and nontraditional, the joint commander of today needs to be able to integrate the efforts of a wider and more disparate set of organizations than ever before—from national intelligence services
to charitable giving organizations.
To develop this integrative capacity, the commander must be more knowledgeable in joint, interagency, and international operations. Additionally, in this
age of globalization, an effective joint commander must be especially adept at
strategic communications and ideally speaks at least one foreign language.
Producing such leaders with the requisite skills in the joint, interagency, and
international arenas, however, will not be easy. Within the U.S. Navy, the
segment of the officer corps responsible for mastering such duties—the Unrestricted Line community—is already, through sheer task saturation, approaching the limits of what current career patterns permit. Today, line officers must
master platform operational skills, develop expertise in technical fields, and gain
at least a nascent knowledge of joint operations.
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If Navy line officers are expected to develop greater expertise in joint, interagency, and international operations, to include strategic communications and
ideally skill in a foreign language, something in the career path must give. In
light of the new requirements levied on today’s commanders, it may be time for
the Navy to reevaluate how it educates, assigns, selects, and promotes future
leaders. A reevaluation of the officer education, assignment, and promotion
system—from “midshipman to admiral”—is in order.
THE NEED
As 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq fade from our immediate memory, the
deeper meaning of these events is coming into better focus. It appears that the
nature and range of war and conflict has changed: it has become broader and
even more complex. Older modes of war have not been dis-invented, but new
modes are upon us. In scenarios now deemed the most likely to face our nation,
our forces will operate in different ways and places: what has been termed “irregular warfare” is on the rise. At the same time, however, the possibility of traditional, high-end, state-on-state conflict cannot be discarded. This means that
while our military leaders must still be able to operate and command sophisticated combat platforms in all dimensions of conflict, there is an increasing demand for leaders who can win in the unconventional and societal domains of
action—where the people are.
Warfare is not an “on/off ” proposition. It is more like a rheostat. Given the
likely threats of the immediate future, the rheostat needs to be capable of dialing
between high levels of traditional conflict and the more likely, lower-end, transnational and irregular threats.
Simply put, the geographical and dimensional locations of war and conflict
have shifted in many scenarios. Much of war has moved to the “hearts and
minds” of countries and areas we have long neglected. Consequently, American
officers will be required to operate in geographical regions different from those
for which they have traditionally prepared. For the Navy, the change in location
of war has been particularly dramatic, as conflict has moved from the “blue water” into the coastal and littoral regions of Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa,
and other locations.
The challenge confronting the line community is more complicated yet. Naval officers are doing more than reporting to new, exotic naval commands or
sailing in new and shallower waters. Evidence points to a future world wherein
naval officers will find themselves in a wide range of significant joint assignments that have not traditionally been filled by the sea service. Naval officers and
naval institutions played early and important roles in the establishment of Africa Command, with the assignment of Vice Admiral Bob Moeller as deputy for
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military operations. In recent years naval officers have also been called upon to
lead combatant commands that were once in the traditional purviews of different services—for example, Admiral Fox Fallon at Central Command and Admiral Jim Stavridis at Southern Command. The requirement for such geographical
agility is not limited to just the senior commanders but has extended well down
the ranks, to field-grade officers. The recent requirement for naval officers on
the ground in landlocked countries (e.g., with Afghanistan provincial reconstruction teams) illustrates this point. The expanded geographical and mission
sets naval officers are expected to fill require different skills of up-and-coming
leaders.
SOCIAL/CULTURAL OPERATOR AND STRATEGIST
International, joint, and interagency assignments require an understanding of
language, culture, and the deep social terrain and environment of an increasingly complex world. Additionally, some proportion of our officers should be
capable of effective strategic-level communications in one of the dominant languages in a given area of focus.
The cultural and social terrains of some of the most challenging theaters are,
however, decidedly non-Western. In such places the “normal” cultural and linguistic experience of most U.S. officers is of relatively little value. In addition, social, cultural, and linguistic skill requirements apply not just to the senior
commanders but, as noted, to field-grade officers. Staff assignments across the
spectrum of the joint world, as well as demanding interagency work—from sailing the hospital ship Comfort through the Caribbean and Latin America to manning the Africa Partnership Station in the Gulf of Guinea—have pointed to the
need for social and cultural and linguistic knowledge.
Such a joint leader will also serve as a participant, even as a “change agent,” to
ensure that the larger U.S. military and interagency realms can better work together. Today the unified combatant commands, for example, are parts of coalitions made up of nontraditional entities (e.g., interagency, international
organizations, informal international coalitions, corporate). Central to success
in this emerging environment is relationship-building leadership. The joint
leader is expected to be part of the combined efforts of disparate organizations
in conditions that could be characterized as highly demanding. These “mega1
communities,” as one author has called them, have complex characteristics.
What kind of leader can best support the efforts of such a wide range of organizations? The answer seems obvious: an officer who understands and has
served in or around these organizations, an officer who literally or figuratively
speaks their languages. Most personnel managers would agree that a career path
with more joint, interagency, and international experience makes an officer a
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better joint leader. However, officers seeking such experience in their career
paths have run into roadblock. The roadblock is an officer education and career
model that has been slow to adapt to the new operational environment.
A ROADBLOCK ON THE PATH TO CHANGE?
The system of naval officer development we have today is fundamentally a product of the Cold War, with a very strong emphasis on technical education and a
career pattern dominated by platform-related assignments. In a career chockfull of requirements, “wickets” to be hit, those officers who in the past have received rigorous preparation for joint or interagency command did so more by
their own force of will than by the design of the Navy’s personnel system. The
Navy’s current generation of joint leaders has risen to joint command despite an
educational and career system that has seldom been conducive to their acquisition of joint and regional knowledge or development of strategic communication skills.
Competing demands on naval officers’ time, education, and career assignments have made it increasingly difficult to prepare these officers to be joint
leaders in an international and interagency setting. To be sure, since the end of
the Second World War the Navy has supported an expansion of several joint educational and assignment initiatives (attendance at the war college, completion
of a joint tour, etc.). However, in parallel with the Navy’s acknowledgment of the
need for more joint education has come an increased requirement for officers
to gain technical education, earn technical subspecialties, and take platformrelated duty assignments.
With the Navy career already packed in order to meet such demands, one may
ask how a larger number of Navy officers can find time for more rigorous joint,
interagency, and international preparation. It is doubtful that officers can attain
additional joint, interagency, or international preparation without hazarding
their technical and platform expertise. It is in that sense that the current Navy
career model may have reached its limit. It is increasingly inefficient and stressed
by attempts to accommodate the emerging joint, interagency, and international
requirements. But to transform the career model from “roadblock” to a “bridge”
that leads to a more adaptive officer corps will not be easy. A first step in the task
is to understand where the roadblock came from, who built it, and why.
DEEP ROOTS IN THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THE COLD WAR
The naval service has long confronted the question of how to balance competing
demands on its officer corps. At the root of the balancing act is the competing
demand, on one hand, for specialized technical knowledge required for
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platforms of high-tech weapons and, on the other, for an ability to integrate the
larger whole in an increasingly joint, interagency, and international
environment.
As early as 1944, seasoned aircraft carrier commanders argued that naval officers must begin to train early to understand and eventually command joint
operations. Admiral William F. Halsey observed in that year, “From the beginning . . . there should be a broader education for the aspirants of all the services
with a view of inculcating into the youngsters the general understanding of the
uses and limitations of all weapons and services. This broader education in the
maintenance of peace and prosecution of war should begin at the service acade2
mies.” Halsey was not alone in his advocacy of joint and integrative education.
As late as 1959, the Navy’s personnel manual made clear the importance of a
wide understanding of joint operations and strategy: “Every experienced naval
officer should possess . . . a thorough grounding in the principles and methods
of naval strategy and tactics and of joint operations with other branches of the
3
armed forces.”
For almost two decades following the Second World War, Navy career policy and
detailing practices more or less conformed to Halsey’s ideas, reflected in the guidance found in the personnel manuals of the day. For example, every midshipman of
the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, was at one time educated in a foreign language, and large numbers of midshipmen participated in joint training exercises with Army cadets in the 1940s and ’50s. Perhaps most significantly, a
majority of officers who
FIGURE 1
rose to flag rank had attended one or more war
4
colleges.
But attaining Halsey’s
vision of a joint leader became increasingly difficult in the 1960s, due to
the presumed implications of more technically
complex platforms and
their shore infrastructures. To ensure that the
officer corps could support proliferating techniAdmiral William F. Halsey commanded one of the largest combined military forces the world has seen. His traincal systems, the Bureau of
ing and education were broad; they included service on surface ships, aviation training, and command of a carrier. Halsey attended both the Naval and Army war colleges, and he served in overseas naval attaché assignments
Personnel endorsed a cabefore rising to high rank.
U.S. Navy
reer path whereby most
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line officers were expected to gain a technical subspecialty. Even at the outset,
however, Navy leaders realized the difficulty of a triple demand—that the combination of a technical subspecialty and traditional seagoing duty would make it
all but impossible for an officer to meet a third requirement, gaining adequate
joint operational knowledge. One solution may have been to produce more engineering specialists to fill the growing number of technical billets, but the Engi5
neering Duty community was simultaneously facing major reductions. When
the line community confronted this seemingly impossible triple task, influential
leaders decided to emphasize the platform and technical subspecialties over the
attainment of wider joint knowledge.
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the father of the nuclear navy, was perhaps the
most influential leader in this period. A brilliant engineer and a long-serving,
adroit bureaucratic operator with allies in Congress, Rickover remade more
than the hardware of the submarine fleet. Rickover inspired changes to
line-officer education and assignment patterns. More than any other single officer, he was responsible for the increased emphasis on technical education and
technical specialization for line officers. Rickover pushed the line community to
develop deeper, more specialized expertise on a singular platform—for example,
the traditional practice of assigning submarine officers to surface ships was
eventually discarded. Rickover also championed the cause of rigorous technical
education at the expense of broader education that line officers had been receiv6
ing at Annapolis and the war colleges. In the depths of the Cold War, the emphasis on platform and technology was probably warranted. The nuclear reactor
was “cutting edge” and dangerous, and it therefore required officers more focused on its safe operation. With regard to the operational environment, in
many cases the Navy operated independently in this period, as evidenced by
many covert submarine operations and the “blue water” scenarios envisioned
with the Soviet fleet. Thus the low priority placed on joint knowledge did not
unduly compromise the nation’s security.
THE COLD WAR CAREER MODEL BECOMES PERMANENT
But the Cold War’s influence on the officer career model persisted for over a generation, and patterns it mandated took hold and deeply embedded themselves
into the system of officer development. For example, in the early 1960s the
Annapolis curriculum became significantly more technical; the requirement
that all academy graduates learn a foreign language was terminated. Career
paths became increasingly technical and platform-specialized, with less time for
war college education and joint training.7 This Cold War model did not incorporate the lessons of the Second World War (Halsey’s emphasis on joint and integrated knowledge) but instead placed greatest emphasis on producing expert
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

38

Naval War College: Full Spring 2009 Issue

STAVRIDIS & HAGEROTT

33

line officers who spent the vast majority of their time in either single-platform
or technical assignments, or at best a combination of the two.
One cost was an officer corps with relatively little joint and international education or experience and almost no knowledge of interagency operations. To
produce the few joint leaders it needed, the Navy relied on chance, the hope that
a small number of officers would push themselves to gain proficiency in nontechnical subspecialties and foreign languages. The Navy also relied on the likelihood that some of these officers would volunteer to serve in remote,
non-career-enhancing joint and international billets overseas and interagency
8
posts ashore.
Also lost was a focus on the ability to perform effective strategic communications. In the Cold War model, foreign-language education for Unrestricted Line
(URL) officers was dramatically reduced. In addition, fewer officers destined for
higher rank followed the exhortation of Admirals Ernest J. King and Chester W.
Nimitz, who were frequent contributors to U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, to
“think, read, and write” as naval professionals. The officer corps became more
expert and skilled in particular technologies but in the process became less joint,
international, linguistically agile, and professionally communicative across platform communities. One metric that illustrates this change was the generational
decline in the numbers of high-ranking officers educated at a senior joint war
college (see figure 2). Yet just as a platform-centric and techno-centric model
was producing fewer joint-educated flag officers, American political leaders
were coming to expect all the services to be joint and integrated. Congressional
legislation, notably the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, increasingly compelled the services to produce more joint and
integrative officers. The Navy’s career model was finding itself out of step with
the new requirements, and for twenty-five years its leaders went repeatedly
before Congress to attain waivers.
Today the Navy acknowledges the need for officers to be joint and integrative. However, it has by and large embraced “jointness” by simply adding to
Cold War career requirements; little if anything substantive has been cut from
the preexisting career path. For example, our academy leaders are told to prepare midshipmen to be experts in engineering but also to produce a core of linguistically capable officers. Our personnel managers are dual-tasked to make
more officers joint and at the same time more technically expert, all the while
ensuring that they are not too long away from their platform communities.
The officer has insufficient time to master traditional Navy war-fighting skills
(e.g., maritime operations), gain more technical expertise, and, at the same
time, acquire the joint, interagency, and international experience necessary to
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FIGURE 2
NUMBER OF THREE AND FOUR-STAR ADMIRALS WHO HAD GRADUATED
FROM THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE (CORRESPONDING TO YEAR OF WAR
COLLEGE GRADUATION)

Source: Data drawn from 2003 Alumni Register for National War College. The data from the alumni register were recorded in
2003. National War College alumni promoted to three or four stars after 2003 are thus not included in the data. The relative dearth
of officers with war college education is not confined only to senior admirals. Data contained in the Navy’s Graduate Education Review Board Report of May 2002 indicates that, when compared to the other military services, Navy officers at the grade of O-6 continued to lag significantly in their attainment of joint education. While between 65 and 95 percent of senior Army, Air Force, and
Marine Corps officers attended a war college, the share of senior Navy officers who attended a war college approximated 30 percent. See page 7 of May 2002 report.

serve as a joint commander. We must face the fact: there just is not time in the
URL career to “do it all.”
In simplest terms, we have arrived at the limits of the current system.
SO, WHAT DO WE DO FIRST?
We should consider changes in our officer career paths to further enhance joint,
international, and interagency skills, while preserving traditional war-fighting
skills and a core of officers with advanced technical expertise. Some reforms are
already under way. The strategy adopted by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, for the enhancement of regional knowledge has pointed
the Navy in the right direction. But additional steps should be taken.
Two possible courses of action might help. One would be to lengthen the career of line officers so that they have more time to master all three fields of
knowledge: the technical arena, general maritime operations, and joint/interagency operations. With longer careers, officers might be able to master a foreign language at the same time they are educated to be an expert engineer;
master the art of three-dimensional maritime operations while they master the
technical complexities of their machines; and master the intricacies of the interagency and regional combatant commander while at the same time preserving
time to serve in at least some of the Navy’s technical divisions. However, this
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approach has drawbacks. It is not altogether clear that an adequate number of
officers can master all three fields, no matter how long they serve in uniform.
Furthermore, allowing officers to serve longer on active duty will necessarily
cause an aging of the line, which in turn will slow promotion for younger officers and may give rise to problems of the kind associated with slow promotions
in the early twentieth century. In addition, it is possible that as the officer corps
grows older it may lose some of its capacity for innovation and new thinking.
The Navy has flourished with a relatively youthful officer corps and should
adopt a longer career only after careful study and reflection.
An alternative would be to restructure the officer career in a way that does not
“age” the officer corps in an attempt to become expert in all three fields. It is possible to structure the line community so as to accommodate new expertise we
need now, make the line more adaptive to unexpected changes we know the future will hold, and at the same time preserve core competencies in the platform
communities. Specifically, the line could be restructured into three career
“tracks” that complement but cut across the existing platform communities; we
call them the Joint/Interagency Operations track, the Technical track, and the
General Operations track.
The three-track career construct for the Unrestricted Line explicitly acknowledges that its officers are currently expected to do too much in the time allotted.
The three-track system recognizes that a growing number of officers need to develop expertise going beyond the platform. The three-track system would point
line officers earlier in their careers to paths that would prepare some for joint/interagency operational careers (language, culture, regional knowledge, interagency
activities), some for technically oriented careers, and some for more general and
maritime operational careers. The modified system would, however, preserve
both core platform competencies and the Navy’s culture of “command at sea.”
Joint/Interagency Operations. This career track would emphasize not only joint
but also international and interagency operations. It would qualify an officer for
command at sea but would also include education and assignments that prepare
for increased responsibility in joint and interagency staffs, culminating ultimately in joint command and staff assignments at very senior levels. In preparation for command of complex international and interagency operations, for
example, officers would receive several years of cultural and linguistic (and
comparatively less technical) education at the undergraduate and graduate levels. This preparatory education would be followed by rigorous sea duty (including command), a majority of shore and staff assignments in their areas of
interest, and a minimum of one joint assignment in the United States.
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Technical. These officers could also attain command at sea but would receive
rigorous technical and scientific educations early in their careers. This kind of
officer would command our nuclear-powered ships and fill the ranks of our
more technical corps (e.g., Information Professionals, Acquisition Professionals, Engineering Duty Officers, and Air Engineering Duty Officers), so necessary
to the functioning of such a complex technical organization as the U.S. Navy.
These officers would rise to command as “type” commanders and “system”
9
commanders. If assigned in the joint world, they would seem well suited for billets in places like U.S. Strategic Command or Transportation Command, and
some could rise to the command of functional (nongeographical) combatant
commands like these.
General Operations. This career path harkens back to the pre–Cold War traditions of Halsey, King, and Nimitz, and it would help bridge the gap between the
more technical and joint/interagency tracks. This type of officer would receive a
more general education that included a substantial exposure to engineering and
science, and perhaps foreign languages as well. To facilitate a more integrated
knowledge of the maritime operational art, the General Operations–track officers would ideally serve in at least two platform communities (for instance, on a
surface ship before going to flight school or nuclear-power school), though they
would ultimately specialize in one of them (earning aviator’s wings, submariner’s dolphins, or a Surface Warfare designation). These officers would constitute the “surge volume” of Navy officers, who would command at sea but would
retain more flexibility than those in the other tracks and so could be redirected
to meet changing personnel needs of the officer corps. The General Operations
track would typically fill key Navy staff and numbered-fleet commands.
The Chief of Naval Operations and Vice Chief of Naval Operations could be selected out of any of the three tracks, and a balance would ideally be maintained
within senior Navy leadership.
Key questions would be: How many of each type of officer would be needed?
When would such specialization begin in the career path? What, specifically,
would the educational requirements be in each specialty? Determining the answers to these questions would obviously require much more thought and analysis, as part of an evaluation of this idea.
Undergraduate Education
Producing the three variants of line officers requires reform of officer commissioning programs. The Naval Academy, the most technically demanding
of the undergraduate programs, currently graduates all midshipmen with
a bachelor of science degree and places an especially heavy emphasis on
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specialized, accredited technical credentials. However, an understanding of
the origin of the academy’s heavy emphasis on rigorous technical degrees
may warrant reconsideration of this priority. The academy’s core curriculum
became more technically rigorous as a result of the unique conditions of the
Cold War, in particular, the building of what many thought would be an
all-nuclear fleet. In 1973, when the basic structure of the current curriculum
was put in place, the Naval Academy’s dean explained the heavy emphasis on
technical subjects: “With the increased dependency on nuclear power plant systems, every major must include enough math, science, and engineering that any
midshipman, regardless of his academic major, qualifies for selection to the nuclear
10
power program.”
The Joint/Interagency Operations undergraduate track would constitute a significant break from the techno-centric curriculum, and it would probably have a
predominantly international humanities focus—history, language, culture, economics—with few courses in engineering. While a shift to a less technical undergraduate degree might produce marginally fewer midshipmen eligible for
nuclear-power training, such a shift would not appear to hazard an officer’s ability
to command at sea. (A recent Navy-funded study found little or no correlation between officers’ undergraduate degrees, either technical or nontechnical, and their
11
performance in command.) In addition to a less technical curriculum, midshipmen in the Joint/Interagency track would enjoy broader experiences outside the
Navy, to include one semester of their four years in an academy exchange program
(with the Military Academy at West Point, New York; the U.S. Air Force Academy,
at Colorado Springs, Colorado; or the Coast Guard Academy, at New London,
Connecticut). Moreover, one semester would be spent abroad in a foreign college
corresponding with their chosen regional specialty languages.
Midshipmen in the Technical track would pursue degrees, accredited by the
Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology, that would prepare them
for future assignments in highly technical billets, such as command of
nuclear-powered ships or duty on technically focused shore staffs. These officers
would also become the source of most lateral transfers to the various engineering specialized communities of the Navy officer corps. Typically, these midshipmen would not study languages, but they would still have a minimal core of
courses in the humanities, as they do today.
The remaining, probably the majority, of midshipmen would be in the more
flexible track—the General Operations track. This progression would prepare
them to become the type of officer traditionally known as the “General Line Officer,” reminiscent of what the Naval Academy produced until the mid-1960s. To
create this type of officer, the more specialized requirements of some degree
programs might be relaxed so as to allow midshipmen to broaden their
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education, perhaps by taking additional language, humanities, or social science
courses. The current academy programs for math/science and the social sciences/humanities might fit well into the General Operations track.
In this General Operations track, midshipmen would seek to establish their
foundations of professional knowledge so important to their futures as operators of Navy platforms in the maritime domain. At the same time they would
build the academic foundations that could facilitate later flexibility, perhaps a
lateral transfer into a Joint/Interagency or Technical career progression.
Inevitably, changes to officer career tracks and education will involve a discussion of numbers. For instance, how many midshipmen would populate each
career track? In-depth study would be needed, of course, to refine these percentages, but the general idea of proportionally more General Operations, fewer
Technical and Joint/Interagency, would seem warranted. While the number of
officers following the Joint/Interagency career path would be relatively modest,
the need for such officers is real and growing.
In the post-9/11 period, the Navy’s inventory of platforms (the number of
ships, submarines, and manned aircraft) appears to have leveled out and is not
expected to increase appreciably in the near future. At the same time nontraditional, irregular-warfare, interagency, and joint assignments have grown. An informal count reveals that in 2008 almost 350 general and flag officers held
joint/interagency billets, of which 150 were in unified combatant commands
12
and fifty on the Joint Staff. Given such a large and growing demand for experienced joint officers, it would seem prudent to modify the educational experience of midshipmen to prepare more of them for these duties. While there
would probably be more of the General Operations than of either the Technical
or Joint/Interagency variety, the relative share could also be adjusted every
several years to meet changing circumstances.
Of course, the commissioning programs based upon the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC, with units at some 160 colleges and universities)
and the Officer Candidate School (OCS, in Newport, Rhode Island) would be
part of the pool of analysis to determine the right mix of the three officer core
specialties discussed above.
Graduate Education and Professional Military Education
The Navy is already taking steps to increase regional knowledge and professional
education at the graduate level, and these improvements should be continued
and enhanced. Officers on the Joint/Interagency Operations track would have
first preference for overseas study and joint war colleges. Opportunities for
graduate education at the nation’s best internationally oriented universities
should be expanded to serve better the cadre of officers seeking advanced
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regional and cultural credentials. Naval officers pursuing the General Operations
track would attend a war college, but more likely the Naval War College (in Newport, Rhode Island) than the National Defense University, in Washington, D.C.
A potential hurdle facing the Technical-track officers would be the congressional requirement that all line officers complete Joint Professional Military Education (JPME, a formal, phased program mandated by the Joint Staff) in order
to be eligible for flag selection. Given the rigors of technical education and specialized nature of many technical assignments, personnel managers would need
to study carefully how Technical-track officers would meet the joint requirements. However, one part of the solution might already be in place. Those officers in the Technical career path who attended the Naval Postgraduate School, in
Monterey, California, would have the opportunity to earn at least JPME Phase I
as part of their program (though waivers might be necessary in special cases).
These proposals for graduate education, like those for undergraduate reforms, constitute only a point of departure and would require more study. What
seems clear, however, is the need for closer cooperation, coordination, and even
integration of the efforts of the various levels of Navy education—the academy,
NROTC, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the war colleges.
Assignment Policy
Sea duty can serve to reinforce either technical skills or operational and joint experience. Along with General Operations–track officers, the Joint/Interagency
Operations officers would typically be assigned to “topside” (non-engineering)
billets at sea—for instance, as the traditional “Ops Boss,” or equivalent, of ships
and aviation squadrons. Given their exposure to general science and engineering as undergraduates, the General Operations group could also fill technical
billets, thus providing additional flexibility for detailers. Technical-track officers, however, would fill most at-sea technical billets, such as engineering or
combat-systems posts.
In the past, shore duty was an “unavoidable evil,” and one of the key aims in
detailing was to keep officers’ shore assignments close to their platform communities. In our proposal, Joint/Interagency-track officers would be assigned early
in their careers to joint or regional duty, as interns on the Joint Staff in Washington or in regional combatant commands, for example. Refresher tours in languages would be scheduled into their careers much as technical proficiency is
maintained in the aviation and nuclear career paths today. The Technical-track
officers would be assigned to rigorous technical assignments early in their careers, and during this first shore tour some would transition to one of the technical corps of the Navy. Again, General Operations officers would retain the
flexibility to fill assignments in either of these broad categories.
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Promotion and Selection and Assignment to Command
The reform of the Navy’s officer corps along these lines will be effective only if
the new vision is translated into positive results in promotion and selection
boards. In the past few decades, since the demise of the “generalist” officer, however, the platform communities have largely determined who will be the Navy’s
leaders. Naturally, the platform communities advocate promotion of their best
performers; such “platform-centrism” typically offers little support for officers
who have spent much of their careers in joint/interagency assignments or education. To effect a lasting transformation, the Navy should change the center of
gravity in promotion and selection boards.
THE NEW NAVAL OFFICER?
The current senior generation of officers has answered the nation’s call. It has
both staffed and commanded more operations involving joint and interagency
activity than any other since the Second World War. But many of these officers
were “self-made” or “trained on the job,” gaining the necessary credentials, experience, and foreign-language skills through their own initiative. Just as the
Navy formalized the creation of superb pilots and elite nuclear engineers, so
should it enhance its formal mechanisms to create the new naval officer, with the
ability to work in the joint, international, and interagency arenas.
One important point—at the end of the day, the heart of a naval officer is not
defined by training tracts or career patterns, for these will eventually pass away
and be replaced, as they always have.
What lies at the heart of this profession are the core beliefs of our lives: the
courage, honor, and commitment to duty we must each find within ourselves.
Yet beyond those vital and central elements, there lies the terrain of education,
training, and experience. Those elements can and must be shaped to best advantage in this emerging and unruly twenty-first century.
A sense of historical perspective may inspire us to action. In 1919, Ernest J.
King, then a captain, reflected on the events of the First World War. Though the
U.S. officer corps appeared to have acquitted itself in battle and had emerged
victorious against the German U-boat, King knew it could have done better. He
recognized that though the Navy had helped “win” the war, the old officer devel13
opment system and “prewar career patterns had been overtaken by events.”
King and his generation profoundly reformed the Navy officer corps in the
years after 1919 and laid the foundation for the creation of the officer corps that
would lead the Navy to victory in the Second World War. Today we face similar
challenges; our officer corps model has been “overtaken by events” and is in need
of reform.
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gunboats for china’s new “gr and c anals” ?
Probing the Intersection of Beijing’s Naval and Oil Security Policies
Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein

O

ver a millennium ago, a waterway known as the Grand Canal, connecting the seaport of Hangzhou with Beijing in the north, became a critical artery for the dynamic growth of Chinese civilization. In the last decade,
the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) connecting China to the Middle East
and Africa have assumed a similarly vital role as a major “center of gravity” for
Chinese economic development. With Chinese oil demand growing rapidly and
seaborne oil imports constituting more than 80 percent of total oil imports,
China’s new “Grand Canal” has also become a vital oil lifeline. In 2007, approximately 85 percent of Chinese oil imports passed through the Strait of Malacca;
Chinese writings commonly refer to this critical vulnerability as the “Malacca
Dilemma” (马六甲困局). Given these developments, along with the 26 December 2008 deployment of two destroyers and one supply vessel from the People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to support counter-piracy operations in the Gulf
of Aden, it is time to consider seriously the prospect of future PLAN missions to
defend Chinese interests not only in East Asia but also beyond.
Against this strategic backdrop, it is not surprising that some Chinese naval and
maritime affairs analysts believe that China needs the military capacity to protect
its long and increasingly vital maritime oil supply lines.1 Defense of oil SLOCs
may become a driver in future PLAN evolution; 2 this
The authors are research faculty in the Center for Nawould be particularly the case if the Taiwan issue were
val Warfare Studies at the Naval War College in Newto become a lesser concern to the People’s Republic of
port, Rhode Island. Professors Erickson and Goldstein
are members (Dr. Goldstein is the founding director)
China (PRC).3 Indeed, a major U.S. government report
of the College’s China Maritime Studies Institute.
states that “as China’s economy grows, dependence on
secure access to markets and natural resources,
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particularly metals and fossil fuels, is becoming a more significant factor shaping China’s strategic behavior.”4 A shift in naval-mission focus from consolidating control of China’s maritime periphery to pursuing SLOC security would
represent a major reconceptualization of Chinese national security, one with
wide-ranging international implications. Examining the Indian case, moreover,
illustrates that promotion of blue-water naval capabilities in China is not unusual for a developing major power.5
The possible interaction between China’s developing oil security and naval
strategies poses important questions. Gunboats were once used to invade China
in the name of protecting international commerce. Now China is itself acquiring powerful warships, but its precise reasons for doing so remain unclear. What
relationships do Chinese civilian and military leaders envision between maritime commerce, oil availability, and the use of force in international affairs?
Such questions appear to be largely undecided in China. They perplex the U.S.
Department of Defense, which stated in 2008 that “the extent to which Beijing’s
concerns over the security of its access to oil supplies shapes China’s defense
policy and force planning is not known.”6 But they are questions that China will
increasingly confront in the future, as its role on the global stage, including both
economic and military aspects, continues to increase.
The maritime dimensions of China’s emerging oil security strategy have received considerable attention from analysts, both inside and outside the nation.7
But to date, few scholars have attempted to analyze comprehensively oil security–
related writings in Chinese naval and maritime publications. This article will
therefore offer possible answers to these questions and attempt to fill an important gap in the existing literature by surveying the maritime oil security discussions conducted by Chinese naval and energy specialists.
China’s dominant domestic oil players are, first, the national oil companies
and, second, the State Council, with its National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC)—not the security establishment.8 Yet maritime oil security is generally not addressed in documents published by these entities, a fact
that raises questions as to how oil security is conceptualized by China’s leadership, which, by default, would likely handle such issues.9
Chinese maritime writings, by contrast, have proliferated in recent years.10
At least five PRC professional publications concerned with naval development
have appeared, as well as a plethora of books discussing the direction of Chinese
naval modernization.11 Few other Chinese publications analyze maritime oil
security in detail.12 A survey of China’s official naval journal, 当代海军 (Modern
Navy), from 2003 to 2006 reveals relatively few articles devoted to maritime oil
security issues. Nevertheless, these articles cite China’s perceived naval weakness
as a key cause of oil insecurity.13 The tenor of these discussions suggests a strong
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1
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disinclination by Chinese naval strategists to accept American or Western control over Beijing’s “oil lifeline” (石油生命线).14 This unease may well help to fuel
China’s ongoing naval buildup. However, one principal finding of this article is
that some Chinese naval and maritime affairs analysts are pragmatic and advocate cooperation with other oil-consuming great powers, including the United
States, in order to secure stability of the oil and gas supply.
This analysis has eight sections. The first establishes a geostrategic context for
China’s current naval and oil security–related actions and explores the role of oil
in China’s recent turn to the sea. The second and third sections explore Chinese
perceptions of the roles of SLOCs and potential threats to them, respectively.
A fourth section discusses People’s Liberation Army (PLA) doctrinal writings
relevant to SLOC protection missions. The fifth explores future naval implications of a more assertive Chinese naval presence driven by oil security concerns.
Section six offers potential leading indicators of Chinese development of a navy
capable of long-range SLOC protection. The seventh section examines Chinese
arguments in favor of international SLOC security cooperation. The final section summarizes the findings and offers reason to believe that U.S.-China energy cooperation is quite possible in the maritime sphere.
The Context for Naval and Oil Security Strategy
Development
In comparison to those of Japan or Taiwan, mainland China’s overall energy
imports are low.15 Domestic energy production remains centered on coal (about
70 percent of total supply), of which China has the world’s third-largest reserves,
after the United States and Russia. China is the only northeast Asian country
to have these advantages. However, the country’s oil use and oil import dependence have been rising rapidly since China became a net oil importer in 1993.
While still a very significant oil producer, China now imports half of its crude
oil needs of more than 7.7 million barrels per day. Oil security has become a hot
discussion topic, because although oil occupies a minority share in the overall
national energy balance, it currently has no large-scale substitutes as a transport
fuel. Without adequate oil supplies, China’s economy would grind to a halt as
fuel shortages shut down trucks, ships, aircraft, and much of the rail system.16
For these reasons, as well as the Chinese Communist Party’s more general
imperative to orchestrate rapid economic development, resource acquisition appears to have become a major focus of Beijing’s pragmatic foreign policy. This
features sophisticated diplomacy, commercial initiatives, a flexible approach to
problem solving that prioritizes economic and social progress over governance
standards or individual human rights, and a new willingness to assume international responsibilities (e.g., peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations).
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China’s emphasis on resource supply security is driven fundamentally by internal development requirements, but against the backdrop of China’s impressive naval modernization over the past decade, concerns about potential Chinese
naval development trajectories do arise. China has been building four classes
of submarines simultaneously. It is also improving its amphibious warfare, air
defense, and antiship missile capabilities. Furthermore, whereas old military
and strategic debates focused on Taiwan contingencies, the new strategic questions concern what may be wider
“Our economic development generates the regional, and potentially global,
need of overseas resources and markets, and ambitions emerging in Beijing.17
there are hidden dangers in the security of our Yet at this point, in the assessment
development.”
of the U.S. Defense Department,
China “is neither capable of using
military power to secure its foreign energy investments nor of defending critical
sea lanes against disruption.”18
To address these questions, it is critical to understand China’s debate over energy strategy. Chinese oil security writings are increasingly numerous, reflecting
a vigorous national debate among civilian experts and scholars. “Free marketeers” believe that markets are the best tool to ensure a secure supply of imported oil. Beijing University’s Zha Daojiong, for instance, argues that China’s path
to oil security lies in greater integration with the existing global oil market.19
Some analysts believe that transnational and nonhuman threats to maritime oil
security are as important as, or more important than, interstate threats.20 There
are pragmatists at Chinese naval institutions who believe that oil security can be
achieved through diplomacy.21
But there are also mercantilists, who take a darker view based on the zerosum premise that dwindling oil supplies compel each consumer to fight for exclusive control of resources. They believe that China must control its foreign oil
supplies from wellhead to gas pump and are typically more inclined than others toward using military power to guarantee oil-supply security. For instance, Zhang
Wenmu, of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, a major public
intellectual, writes that China must control its sea-based oil supplies: “We must
build up our navy as quickly as possible. . . . Otherwise, China may lose everything it has gathered in normal international economic activities, including its
oil interests, in a military defeat.”22 While Zhang’s writing appears to have attracted a limited following, it is conspicuous for its apparent lack of calculation
of costs or of potential balancing reaction by others, or any clear estimate or
plan about exactly what kind of naval capabilities China would need for what
kind of scenarios. There is a wide and sophisticated array of viewpoints even in
China’s naval studies community.
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The Role of Oil Resource Protection in China’s Maritime
Development
Despite its largely insular, continental history, China appears to be turning decisively to the sea as its trade relationships blossom and resource demand grows.
In 2006, maritime industries accounted for $270 billion in economic output
(nearly 10 percent of GDP).23 Extensive foreign oil resources are required to sustain China’s growth, and some Chinese analysts appear to assume that there will
be an unrelenting, zero-sum competition for access to them.24 This justification
has been present in the Chinese literature since the 1980s or early 1990s. In fact,
it was in some ways more prevalent in those years (though not in connection
with the Middle East/Malacca Straits but, rather, oil and resources in the South
China Sea). The PLAN attempted to use these factors to justify budgets and
modernization plans, because at the time the Taiwan and U.S. issues were less
pressing.25 One explanation for the content of maritime debates is the context of
domestic bureaucratic and political wrangling for defense budget and procurement priority.
In the future, if tensions between China and the United States over Taiwan
ease, maritime interests and SLOC security might reemerge as a basis for justifications of missions and modernization programs and budgets for the PLAN. Yet
this may not be driven only by a perception of actual international interests and
China’s security environment; another driver may be a struggle by the PLAN to
secure a greater portion of the PLA budget, particularly if it is able to improve
its status vis-à-vis the PLA ground forces. This possibility is hardly far-fetched:
China’s 2008 Defense White Paper for the first time treats the ground forces as a
distinct service equivalent to the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery, suggesting that they are becoming less dominant within the military and that the PLAN
may grow correspondingly over time in funding and mission scope.26
Today, Beijing appears to believe that China’s maritime commercial and oil
interests might need increasing protection. At an expanded Central Military
Commission conference on 24 December 2004, Chairman Hu Jintao introduced
a new military policy that defined the four new missions of the PLA: first, to
serve as an “important source of strength” for the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) to “consolidate its ruling position”; second, to “provide a solid security guarantee for sustaining the important period of strategic opportunity for
national development”; 27 third, to “provide a strong strategic support for safeguarding national interests”; and fourth, to “play an important role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development.”28
The last two missions reflect new emphases for the PLA, and the fourth is
unprecedented. According to a subsequent article in Liberation Army Daily, the
third includes maritime rights and interests. Specifically, Hu requires the PLA
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“to not only pay close attention to the interests of national survival, but also
national development interests; not only safeguard the security of national territory, territorial waters, and airspace, but also safeguard electromagnetic space,
outer space, the ocean, and other aspects of national security.”29 On 27 December
2006, in a speech to People’s Liberation Army Navy officers attending a Communist Party meeting, Hu referred to China as “a great maritime power (海洋大
国)” and declared that China’s “navy force should be strengthened and modernized” and should continue moving toward “blue water” capabilities.30 China’s
2006 Defense White Paper further states that China’s “navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing
its capabilities in integrated maritime operations.”31
China’s 2008 Defense White Paper adds that “the Navy has been striving . . . to
gradually develop its capabilities of conducting cooperation in distant waters.”
It arguably alludes to oil security in describing the present state of the world:
“Struggles for strategic resources, strategic locations and strategic dominance
have intensified.”32 But oil security is not mentioned directly in Hu’s redefinition of PLA policy, raising the question of whether an oil security/SLOC mission is specifically sanctioned by China’s leadership. This is hardly surprising,
as Chinese leadership pronouncements tend to represent abstract distillations of
high-level consensus, particularly concerning emerging issues for which specific
policy has yet to be decided. Potential factors that could motivate expansion of
PLAN activities include: first, a perceived need to protect Chinese shipping and
resource supply lines and, second, to make sure that China can handle a Taiwan
crisis and other regional contingencies; third, bureaucratic interests (e.g., of the
navy and specific factions within it); and fourth, a desire within the leadership
for a Chinese “Great White Fleet” for international prestige. It is likely that a
combination of these factors provides the impetus behind China’s naval modernization. However, oil supply security stands out as a clear national strategic
interest that has the potential to unite factions within China in support of more
assertive naval policies.
China’s growing reliance on oil imports to power economic growth makes oil
supply security a distinct national security interest. In an attempt to transform
Hu’s general guidance into more specific policy, articles in state and military
media have argued that to safeguard China’s economic growth, the PLA must
go beyond its previous mission of safeguarding national “survival interests” (生
存利益) to protecting national “development interests” (发展利益). “Our economic development generates the need of overseas resources and markets, and
there are hidden dangers in the security of our development,” explains a Nanjing
Army Command College political commissar, Major General Tian Bingren.
“With the deepening of economic globalization and increasingly frequent
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

54

Naval War College: Full Spring 2009 Issue

erickson & goldstein

49

flow of . . . energy sources, an outside local war or conflict will influence the
development and construction of a country.”33 Writing in a PLA newspaper, the
recently retired Major General Peng Guangqian—who has served as a research
fellow at China’s Academy of Military Sciences and who, as an adviser to China’s
powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and Politburo Standing Committee, has enjoyed significant influence in the shaping of PLA strategy—warns
that “some of the foreign hostile
“[China] must view things from the perspec- forces” may “control the transport
tive of keeping the United States from cutting hubs and important sea routes
its oil supply lines. Concretely speaking, this for China to keep contact with
entails making the United States not willing to the outside, and curb the lifeline
cut China’s oil supply lines, not daring to do so, China needs to develop.”34 A major
and not able to do so.”
study advised by such influential
policy makers as Dr. Qiu Yanping,
deputy director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s National
Security Leading Small Group Office,35 emphasizes the importance of securing
China’s sea lines of communication.36 Writing in the official journal of the Central Committee, the PLAN commander, Wu Shengli, and Political Commissar
Hu Yanlin state, “To maintain the safety of the oceanic transportation and the
strategic passageway for energy and resources . . . we must build a powerful
navy.”37 While this serves these individuals’ bureaucratic interests, they must
nevertheless coordinate their statements with PLA and CCP leadership; such
naval advocacy would have been impermissible previously. Analysts writing in
PLA publications label oil security a key area of concern and advocate measures,
including expansion of strategic petroleum reserves and modernization of the
PLA Navy and Air Force, as well as of the Second Artillery (the strategic missile
force), in order to protect China’s energy supplies and key infrastructure.38
A series of naval strategy books, published in Beijing during 2003 by a PLANaffiliated press, under the overarching theme of “The Chinese Nation and the
Ocean,” suggests a relatively firm link between naval strategy and resource concerns among serious Chinese analysts. The introduction to one of these books,
蓝色方略 (The Blue Strategy), explains that “in today’s world, the population is
growing as land-based resources are depleted. Conflict and competition over
maritime rights and interests are intensifying with each passing day.”39 Another
book in the series, 卫海强军 (A Mighty Force to Protect the Sea), suggests that
resource issues will greatly affect China’s development trajectory. Resolving this
issue in a manner that supports China’s development strategy will require new
“resource space” (资源空间) that can only be found in maritime domains.40
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s dicta that commerce is vital to maritime power and
that the best way to threaten and defend commerce is by engaging naval forces in
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decisive battle are pervasive in Chinese writings.41 They appear in a recent book,
海上力量与中华民族的伟大复兴 (Sea Power and the Chinese Nation’s Mighty
Resurgence), by two Chinese naval officers.42 Published by China’s National Defense University, the volume emphasizes the critical role of controlling sea-lanes
for the purposes of developing sea power, as well as the nation’s economy. Its
authors contend that sea powers have generally enjoyed great geostrategic advantages over land powers—an argument with major implications for China’s
future development. Once again stressing the link between economic and naval
power, the two naval officers note, “from an economic power standpoint, maritime civilizations . . . are far superior to continental civilizations.” Of particular
relevance to this discussion of oil security, the authors observe that continental
powers have frequently been surrounded and blockaded with considerable strategic effect. They suggest that maritime threats to China are increasing and that
its maritime resources are being plundered.
The recent actions of the United States have exerted an especially deep influence on Chinese analysts’ oil security views. According to a 2004 article on oil
security in China’s foremost naval journal, Modern Navy, “The 9.11 events gave
the United States an opportunity to assert greater control over the oil-rich Middle East. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq ensured that Middle Eastern oil and
gas was ‘in the bag’ for the United States.” The author of this analysis argues:
“The great powers compete for oil [because whichever state] controls the oil
can also control the lifeblood of other countries’ economic development, [but
whichever state] controls the Middle East can control that of the [entire] world
economy.”43 Such perceptions are important. If Chinese policy makers see the oil
market as United States–controlled and unreliable and come to doubt Washington’s willingness to keep critical oil SLOCs open impartially, they might push
hard to create a blue-water navy. Such actions would mark a strategic tipping
point in the Sino-American relationship and could set off a cascade effect of
more assertive SLOC security policies by Japan and other major oil importers.
Chinese Views of Oil SLOCs
Chinese defense policy intellectuals generally consider oil SLOC security to be
a major issue, as suggested by an edited volume on SLOC and maritime oil security published by China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
(CICIR).44 In addition, the PLA’s first English-language volume of its type, The
Science of Military Strategy, emphasizes that SLOC security is vital to China’s
long-term development.45 As discussed above, the authors of Chinese oil security works tend to fall into two primary camps: the “free marketeers,” who see
the global oil market as the best guarantor of oil supply security, and the “mercantilists,” who see the global oil supply situation in zero-sum terms and favor
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1
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greater state involvement in securing energy supplies. Those who believe that
greater reliance on the international oil market is the best path to oil supply
security have gained strength over the past several years. However, based on assessment of Chinese-language analyses on oil supply security, it appears that the
mercantilists still exert significant influence. More to the point, authors close
to the military and to the party’s top ranks appear to have strong mercantilist
inclinations. Accordingly, that the mercantilists’ articles occupy less print space
relative to those of free marketeers does not necessarily mean that their policy
influence is insignificant.
In fact, the upswing in Somali piracy in late 2008 and the pirates’ capture
and holding for three months of the supertanker Sirius Star have likely strengthened the hand of those favoring a more assertive naval presence along key maritime energy transit corridors. The PLA Navy’s subsequent deployment of two
destroyers and a supply ship to the Gulf of Aden is an unprecedented move that
may presage a more active Chinese presence near global maritime energy routes.
At the very least, it will make China’s energy diplomacy much more credible,
given that it demonstrates a capability to deploy military assets in areas of interest. The following section surveys Chinese strategic thinkers’ views as to which
regions are most crucial to Chinese energy security.
China’s modern strategists envision their nation as having four strategic sealanes: east (from across the Pacific), south (from Australia and the Pacific islands), west (from the Middle East and East Africa through the Indian Ocean),
and north (through Sea of Okhotsk and the Tsushima Strait). They worry that
more than 75 percent of China’s seaborne oil imports flow through a few key
maritime arteries.46 Chinese analysts and policy makers discuss possible ways to
bypass these established routes, but thus far few of their plans appear likely to
alter substantially China’s dependence on established global oil shipping lanes.
Seaborne oil transport tends to be far less expensive than pipelines, for instance. In addition, the majority of China’s oil imports come from the Middle
East and Africa, where distance and geographic obstacles (oceans) make pipeline shipments economically and physically unfeasible. According to a map that
appeared in the October 2006 issue of 现代舰船 (Modern Ships), such alternative routes could ultimately include oil pipelines from Siberia, Pakistan, the
Burmese port of Sittwe, and the just-completed Kazakhstan pipeline that carries
oil into western China. The accompanying analysis, however, is skeptical that
these pipelines could solve China’s “Malacca Problem.” Regarding Russia, for
example, it is suggested that Moscow’s evident distrust of China means that the
Kremlin “will not accept putting its lifeline under the control of another great
power.”47 Chinese analysts worry that Russia might suspend oil supplies during crisis; they realize that their Russian counterparts worry that in peacetime
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China might import additional oil by sea and refuse Russian oil shipments unless it received lower prices. On the other hand, CICIR scholar Zhang Xuegang
maintains optimistically that a proposed canal across Thailand’s Isthmus of Kra
“could . . . provide a strategic seaway to the Chinese navy” through which “fleets
could . . . more easily protect the nearby sea-lanes and gain access to the Indian
Ocean.”48
It is generally held that land-based oil pipelines can displace a portion of
future oil import growth and will help diversify China’s oil import channels
to some extent but that they cannot replace maritime oil transport.49 Available
overland supplies from Russia, Kazakhstan, and other areas are insufficient to
reduce China’s growing absolute and relative reliance on seaborne oil imports.
Furthermore, off-loading seaborne crude in Burma or Pakistan seems problematic, given their great distances from China’s coastal economic centers. Moreover,
as a few Chinese sources recognize, pipelines have their own vulnerabilities—to
substate actors and precision-guided munitions.50 An article in 舰船知识 (Naval
and Merchant Ships) states succinctly, “SLOC security is much more important
than pipeline transport lines.”51 It is therefore reasonable to assume that China
will continue to rely on the Indian Ocean sea-lanes, the Malacca and Hormuz
straits, and the South and East China seas as its primary oil import channels.52
Chinese writers have dubbed the Strait of Hormuz the “Oil Strait” (石油海
峡), because China obtains approximately 40–45 percent of its oil imports from
the Middle East, the vast majority of which must flow through Hormuz.53 Chinese scholars recognize the Middle East’s instability, noting that since 1951 ten
of the sixteen major global oil supply disruptions have originated in the region.54
A recent PRC analysis notes that by 2020 China could be importing nearly four
million barrels per day of oil from the Middle East (over twice the current average level of 1.5 million barrels per day).55 Chinese experts note pointedly that
“all oil that China imports from the Middle East and Africa has to go through
the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, but [these straits] are beyond the reach of
the PLAN’s power.”56
The “Western SLOC” (西行航线), running from the Indian Ocean through
the Malacca Strait, to the South China Sea, and finally to the Chinese mainland,
has particular strategic value as “China’s ‘lifeline’ of economic development.”57
It carries 80 percent of Chinese oil imports; 58 that figure includes virtually all
of China’s imports from the Middle East and Africa.59 Chinese researchers fear
that Malacca, which “has become the strategic throat of China’s energy and economic security,” is “extremely narrow, easy to blockade.”60 “Whoever controls
the Strait of Malacca,” therefore, “effectively grips China’s strategic energy passage, and can threaten China’s energy security at any time.”61
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Chinese specialists are therefore particularly sensitive to the growth of American influence in and around the Strait of Malacca. Chinese writings do mention
piracy and terrorism as threats to the oil flow through Malacca, noting that “in
2001 alone, there were over 600 piracy incidents.”62 The foremost concern of
many, however, is clearly the strong U.S. presence in the region, which has
increased with the ongoing war on terror. There is little doubt that the situation in
the contemporary Middle East has made an impression: whichever state “controls
the Middle East can control . . . the [entire] world economy.”63 Chinese observers
scrutinize what they regard as an American choke point control strategy, stating:
“Everyone knows that the Malacca Strait is tightly linked to the South China Sea
. . . and grips the throat of both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.”64
One PRC analysis asks whether the Malacca Strait will become yet another
American forward military position in the Asia-Pacific.65 Another asserts that
the United States poses a “grave, hidden threat” to China’s energy security.66
PRC scholars have noted that in 1992 the Seventh Fleet’s logistics agent, Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific, was moved from Subic Bay in the
Philippines to Singapore.67 The United States has no military base there, only
access to facilities like Changi Naval Base, but, it is suggested, “the area can be
placed under the control of U.S. military power.”68 China is uneasy with growing U.S.-Singapore security cooperation and the notion that the United States
appears to be cementing its regional strategic position under the guise of “combating terrorism.”69
The South China Sea is another of China’s critical oil transport zones, as Chinabound oil flowing through Malacca must also transit this area on its way to
southern and eastern China.70 The South China Sea is, moreover, a vital transport corridor for liquefied natural gas (LNG), carrying two-thirds of the world’s
current LNG trade.71 At present, Japan and South Korea are the region’s primary
LNG users, but the LNG transport security question is of increasing interest
to China, which by 2020 may be importing more than thirty million tons per
year.72
At the same time, China is keenly interested in producing oil and gas from
beneath the South China Sea. Some Chinese observers claim that the South China Sea represents a “second Persian Gulf.”73 Two naval analysts assert that “oil
and gas reserves [of the South China Sea] could reach 3.5 billion tons [or more
than twenty-five billion barrels of oil equivalent] . . . [which would be] extremely
important for China’s economic development.”74 A PLA publication also claims
that the South China Sea possesses “rich oil reserves equivalent to those of the
Middle East.”75 Such assertions, however, are not supported by the limited oil
yield from the South China Sea over thirty years of exploration and appear divorced from the far lower reserves that international oil companies believe to be
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009

59

54

nava l wa r c o l l e g e r ev i ew

Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 2, Art. 1

present there. Figure 1 lists the top global oil and gas reserve zones, according to
a widely accepted industry benchmark.
If Chinese researchers’ reserve estimates appear wildly optimistic, they do
suggest that Beijing greatly values the South China Sea’s oil and gas production
potential. This could assume particular importance if China increases exploration and production activities there to reduce oil and gas import dependence,
and thereby vulnerability to SLOC disruption. If Chinese national oil companies find oil or gas in the South China Sea, even outside China’s territorial waters or exclusive economic zone, SLOC vulnerability would be reduced substantially by the shift of oil assets to be defended from the far reaches of the Indian
Ocean to areas increasingly within range of China’s air and naval bases. To date,
the South China Sea appears to be yielding much more natural gas than oil.
In collaboration with China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), for
instance, Hong Kong–based Husky Resources in 2006 made a world-class fourto-six-trillion-cubic-foot gas discovery 250 kilometers south of Hong Kong.76
Like the South China Sea, the East China Sea has attracted the interest of
Chinese specialists because of its oil resources, the value of which they likewise seem to exaggerate. “The East China Sea’s continental shelf could be one
of the world’s richest oil fields,” declares a book by two PLAN officers. “The
waters near the [disputed] Diaoyu [/Senkaku] Islands could become the ‘Second Middle East.’”77 The East China Sea is typically mentioned in the context of
energy and territorial disputes with Japan, as opposed to SLOC security per se.
Nevertheless, it contains some of China’s most important ports, and, unlike the
Malacca Strait and Indian Ocean oil lanes (but like the South China Sea), it lies
figure 1
global Oil and Gas Reserves by Region

Source: “Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2008,” British Petroleum, www.bp.com.
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near Chinese air and naval bases. The next section will explore which threats
Chinese analysts fear most and under which scenarios they might arise.
Perceived Threats to China’s Major Oil SLOC
It is often said that American naval supremacy is an excellent guarantor of
global SLOC security and that Beijing actually benefits substantially from the
stabilizing role that American naval hegemony plays.78 This is perhaps especially
true with respect to oil markets and the related question of sea-lane security.79
But Chinese naval and maritime analysts tend to focus on what might happen
to Chinese seaborne oil supplies during a conflict, and they generally perceive
a substantial naval threat to China’s oil SLOCs. One representative writing observes that oil and gas supply routes often become important military targets
in wartime: “Japanese tankers became Allied targets and in 1944, Japanese oil
imports were halved. By early 1945, Japanese oil imports had basically been
stopped.”80 It should be noted that in assessing the threats to China’s major oil
SLOC, Chinese specialists contend that this threat does not emanate solely from
Washington.
Despite the pathbreaking bilateral exercises with the Indian navy in 2005
and Hu Jintao’s successful November 2006 visit to India, Chinese observers worry about India’s dominant position astride China’s most important oil
SLOC. Chinese naval and maritime affairs publications keenly follow Indian
naval development; 81 they are impressed by this development, especially in the
realm of naval aviation, and fear that such capabilities could allow New Delhi
to “effectively prevent any outside great power’s Navy from entering the Indian
Ocean.”82 Moreover, Chinese observers also note India’s enhanced ability to
project power to the east. Indeed, a 2004 article in Modern Ships reviews New
Delhi’s establishment over the past decade of a Far Eastern Fleet (远东舰队), its
growing operational presence in the Andaman Sea and the Malacca Strait area,
and increased exercises with the U.S. Navy.83 Perceiving an emerging threat to
a vital SLOC, one Chinese expert observes that the 75 percent of Chinese oil
imports oil coming from Africa and the Middle East must pass through Indian
navy–controlled seas.84
According to another Chinese observer, it is the fleets of the United States,
Japan, and India that, together, “invariably constitute overwhelming pressure
on China’s oil supply.”85 In appraising Japan’s newly evolving defense posture,
Chinese researchers express concern that “Japan’s defense scope has extended to
the Taiwan Strait and could include the Malacca Strait. [Also,] Japan has used
Singapore’s air bases.”86 Other naval specialists have been critical of Japan’s deployment to Iraq, arguing that this initiative has more to do with the geopolitics
of oil than with any humanitarian motives.87 This illustrates a larger concern
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that the regional maritime oil security environment is being reshaped to Beijing’s detriment.
Nevertheless, as a recent maritime oil security assessment in Modern Ships
states, “For the foreseeable future, the U.S., Japan, and India are the three countries that have the capability to cut China’s oil supply lines. However, cutting
China’s oil supply lines essentially
“A big and powerful [Chinese] fleet will sup- means starting a war with China.
port a stable supply chain [from which] all oil . . . Only the U.S. has the power
trading nations benefit. Thus, in the era of glo- and the nerve to blockade China’s
balization, a formidable navy is not only in our oil transport routes.” The same
own country’s security interest, but is actually Chinese naval analysis suggests
a requirement of global security as well.”
two possible scenarios wherein
the United States might seek to
embargo China’s oil supplies. The first would be a Taiwan contingency. The second is less clear: “If China’s rise is not of a peaceful character, or if the speed of
the rise is too rapid . . . the U.S. could blockade China’s maritime oil transport
lines, thereby cutting short China’s rise.” It is argued that, in addition to the
Malacca Strait, American forces could block China’s energy SLOC at multiple
points. This prospect is interpreted as a source of considerable leverage for the
U.S. Navy vis-à-vis China.88 Another analysis arrives at similarly stark conclusions, stating that the 1993 Yinhe incident (frequently invoked by Chinese analysts) could foreshadow American interception of China-bound oil shipping
during a Taiwan crisis.89
One of the most interesting naval strategy discussions regarding the threat to
China’s oil SLOC concerns Taiwan. Most PRC analyses of the Taiwan question
tend to focus on the official line that Taiwan is fundamentally a sovereignty
issue. By contrast, the book 戍海固边 (Defend the Sea, Strengthen Frontiers) focuses on the strategic value of the island for China. Its authors assert that the
Taiwan issue is a matter of survival for China, because control of the island will
enable mainland China to “project [naval power] upon the Pacific Ocean’s critical strategic sea lanes.” Its authors suggest that unfavorable geography, especially
the enemy’s position on Taiwan, has enabled adversaries to blockade China in
the recent past. According to this analysis, Taiwan is critically positioned along
the “oil route” from the Middle East to East Asia. It is suggested, moreover, that
“if Taiwan fell under the control of a power hostile to China, not only would
this mean that this great gate was closed but also that the Taiwan Strait Channel
could be blocked.”90
Chinese naval and maritime analysts are well aware that the U.S., Indian,
and, especially, Japanese economies are also highly dependent on seaborne trade
in oil and gas. One Chinese interlocutor has even suggested that at least in the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

62

Naval War College: Full Spring 2009 Issue

erickson & goldstein

57

near term China’s only viable naval response to the aforementioned embargo
scenarios would be a strategy of retaliation—an effort to answer an embargo
against China with “an eye for an eye.”91 The implication during the interview
was that China could interrupt U.S. oil supplies if Washington attempted to
blockade China, but no specific methods were mentioned.
PLAN Requirements for Protecting Maritime
Oil Supply Routes
As noted previously, Chinese writings that examine energy and oil supply
security issues have become increasingly available in recent years. Still, very
few publicly available sources contain detailed discussions of SLOC security
missions and the tactics and platforms that such missions might require. It is
useful to examine some of those that do.
战役理论学习指南 (Campaign Theory Study Guide), a 2001 textbook written
by Chinese National Defense University scholars, draws on a variety of highquality doctrinal publications. Its authors believe that air and information superiority will be necessary to achieve sea control, using such offensive operations
as “raids on enemy bases or harbors and other major coastal targets; operations
to annihilate enemy force concentrations on the water; ocean blockades; operations to disrupt enemy ocean transportation; and operations to take islands or
shoals,” as well as defensive measures, including “defense of straits and waterways, protecting ocean transportation lines and counter blockade operations.”92
To safeguard its own ocean transport, the PLAN may have to “annihilate enemy
heavy naval groups . . . and . . . destroy the enemy ocean transport and supply
system.” The range of the PLAN will be an important determinant of operational success: “Offshore combat stresses that the front lines of the first island
chain is a primary battlefield for our offshore waters which should be seized and
held to our advantage.”
Should China implement a naval blockade, the authors acknowledge, international law will impose constraints, though they believe such targets as enemy
offshore oil zones to be legitimate. To attack an enemy SLOC the authors recommend selecting an accessible section of the ones least protected but most frequently used. Distant enemy bases, which are heavily fortified but fixed, could
be destroyed, preferably by a preemptive strike.
Regarding “coastal SLOC defense,” the authors believe that China enjoys “numerous forms of superiority such as weather, topography, and a friendly population.” Based on PLAN requirements, elements of the PLA and “sea militias,
sea transport, and the fishing industry,” they propose, should navigate in small
groups “between islands and through maritime areas that are inconvenient for
submarines and large surface vessels.” Notwithstanding the high defensibility of
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coastal waters, infrastructure improvements are making them less important to
China’s oil security. China is rapidly improving its domestic pipeline network
for transporting crude oil and products and is thereby is becoming less reliant
on coastal shipping to move petroleum from point to point.
Chinese strategists are rather more concerned that an enemy could interdict
China-bound tankers far from PRC shores. As Campaign Theory Study Guide
notes, “During deep-sea SLOC defense combat, the loss of superior coastal conditions and the presence of numerous disadvantageous factors mean that the
threat from enemy transportation disrupting forces is great.” Limitations include “relatively low integrated mobility, less desirable reconnaissance and earlywarning capacity, and limited maritime control area, which make it difficult for
us to discover the enemy’s forces in a timely manner.”
To make the best of a difficult situation, the PLAN should employ “large
group concentrations” to attack enemy ships taking on fuel and supplies, transiting “narrow waterways,” particularly during inclement weather, and “stick
close to the coasts of friendly countries,” perhaps aided by “diplomatic shortcuts.” As in coastal SLOC defense, forces should operate in unexpected areas
and prepare both “reserve” and “decoy” routes. In addition to “moderniz[ing]
and refit[ing] destroyers, escorts, and conventional submarines,” “outfitting
transport vessels with certain weapons and helicopters and having them conduct necessary warning, anti-submarine, anti-vessel, and other self-defense
combat has a certain technological superiority over the use of guard vessels.”
To improve deep-sea SLOC protection in the future, China should “endeavor to
establish a contemporary, integrated and offensive, new, special mixed fleet with
an aircraft carrier as core and missile destroyers (or cruisers) and nuclear attack
submarines as backbone forces.”
战役学 (The Science of Campaigns), an operationally and tactically focused
doctrinal textbook, was also published by China’s National Defense University.93 The 2006 version devotes considerable focus to joint operations and the
specific measures necessary to support offensive operations in order to deter
other militaries from threatening China’s SLOCs, or, failing that, to retaliate
and compel them to retreat. Chapter 12, “Joint Blockade Campaign,” emphasizes the need to achieve objectives rapidly in a complex battle environment by
jointly implementing an air, maritime, and information blockade.94 The last entails “actively destroy[ing] the enemy’s important ground information installations, disrupt[ing] the enemy’s satellite and radio channels, cut[ting] off the
enemy’s submarine cables and cable channels . . . [and] smashing the enemy’s
information warfare capability.” In order to “achieve and maintain campaign
sea control,” the PLA should “establish an integrated air and sea monitoring and
controlling system.” China’s “Air Force, conventional missile forces, submarine
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forces and surface combat ship force” should implement “barrier” (e.g., sea
mine), “firepower,” and “armed force” blockades on the enemy’s naval ports
and bases.
This emerging doctrine’s focus on how to ensure the security of the sea-lanes
adjacent to China’s coast in a conflict over Taiwan against the attempts of states
to blockade China (as opposed to securing SLOCs in peacetime) seem to suggest
that China would consider preemptive action to protect its sea-lanes and that it
would not hesitate to escalate in order to protect maritime resource supply lines.
These doctrinal writings also suggest present limitations in PLAN capabilities:
they reveal an apparent need for improvised and stopgap measures to achieve
such goals in actual combat conditions. Even after a decade of intensive naval
modernization, many of the ideas suggested remain aspirational rather than operationally feasible. These statements need to be compared with those in other
PLAN doctrinal writings as they become available outside China; nonetheless,
it seems reasonable to conclude that Beijing nearly a decade ago was already
carefully evaluating the consequences of, and potential countermeasures to, a
maritime oil blockade. As new doctrine imposes new requirements, this will
highlight capabilities and limitations, thereby clarifying further the extent and
direction of the PLAN’s SLOC security efforts.
Naval Implications: Beyond Taiwan?
China might also be pursuing the ability to project naval power further than
would be necessary in a Taiwan contingency. Modern warships are capable of
performing many missions. Hence, they are not restricted to a specific role in
specific waters. Their political masters presumably find them useful to perform
a variety of missions in a wide range of circumstances and locations (e.g., both
a Taiwan context and deployments farther afield). One explanation for China’s
possible movement toward a blue-water navy that might transcend the Taiwan
issue is found in its growing dependence on imported oil and other key economic inputs.
The PLAN’s present inability to secure China’s long-distance oil transport
SLOCs, or to deter a U.S. blockade militarily, greatly concerns Chinese experts.95
They are painfully aware of the U.S. Navy’s superiority over the PLAN.96 There is
a clear sense of urgency: “Regarding the problems . . . of sea embargo or oil lanes
being cut off . . . . China must . . . ‘repair the house before it rains.’”97
One PRC naval analysis of maritime rights and resource security explains that
China’s navy is not sufficiently strong to undertake the oil-SLOC security mission, because of Beijing’s longtime policy of “emphasizing land power over sea
power” (重陆轻海).98 This policy stems from the fact that for much of its history
China faced land-based threats from what is now Central Asia and Mongolia, as
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well as internal security concerns. Threats from the sea did not become a major issue until the arrival of European forces in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, and China did not come to depend significantly on seaborne natural
resource imports until 1993, when it became a net oil importer.99 Hinting at
a possible redirection of PLAN strategy, as well as at potential rivalry among
PLAN warfare communities, the above-mentioned analysis advocates shifting
priorities from a submarine-centric navy to one with aircraft carriers as the
“centerpiece.”100
Such a shift would have major internal and international implications. Internally, it would mean that the PLAN would likely capture a much larger portion of
the defense budget, especially as the carriers themselves would need a complement of aircraft and a dedicated fleet of escort vessels to be useful in actual
combat conditions. Its internal clout would be further enhanced by the fact that
aircraft carriers might rapidly become an important diplomatic instrument for
projecting Chinese presence and influence in Asia, and perhaps (eventually)
globally. Internationally, moving toward a carrier-centric navy could prompt
other regional and global navies to upgrade their own forces in anticipation of
China’s taking a more assertive stance regarding naval power projection.
Despite any efforts both to channel China’s maritime development in a peaceful direction and to portray it accordingly to the rest of the world, history suggests that any major military modernization program is likely to unnerve other
powers. A move by Beijing from a “near sea” to a “blue water” naval strategy, even
if conducted under the auspices of “commercial protection,” may be no different.
A recent article in 中国军事科学 (China Military Science) states that “[China’s]
navy must . . . unceasingly move toward [the posture of] a ‘blue-water navy’
[and] expand the scope of maritime strategic defense.”101 To accomplish this goal,
one Chinese analyst asserts that Beijing requires long-range area-air-defense destroyers, helicopter carriers, diesel submarines with air-independent propulsion
and cruise missiles, nuclear submarines capable of attacking enemy harbors and
land targets, and advanced naval aircraft, such as the Su-30 Flanker.102
Proponents of energy/SLOC defense as a mission for the PLAN are not the
only ones contributing to what seems to have become a robust debate within
China. Some Chinese views acknowledge the costs and difficulty of building
the power-projection capabilities necessary to carry out credible SLOC-defense
missions (e.g., aircraft carriers), as well as the potential for balancing against
China and the political costs that would likely occur in the event that China
procured a carrier battle group. Many writers express similar or related reservations, either directly or indirectly. The presence of these views within China may
help explain why the arguments for energy/SLOC-defense missions have not yet
gained greater traction.
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Potential Indicators of a Shift to Oil Security as a Naval
Development Driver
Chinese writings suggest a range of views on how to organize the PLAN for operations further afield. A sustained movement of assets to the South China Sea
could imply a PLAN mission beyond Taiwan, in pursuit of genuine, if limited,
SLOC protection capability. Indeed, a student at Beijing’s influential Central
Party School asserts that China has been overly cautious in its naval development and should instead pursue a navy capable of deterring SLOC attacks all
the way to Malacca and of conducting combat operations beyond a thousand
nautical miles from China.103 Increased PLAN presence in key SLOC areas could
also have a valuable “shaping” function, as it can “strengthen [China’s] power
of influence in key sea areas and straits” in peacetime and thereby decrease the
chance of its interests being threatened in war. 104
One of the most ambitious discussions of PLAN development in relation
to energy SLOC security is found in a 2006 article from 舰载武器 (Shipborne
Weapons). This article proposes that in the twenty-first century, as China broadens its naval presence on the world’s oceans, Beijing’s North, East, and South
Sea fleets should transform into a Northern Fleet, a Pacific Fleet, and an “Indian
Ocean Fleet” (印度样舰队). A systematic outline of the potential scope and mission of such notional Northern and Pacific fleets is beyond the parameters of
the present article. Nonetheless, we can observe that the very idea of a Chinese
Indian Ocean Fleet, while speculative, could suggest the potential for significant
change in the PLAN’s response to the SLOC security issue. According to this
Chinese analysis, the core mission of the proposed Indian Ocean Fleet would be
“to protect [Beijing’s] interests in the South China Sea, while at the same time
guarding the Indian Ocean navigation route and escorting Chinese oil tankers transiting the Malacca Strait.” The analysis emphasizes the crucial role that
aircraft carriers would play in such a fleet, particularly if they could coordinate
effectively with China’s new air defense destroyers.105
Were China to move toward a robust blue-water SLOC-defense capability,
the evidence of its doing so would likely emerge, sequentially, in, first, adoption
of the logic and the language of the proponents’ arguments in major speeches; followed by, second, formal changes to published doctrines and published
guidelines; third, in a shift in acquisitions and procurement; and fourth, a shift
in such areas as deployment and training. A major speech might be made by a
senior civilian leader (e.g., on the Politburo Standing Committee) that adopted
some of the language outlined by some of the proponents described above. Adjustments to doctrine would likely be published prior to the actual acquisition
of capabilities. This general PLA pattern is exemplified by Jiang Zemin’s 1993
speech on “military strategic guidelines,” which presaged later acquisitions and
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changes to operational doctrine.106 Of course, if the PLAN acquired certain capabilities for SLOC defense but doctrine and the majority of procurement, deployment, and training remained focused on other missions, then it would seem
that a transition had still not occurred.
While logical in practice, however, this sequence might be difficult to monitor. Chinese doctrine and policy statements are often vague, and they might be
deliberately obfuscated in order to minimize the scope for balancing behavior by
other powers. Larger precipitating developments, such as a bureaucratic change
that enhanced the PLAN’s status or budgetary resources, might occur without
foreshadowing obvious to the outside world. Even deployment and training can
be ambiguous; PLA experts have recommended using missions other than war
(e.g., anti-piracy efforts off Somalia) to develop war-fighting capabilities and
interoperability.107 Hardware acquisition and deployment, by contrast, is a useful indicator to monitor, because it is typically less ambiguous. With respect to
force structure, indicators of a more ambitious Chinese naval presence, particularly in the area of SLOC protection, would likely include:
•• Construction and deployment of additional nuclear attack submarines and
other platforms with significant demonstrated antisubmarine warfare
capabilities108
•• Development of aircraft or helicopter carriers and related doctrine and training programs109
•• Establishment of new, modern shipyards dedicated to military ship production or expansion of areas in coproduction yards that are dedicated to military ship production110
•• Expansion of the PLAN auxiliary fleet, particularly long-range, high-speed
oilers and replenishment ships
•• Development of the ability to conduct sophisticated ship repairs remotely,
either through tenders or overseas repair facilities111
•• Steady deployment of PLAN forces to vulnerable portions of the sea-lanes to
increase operational familiarity and readiness
•• Maturation of advanced levels of PLA doctrine, training, and human capital.
Perhaps the most important indicator, however, would be Chinese acquisition of reliable overseas air and naval bases—a major shift from current foreignpolicy doctrine. China is already bolstering its strategic position along Indian
Ocean oil SLOCs. Writing in China Military Science, a PLAN senior captain
details Chinese investments in Burmese and Pakistani port facilities (e.g., Gwadar) that would improve western and southwestern China’s sea access and also
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

68

Naval War College: Full Spring 2009 Issue

erickson & goldstein

63

expand China’s geostrategic influence.112 Gwadar has been designed in part to
“serve as an alternate port to handle Pakistani trade in case of blockade of existing ports,” however, and Pakistan might be reluctant to grant the PLAN access
during a conflict.113
Perhaps the PLA is making greater progress in Burma, where it has reportedly assisted in the construction of several naval facilities on the Bay of Bengal.
A Chinese Southeast Asia expert notes that Sino-Burmese military and security
relations have strengthened, with China assisting in the construction and modernization of Burmese naval bases by repairing and constructing radars and fuel
facilities. Burma’s leaders, he claims, have pledged to support China if it needs
to defend its interests.114
Despite these reports, however, China appears far from having overseas naval
bases of its own. An Indian naval officer, Commander Gurpreet Khurana, assesses, “China and the IOR [Indian Ocean Region] countries involved maintain
that the transport infrastructure being built is purely for commercial use. There
is no decisive evidence at this point to assert otherwise because these facilities
are in nascent stages of development.”115 In the future, any bases that China did
establish would have to be defended effectively in the event of conflict.
A Responsible Stakeholder?
It is perhaps not surprising that Chinese naval and maritime affairs analysts
are looking to “blue water” missions beyond the strict confines of Taiwan contingencies. It is certainly in their bureaucratic interest to do so. Indeed, such
bureaucratic interests have fueled previous naval rivalries. Of course, it is also
possible that official approval of planning, budget, and forces for explicit SLOC
security missions might promote factional disagreement because of the cost and
the potential for negative international repercussions. China’s national oil companies, which shape much of China’s oil and gas policy, may prefer the status
quo. The State Council and other bureaucratic organs are committed to vital
domestic development priorities that include the foremost challenges confronting China’s leadership (welfare, health care, urbanization, west and northeast
development, and rural modernization). The army, air force, and Second Artillery may have different priorities for defense-spending allocation. Moreover,
the foreign ministry and even top leaders share an understanding about the potential for balancing against China if Beijing appears too aggressive. Nevertheless, continued development of China’s economy may make available sufficient
resources to permit “logrolling,” in which different organizations and policy
factions acquiesce to the fulfillment of others’ budgetary priorities in return for
support for their own.116 Continued substantial increases in the PLA budget as
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a whole, and even improvements in the PLAN’s ability to compete with China’s
other armed services, cannot be ruled out.
A more surprising finding is that a number of Chinese maritime and naval
specialists support maritime cooperation with the other oil-consuming powers,
particularly the United States. Some Chinese analysts recognize the potential
costs to China of a balancing reaction, by neighbors and the United States, to
a Chinese shift toward an extended SLOC-defense mission for the PLAN. Key
strategic implications that could destabilize the Indian Ocean and western Pacific littoral regions might include regional naval power upgrades and alliance
rebalancing to offset a more muscular and far-ranging Chinese naval presence.
A unilateral approach is unnecessary, some write, and the costs would be very
great. India, Japan, the United States, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia would
almost certainly bolster their own naval forces and would also likely seek to create security architectures more explicitly designed to contain China.
A major study of China’s SLOC security problem calls for emphasizing cooperation in international organizations and conventions and in laws and regulations concerning oil transport.117 A 2004 survey in Naval and Merchant Ships
reveals many nationalist themes on energy but concludes that China is “increasingly dependent on stability in the Middle East.”118 Of course, such language
sounds entirely familiar to Western ears. An analysis from Modern Ships finds
that “the energy crisis and maritime SLOC security are not problems that are
just confronting China alone . . . but [rather] impact on international SLOC
security and stability.”119 A more recent analysis from the same journal observes
that Persian Gulf instability could harm China’s interests significantly; it argues
that China must cooperate closely with India, South Korea, and even Japan—
which might otherwise join the United States against China in any conflict—in
the energy sphere.120 But the overarching requirement is to maintain good relations with Washington. There is little choice, according to this source, because
“the U.S. could blockade energy shipments to China at any time.” It is suggested,
moreover, that present U.S.-China relations have stabilized to a large degree,
despite the UNOCAL incident and other irritants.121 It is also recognized that
Washington is unlikely to act against the status quo. In fact, “if stability can be
maintained in U.S.-China relations, then China’s maritime oil transport will be
basically secure.”
On a similar note, CICIR scholar Zhao Hongtu writes that while oil security
will continue to be a challenging and controversial issue, China cannot hope to
compete with the United States in naval development and can best safeguard
its interests by helping Southeast Asian states develop an indigenous capacity to
address nonstate challenges. He asserts that the United States has promulgated
a “String of Pearls Strategy” and also that the international community still
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1
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entertains a “China Energy Threat Theory.” In the end, however, he concludes
that while China’s energy infrastructure (e.g., the country’s nascent strategic petroleum reserve) is indeed vulnerable to attack, an oil blockade of China is both
risky and “not likely at all,” primarily because “the fate of the two countries have
forged a community of destiny, [and therefore] war and military blockade will
only cause both sides to suffer.”122 Zhao’s view seems to be that while tankers and
oil storage depots might be tempting military targets, the serious market disturbances resulting from attacks upon them would affect all global oil consumers,
as would China’s likely military response to any attack on its oil assets.
Even advocates of robust PLAN development do not foreswear cooperation.
One researcher insists that “the building of a powerful Chinese navy is a necessary requirement to ensure China’s oil security” because “if China is to become
[equal] friends with Americans in the future, we must first become an opponent
that the U.S. cannot defeat.”123 A variety of Chinese naval analysts further support the cooperation theme. Writing in China Military Science, two PLAN academics describe maritime oil security as a problem not of “SLOC security” but
rather of “regional maritime stability.”124 Another allows that seaborne oil transport remains a security issue in specific instances but maintains that “international bilateral and multilateral security cooperation is the necessary trend.”125
A rather remarkable article on the energy issue in Modern Navy actually links a
Chinese naval buildup to support a SLOC mission to the principle of “peaceful
development.” The analysis asserts that “a big and powerful [Chinese] fleet will
support a stable supply chain,” from which “all oil trading nations benefit. Thus,
in the era of globalization, a formidable navy is not only in our own country’s
security interest, but is actually a requirement of global security as well.” This
analysis concludes that as long as China’s navy continuously engages with the
outside world, developing opportunities to partner with other countries, the
world will come to accept, and even welcome, a strong Chinese navy.126
Nevertheless, a wide variety of Chinese analysts continue to worry that in a
confrontation the United States would have a range of options for interrupting
Chinese oil supplies. They are suspicious of U.S. exercises with other regional
navies. While the United States must continue to pursue its core regional interests and support its allies, it may be able to counter Chinese arguments for
a PLAN capable of energy/SLOC-security missions by persuading relevant individuals that it is a genuine guarantor of open SLOCs. The United States can
enlarge common ground on energy and SLOC security by engaging China and
the PLAN more through joint exercises (e.g., search and rescue, humanitarian
assistance, and disaster relief) and strategic dialogue. In promoting constructive
communications with Chinese interlocutors, it will be important to emphasize
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that SLOC security is a problem for nations around the world (particularly in
East Asia), not just for China.
The Depth of Beijing’s Insecurity
This article has found that discussion of oil SLOC protection within the voluminous naval and maritime affairs literature in contemporary China is not
extensive, at least in comparison with, for example, undersea warfare or airindependent propulsion technology. Yet oil SLOC protection has the potential
to emerge as a major bureaucratic sales point for acquisition of modern, bluewater platforms, as well as the training and doctrine needed to employ them
effectively. Already, some Chinese naval and maritime analysts display pointed
interest in energy issues, and many of these share a fairly distinct general viewpoint. The most critical theme that underlies this perspective is China’s perceived current vulnerability to an oil embargo. As one might expect, Chinese
analysts are reluctant to place their country’s oil security in the hands of other
great powers, especially the United States. If it does not already serve this role,
then, the oil issue could offer a potent rationale for continuing or even further
accelerating China’s naval modernization, especially as Beijing’s military planners begin to grapple seriously with scenarios beyond Taiwan. Perhaps somewhat more unexpected, given their tone of profound and immediate concern
for China’s maritime oil security, are the candid admissions of Chinese naval
and maritime analysts that the PLAN’s capabilities for protecting China’s long
oil SLOCs are minimal at present. Also, it is somewhat surprising that these
specialists, while sounding a wide variety of themes, many quite nationalistic in
character, seem in general to be guardedly open to multilateral oil security cooperation and appear to understand the importance of trying to preserve good
relations with Washington.
Of the many Chinese naval analyses surveyed for this study, among the most
sophisticated was a lengthy treatment of the oil security question in the October
2006 issue of Modern Ships. At the conclusion of that analysis, the author articulates a three-point strategy that may encapsulate the Chinese naval community’s
views on the oil security question: “[China] must view things from the perspective of keeping the United States from cutting its oil supply lines. Concretely
speaking, this entails making the United States not willing to cut China’s oil
supply lines, not daring to do so, and not able to do so.” Though the importance
of this particular source should not be exaggerated in the absence of information concerning its provenance, this statement’s succinct parallelism suggests
that it might perhaps be influenced by (or even drawn from) some element of
official internal policy. It further suggests that a web of self-interest would deter the United States from embargoing China and that adept diplomacy could
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1
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hinder any attempt by Washington to use this leverage. Most surprising, perhaps, is that this formulation calls not just for strengthened naval forces but also
nuclear strategic forces as well.127 This perceived need for additional deterrence
capabilities, apparently driven by concern that the United States might attempt
to sever Chinese SLOCs in the event of a Taiwan conflict, may truly illustrate the
depth of Beijing’s insecurity with respect to maritime oil access.
On the whole, however, means of safeguarding SLOC security remain under debate in China, perhaps offering other states an opportunity to influence
Beijing’s plans in a way that will support cooperative maritime security. Beijing
and Washington in particular share a wide range of maritime oil security interests that could best be promoted through cooperation. The primary threat to
seaborne oil supplies comes not from national navies but from well organized
and increasingly capable nonstate actors, such as the pirates that are, at this
writing, creating havoc in the waters off Somalia.
Cooperation to blunt nonstate threats to maritime oil shipments can help
build trust and reduce the potential for state-on-state naval confrontations over
energy-supply security. It can also be a showcase for how maritime powers like
the United States can work to integrate China into a global security architecture,
which will need modifications to accommodate the relative newcomer but offers
an excellent starting framework. Both official and unofficial diplomacy can help
build a foundation for a more extensive maritime energy security partnership
in coming years.

Notes

The views expressed in this essay are those of
the authors alone, and do not represent those
of the U.S. Navy or any other element of the
U.S. government. An earlier, preliminary version of the present argument was presented
at the China Maritime Studies Institute’s
second annual conference, “Maritime
Implications of China’s Energy Strategy,” in
December 2006 and appeared as “Chinese
Naval Analysts Consider the Energy Question” in Gabriel Collins, Erickson, Goldstein,
and William Murray, China’s Energy Strategy:
The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008),
pp. 299–335. The authors thank George
Gilboy, James Holmes, Nan Li, William Murray, and Toshi Yoshihara for their significant
contributions.
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1. This article uses the term “naval analyst”
to describe PLAN officers and researchers
known to be attached to naval research institutes; all other scholars of naval affairs are
referred to as “maritime affairs analysts.”
2. This is similar to drivers and justifications
put forth by other regional navies. See, for
example, Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s
Maritime Military Strategy (New Delhi:
Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation, Integrated Headquarters Ministry
of Defence [Navy], May 2007). But a Chinese
shift would be very important, in part precisely because others have similar claims.
3. Maj. Gen. Peng Guangqian, PLA (Ret.), for
example, recently stated that danger of
war over Taiwan has greatly declined.
“彭光谦: 两岸军事冲突危险大减” [Peng
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Guangqian: The Danger of Cross-Strait
Military Conflict Has Greatly Decreased],
China Review News, 24 December 2008,
gb.chinareviewnews.com.
4. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military
Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008,
Annual Report to Congress (Washington,
D.C.: 2008), p. 10, available at www
.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military
_Report_08.pdf.
5. Many Indian writings reveal a vision for the
Indian Ocean as India’s Ocean, with India
assuming “a pivotal position” (Kanwal Sibal
[former Indian foreign secretary], “Safe on
the High Seas: India Plays a Critical Role
in Keeping Sea Trade Routes Secure,” Telegraph, 12 March 2008, available at www
.telegraphindia.com). One of India’s two
current strategic naval documents declares,
“Geography has been kind to India, placing
her in a favourable position to control the
vital northern areas of the Indian Ocean”
(Indian Maritime Doctrine INBR8 [New
Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry
of Defence (Navy), 2004]). Former prime
minister Jawaharlal Nehru is credited with
the philosophy that “to be secure on land, we
must be supreme at sea” (Maitreya Buddha Samantaray, “Strengthening Ocean as
a Substitute for India’s Land Diplomacy,”
Newstrack India, 16 July 2008, available at
www.newstrackindia.com). Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh states that “India’s growing international stature gives it strategic
relevance to the area ranging from the
Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca.” India’s
navy formally pursues a SLOC security mission, because it is “in all respects, a maritime
nation,” and 90 percent of its oil arrives by
sea or undersea pipeline (India’s Maritime
Military Strategy, pp. iii, 46, 49, 96). Admiral
Sureesh Mehta, commander of India’s navy,
is said to envision “a truly blue-water navy
with strategic reach to operate from Africa’s
eastern coast right up to Malacca Straits”
(Rajat Pandit, “Blue-Water Navy Is the Aim,”
Times of India, 1 November 2006, available at timesofindia.indiatimes.com). In
comparison, one might even argue that the
Chinese debate remains relatively modest
and restrained, and that it hews close to core
interests rather than ambitious visions.
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6. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military
Power of the People’s Republic of China, p. 12.
7. See, for example, Bernard D. Cole, Sea Lanes
and Pipelines: Energy Security in East Asia
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2008); Kenneth
Lieberthal and Mikkal Herberg, “China’s
Search for Energy Security: Implications for
U.S. Policy,” NBR Analysis 17, no. 1 (April
2006), p. 23; Dan Blumenthal and Joseph
Lin, “Oil Obsession: Energy Appetite Fuels
Beijing’s Plans to Protect Vital Sea Lines,”
Armed Forces Journal (June 2006), available
at www.armedforcesjournal.com; Wu Lei
and Shen Qinyu, “Will China Go to War over
Oil?” Far Eastern Economic Review 169, no. 3
(April 2006), p. 38.
8. Erica S. Downs, “The Chinese Energy Security Debate,” China Quarterly 177 (March
2004), pp. 21–41. See also Trevor Houser,
“The Roots of Chinese Oil Investment
Abroad,” Asia Policy, no. 5 (January 2008),
pp. 141–66.
9. Energy security discussions are not widespread in publicly available Chinese materials. There are three possible explanations.
First, maritime and energy security issues
appear to be integrated primarily at the top
leadership level, not at the ministry level
(where open reports might be issued). With
the exception of three short periods, the PRC
has lacked a central energy ministry with real
authority over the many energy-sector players. (These include the NDRC, state oil and
gas producers, and special high-level working
groups, such as the National Energy Leading
Group (国家能源领导小组), chaired by
Premier Wen Jiabao since its establishment
in 2005). There is also a State Energy Office,
attached to NDRC’s Energy Bureau, but it is
staffed at less than a hundredth of the level
of the U.S. Department of Energy (100 :
110,000), lacks formal authority over energy
stakeholders, and is likely so overwhelmed
with work that it can only react to events, not
shape policy proactively. NDRC documents
tend to focus on general aspects of national
energy consumption and conservation, not
maritime or military issues. See, for example,
能源发展 ‘十一五’ 规划 [Eleventh Five-Year
Program for Energy Development] (Beijing:
国家发展改革委 [National Development
and Reform Commission], April 2007),
available at www.ndrc.gov.cn. Second, there
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appear to be few dedicated civilian experts
who focus on both energy and maritime
security issues, and those who do tend to
focus on specific subjects (e.g., Southeast
Asia experts study the Malacca Strait). The
PLAN almost certainly pays close attention
to energy security, but its views are difficult
to track directly, because the PLA continues
to lack transparency. A variety of institutions
likely give inputs into PLAN strategy, including the Naval Studies Research Institute in
Beijing, the Command and Staff College in
Nanjing, and the Submarine Academy in
Qingdao. Third, Chinese observers are apparently discouraged from publishing openly
on certain sensitive topics. Naval and military
analysts more often discuss technological
developments than such potentially sensitive
yet clearly important and widely recognized
themes as maritime energy security. Still,
this tendency reinforces the importance of
reviewing those materials that do appear.
10. Chinese security-related writings may be
divided into six major categories, of varying
relevance to maritime energy security issues.
Political-science and international-relations
journals, such as 现代国际关系 (Contemporary International Relations), 国际问题
研究 (International Studies), 国际政治研
究 (International Politics Quarterly), 国际
论坛 (International Forum), 国际政治科学
(Quarterly Journal of International Politics),
国际交流 (International Understanding), 和
平与发展 (Peace and Development), 中国国
际问题研究 (China International Studies),
当代亚太 (Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), and 太平洋学报 (Pacific Journal), rarely
if ever have specific relevant content. Military
intellectual and strategic publications,
as exemplified by 中国军事科学 (China
Military Science), offer broader insights but
few specifics. Doctrinal publications—for
instance, 战役学 (Science of Campaigns)—
reveal potential strategic and operational approaches. Technical journals, such as 中国能
源 (China Energy), 中国油气 (China Oil and
Gas), 石油科学 (Petroleum Science), 石油学
报 (Acta Petrolei Sinica), 海洋石油 (Offshore
Oil), and 中国海上油气 (China Offshore Oil
and Gas), normally offer some of the highest
quality and most reliable research but do not
address directly such a complex, interdisciplinary, strategic subject. For this particular
topic, then, the sources with most direct
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coverage are military newspapers, like 人
民海军 (People’s Navy), and semitechnical/
trade publications (e.g., 舰载武器 [Shipborne Weapons]), which describe technology
and platforms in some detail and link them
to larger strategic issues.
11. These include, at a minimum, 当代海军
(Modern Navy), 人民海军 (People’s Navy),
舰船知识 (Naval and Merchant Ships), 舰载
武器 (Shipborne Weapons), and 现代舰船
(Modern Ships). Modern Navy is a monthly
magazine published by the official PLAN
newspaper People’s Navy, which is the daily
newspaper published by the Political Department of China’s navy. Naval and Merchant
Ships is a semitechnical monthly publication
of the Chinese Society of Naval Architecture
and Marine Engineering. Shipborne Weapons
and Modern Ships are monthly journals published by the state-owned China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC), China’s
largest designer, manufacturer, and trader
of military and civilian vessels and related
engineering and equipment. In addition to
these naval-oriented publications, Beijing’s
foremost military journal, 中国军事科学
(China Military Science), is published by the
PLA’s Academy of Military Science. Sea Tide
Press (海潮出版社), located in Beijing, is affiliated with the PLAN Political Department.
It publishes such officially sanctioned books
as the 杨志本 [Yang Zhiben, ed.], 中国海军
百科全书 [China Navy Encyclopedia], vols.
1 and 2 (Beijing: 海潮出版社 [Sea Tide],
1998).
12. Chinese doctrinal texts rarely, if ever, offer
specific insights into Chinese maritime
energy security. It is not helpful to dismiss
Chinese maritime interest publications as
“popular”; doing so narrows the scope of
available literature to an impractical degree.
Contemporary China is a highly technocratic
and extremely nationalistic society where
magazines devoted to military issues that
are quite sophisticated also happen to make
a profit. That the case is different in other
countries does not automatically render
the Chinese sources unreliable. Given the
complexity and opacity of China’s “defense
intellectual complex,” affiliations of authors
in Chinese journals are often unknown. We
may wish the case was different, but scholars
of China need to learn to cope with such
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ambiguities. Rejecting these viewpoints
because backgrounds are unknown is not
an option for serious scholars. It would also
be excessively narrow to restrict all discussions regarding naval matters to identified uniformed personnel. Like the United
States, China has a large number of research
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policy in China—and for that matter, in
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THE NAVAL BATTLE OF PARIS
Jerry W. Jones

I

t involved no fleet action, and only verbal salvos were exchanged, but the “naval
battle of Paris” was a high-stakes diplomatic contest that threatened to poison
the good relations between erstwhile allies Britain and the United States and that
at one point disrupted the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The common goal of
defeating imperial Germany ensured Anglo-American cooperation while the
war lasted, but as soon as an armistice appeared imminent, both powers began
to maneuver to secure their postwar interests. Previously obscured by the common crusade against a common foe, the reality of conflicting war aims and interests now threatened the peace.
By 1918 President Woodrow Wilson had emerged as the most articulate proponent of a new era of international relations based upon law and international
cooperation. Enshrined as it would be in the “Fourteen Points,” a Wilsonian
peace promised to end the kind of great-power rivalry that had led to the Great
War. The most revolutionary part of Wilson’s program was the establishment of
a League of Nations—not only a forum for arbitration but a vehicle for collective
security.
Despite Wilson’s liberal internationalism and support for disarmament,
however, during the conference he threatened a naval arms race with Great BritDr. Jones is an associate professor of history at Tarleton
ain. The challenge to British naval supremacy alarmed
State University’s campus in Killeen, Texas, and at Fort
the British and nearly alienated the European partner
Hood. Dr. Jones’s publications include U.S. Battleship
most sympathetic to Wilson’s vision of the peace. The
Operations in World War I, published by the U.S. Naval Institute. He serves as a guest lecturer for the Naval
United States and Britain, both great trading powers,
War College Strategy and Policy Program.
had much to gain from cooperation and much to lose
if attempts at collective security failed to halt a slide
Naval War College Review, Spring 2009, Vol. 62, No. 2
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into renewed great-power rivalry. The failure to set aside their naval and commercial competition at Paris ultimately helped undermine Anglo-American
hopes that together the two nations could forge a system of international cooperation to keep the peace and promote global trade. Wilson’s conduct of the negotiations was most unwise. While the threat of a naval race gave Wilson
leverage at the conference, coercion came at the cost of damaged relations with a
vital ally.
Originally, as the Great War raged in Europe, Wilson had been determined to
keep America out of the war while protecting its trading rights as a neutral
power. In a situation not very different from the Napoleonic Wars, both Britain
and Germany were violating the American notion of neutral rights in their at1
tempts to deny U.S. trade to the other. Germany’s U-boat campaign was more
brutal than Britain’s blockade, and unrestricted submarine warfare was widely
viewed as an atrocity against noncombatants and contrary to international law.
Ultimately, of course, unrestricted submarine warfare would force Wilson to declare war on Germany and join the Entente powers. Nevertheless, Wilson fumed
that the United States could not resist British restrictions on U.S. trade because
of the supremacy of the Royal Navy. In September 1916 Wilson remarked to his
closest adviser, Colonel Edward House, “Let us build a bigger navy than hers and
2
do what we please!” Wilson was beginning to see the U.S. Navy not only in its
3
traditional role of providing security but as an instrument of diplomacy. The
result of Wilson’s new appreciation of naval power and public enthusiasm for it
was the unprecedented three-year naval building program of 1916.
The bill called for $300 million in appropriations—more than double those
for the preceding year and six times the naval funding for the Spanish-American
4
War. Had American entry into the First World War not intervened, the program
would have given the United States twenty-seven battleships, six battle cruisers,
and over 350 smaller warships—approaching parity with the Royal Navy by
1921. In terms of modern capital ships, the U.S. Navy would have been superior.
In the event, the danger that U-boat depredations might defeat Britain in the
spring and summer of 1917 forced the reluctant Wilson administration to postpone dreadnought construction and concentrate on escort craft to defeat the
U-boats. Wilson remained committed, however, to continuing the dreadnought
5
program as soon as conditions permitted.
If the United States was concerned in 1918 with neutral rights and the
strength of the fleet, the British were worried that the end of the war might see
naval and mercantile supremacy pass to the Americans. As vexing as the 1916
building program had been to the British, the dramatic growth of the U.S. merchant marine during the war was equally troubling. Would the United States
capture markets Britain had formerly held? On 2 August 1918, as Allied armies
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1
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were beginning the series of offensives on the western front that would lead to
the end of the war, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Eric Geddes, presented a
memorandum to the War Cabinet. He complained that while Britain had been
maintaining a huge war fleet, the United States had produced very few warships
for convoy escort duties, eleven a month, while building great numbers of merchantmen. He warned that Britain’s position as the world’s shipper and premier
shipbuilding country was imperiled: “Are we to go on losing ships in our Allies’
interest, and repairing ships for them while they overtake us in their Mercantile
Marine?” The building of U.S. battleships was also resuming. Geddes insisted
that the United States be induced to shift its priorities to destroyers so British
yards could focus on merchantmen, to make up for Britain’s great shipping
6
losses during the war. It soon became clear to the Admiralty, however, that it
could not count on the use of any U.S. destroyers until 1919; Geddes now re7
ferred to the United States as “a naval liability” and a “tax on the alliance.”
During mid-October 1918, as Germany sought an armistice based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the Navy Department and Admiralty were already contemplating how the naval section of the armistice terms might affect their
8
relative positions. The British pressed for harsh naval terms, including the surrender and destruction of the German surface fleet, leaving Germany with only a
coastal defense force. Wilson and the Navy Department, in contrast, wanted lenient naval terms, because the destruction of the German fleet would leave Britain without a significant European rival, in which case the Royal Navy could “do
9
with our new merchant marine as she saw fit.” The Admiralty, for its part, now
began considering the implications of the second of Wilson’s Fourteen Points:
“freedom of the seas.” That aspiration enshrined the traditional U.S. position on
neutral rights in wartime—the very issue that had provoked American entry
into the war. The Admiralty took alarm at the thought of placing restrictions on
Britain’s ability to conduct effective blockades. Was not the purpose of sea power
to deny overseas communication to an enemy? The blockade was clearly an important factor in the approaching German defeat. The British Empire could not
in future wars afford to trust its security to an untested international organization (Wilson’s League) or surrender the bulwark of sea supremacy, which had
10
never failed it.
In its battle against freedom of the seas, the Admiralty had the unshakable
support of Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Lloyd George insisted that Britain could not abandon its principal strategic weapon. In response, Wilson, resorting to “brinkmanship,” instructed House to tell the Allies that they could
either accept freedom of the seas or the United States would build “the strongest
navy that our resources permit and as our people have so long desired.” House
amplified the president’s message by pointing out the United States had more
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
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resources and money than they—that if it came to a contest, Britain would lose.
Lloyd George held his ground, retorting that Great Britain would “spend her last
11
guinea to keep a navy superior to that of the United States or any other power.”
However, anxious to avoid an open break over freedom of the seas yet determined not to surrender on the issue, Lloyd George offered to defer the matter to
the peace conference; Wilson accepted that olive branch.
In any case, as would become clear, Wilson’s broadening concept of the
League of Nations made freedom of the seas moot—in a world without neutrals
there would be no wars except between the League and outlaw states. Wilson ultimately abandoned his support for freedom of the seas, later explaining that it
had been a “practical joke” on himself, since Point Fourteen (“a general association of nations”) eliminated the need for Point Two.12
There remained the issue of the U.S. naval building program, which assumed
even larger dimensions. In late October 1918 the Wilson administration raised
the ante and asked Congress for a second three-year naval building program, a
repeat of the 1916 program plus ten additional battleships and six battle cruisers. Wilson now had a bigger club, or bargaining chip, to use at the peace conference, as well as clear evidence for the American people that failure to endorse the
13
League would mean expensive defense policies. In his annual message to Congress on 2 December 1918, Wilson declared that he took it for granted Congress
would continue the naval building program begun in 1916. He implied that the
new program was simply a continuation of the long-term development of the
Navy and insisted that the building program should continue: “It would clearly
be unwise for us to attempt to adjust our programs to a future world policy as yet
14
undetermined.”
Two days later Wilson boarded the transport ship George Washington, escorted by the battleship Pennsylvania, for Brest, in France, and the peace conference. Once in France Wilson became increasingly bitter about the motives of the
Allied statesmen. At a dinner with a few Americans on 10 January, he opened his
mind. He seethed with indignation that the French wanted rent for the use of
their trenches and that the British were demanding payment for each American
soldier transported in British ships to fight in their cause. He made a distinction
between the people of Europe, who wanted a just peace, and the ruling classes,
15
who cared only for their national rivalries.
While the president was in France, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels
was energetically promoting the naval building program to the American public. In a lengthy press release Daniels explained the administration’s motives and
why it was imperative to support the program. Arguing in moralistic terms,
Daniels said the country had no designs on the territory or trade of other nations but was “pledged to the protection of the weak wherever they may suffer
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threats.” The nation would have to be “strong in defense against aggressors and
in offense against evil doers.” Should the peace conference fail to create a “world
police force” to keep peace in the new order, the United States would have to create “incomparably the greatest Navy in the world.” Here indeed was not just justification for naval expansion but an expansive vision of the Wilson
16
administration’s internationalist agenda. Clearly thinking of his negotiating
position in the peace conference, Wilson sent a message to Secretary Daniels encouraging him to continue pushing for the new building program, which was
“essential to our purpose here.” He revealed that he was willing to accept a proviso in the pending naval legislation that if the peace conference adopted some
agreement to reduce armaments (the fourth of the Fourteen Points, “national
armaments would be reduced”), he could postpone building contracts pending
consultation with Congress.17
In late January the American, British, and French naval leaders established a
committee in Paris to consider the naval terms of the treaty. The American representative, Admiral William Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations and Wilson’s technical adviser on naval affairs during the conference, soon clashed with
the British First Sea Lord, Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, and the French Chief of Naval
Staff, Ferdinand de Bon. The thorniest issue was the final disposition of the interned German fleet. Benson favored sinking the German ships, so they would
not affect the postwar balance of naval power. Admiral de Bon wanted them distributed, so France could have compensation for its lack of naval construction
during the war. Wemyss entertained destruction of the German ships, but only
as part of an Anglo-American agreement on new naval construction. Benson’s
position found support in a lengthy memorandum by the U.S. Naval Advisory
18
Staff in Paris. Ignoring the inconsistency of calling for reduction of armaments
while embarking on a major building program, the Advisory Staff argued that
destruction of the German ships would “be a practical demonstration of the sincerity of the High Contracting Parties of the determination to reduce armaments.” If distribution happened, the United States should abstain: “America is
proud to claim that she came into this war with clean hands and will come out
with empty hands.” After evoking the specter of an Anglo-Japanese combination
aimed at the United States, the document called for naval parity with Britain,
concluding, “World interests demand that no single power may rule the sea
19
against all comers.”
By early March the committee of naval leaders was deadlocked. Moreover,
Admiral Benson’s insistence on naval parity with Britain was increasingly at
odds with the administration’s diplomacy. Benson’s biographer Mary Klachko
writes, “House shared the president’s conception of the building program as primarily a diplomatic bargaining chip, whereas Benson wanted to construct the
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20

ships.” Meanwhile, the Admiralty was considering how best to respond to the
American naval challenge. In a shrewd and insightful memorandum to the War
Cabinet the Admiralty advised tact, caution, and restraint. The Admiralty noted
the deep political divisions already apparent in the United States, where the Republican Party, hostile to the building program, controlled Congress. The Admiralty recognized that many in the United States would support equality with
Britain but argued that any program to gain supremacy was certainly a bluff;
most Americans, it believed, were not anti-British but jealous of American dominance in the Western Hemisphere. The paper warned that “any ill-judged action on our part might be fanned to produce among them such a wave of
spread-eagleism as to force the government to carry through the biggest naval
programme, even if the President does not really mean or wish to do so.” Finally,
the memorandum recognized the deep distrust between the two countries but
dismissed the threat of war as “unthinkable.”21
In late March Wilson returned to Paris after a month in the United States.
Daniels too arrived in Paris, and it was shortly after Daniels’s arrival that the
most heated confrontation of the “naval battle of Paris” took place. The First Sea
Lord, Wemyss, called on Daniels at his hotel, and the secretary sent word to
Benson to join the discussions. Benson, when he arrived, was shocked to find his
British counterpart pressing Daniels about the U.S. naval building program.
Benson later reported that Wemyss demanded to know why the Wilson administration had undertaken its naval increase and to what extent the administration
planned to carry it out. Indignant, Benson shook his finger at Wemyss, retorting,
“By what authority do you presume to come over here and ask such a question
22
from our Secretary?” There is no complete account of what followed, but
Daniels wrote in his memoirs that while the two admirals did not descend to
23
cursing one another, they came close, and he had to intervene between them.
The next day, 27 March, Daniels and Benson met with the First Lord of the
Admiralty (the First Sea Lord’s civilian senior), Walter Long. Wemyss was not at
the meeting, presumably to avoid an altercation with Benson. Long told the
Americans that Great Britain simply could not abide coming out of the war a
second-rate naval and commercial power. After Long’s explanation of Britain’s
need to maintain sea supremacy, Benson demanded to know whether Britain,
simply because it had always been supreme, would try to remain supreme at all
hazards. After reflection, Long replied, “Well, Admiral, that is about the size of
it.” Benson responded that if the British government continued policy along
those lines it would mean “war between Great Britain and the United States.”
Daniels affirmed that Admiral Benson had not stated the case too strongly. Long
responded, “In that case you had better talk to your President, and I will talk to
24
my Prime Minister.”
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

88

Naval War College: Full Spring 2009 Issue

JONES

83

From this point, political leaders intervened to resolve the impasse at Paris.
When Daniels reported the naval discussions to Wilson, the president considered the reality that British support for the League of Nations depended on resolving the naval dispute. Wilson instructed Daniels, “Do not leave this matter
in the hands of naval officers. Take it up with Lloyd George. You are both civilians and will understand the situation better than men who belong to the profes25
sion of arms.” If Wilson now considered Benson poorly suited to a role in the
negotiations, he could have turned to other naval advisers who were on good
terms with the British. For instance, William S. Sims, the administration’s liaison
with the Admiralty during the war, had established an excellent working relationship with the British and would have been a fine diplomat and able negotiator. Wilson, however, mistrusted Sims, probably because Sims had been the
naval aide to his Republican rival in the 1912 election, Theodore Roosevelt.
On 1 April Daniels had a breakfast meeting with Lloyd George and Long. The
prime minister suggested, “You ought to stop work on your cruisers and dreadnoughts if you really believe in the League of Nations.” Daniels responded that
limits to the U.S. program could not be invoked before the League was a reality.
When the prime minister insisted the defense of the empire required naval supremacy, Daniels countered that the imperatives of the Monroe Doctrine demanded even greater U.S. naval forces, since American interests included not
just the Western Hemisphere but Pacific possessions as well. Lloyd George exploded: “Do you mean to say that your country dominates Mexico, Central
America, and all South America?” Lloyd George and Daniels were now at an impasse as intractable as the admirals’ had been. With British support for the
League dependent on U.S. acceptance of a subordinate position in naval
strength, the negotiations were deadlocked. On 6 April, Wilson, in a dramatic
26
step, prepared to leave the conference for the United States. One gets the impression he was using the old salesman’s trick of threatening to leave the negotiations simply to apply pressure.
If so, the ploy seems to have worked, for over the next few days Colonel House
and Lord Robert Cecil, who was responsible for British negotiations on a League
of Nations, worked to broker a compromise to save the conference and the
League. Cecil had been an early advocate of the League and understood that
27
Anglo-American cooperation would be critical to its success. Happily, both
men also understood that their respective nations would have to make concessions in their mutual interests. In his diary for 3 April, House recounted a visit
from Benson that morning urging him to uphold the naval building program:
“Benson is a little obsessed with this idea.” House explained to the admiral that
“if the League was to have a chance of life, it would not do to start its existence by
increasing armaments instead of diminishing them.”28 House believed it was
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sufficient to complete the 1916 program, but Benson and Daniels continued to
press for naval parity with Britain. Wilson should have intervened to settle the
dispute among his representatives. His failure to do so is likely explained by the
fact he was by then consumed with his clash with Prime Minister Georges
29
Clemenceau over French demands to detach the Rhineland from Germany.
Daniels would later disparage House for failing to gain both freedom of the
seas and naval parity at the peace conference: “We never lowered our flag of
30
equality.” At the same time, the Naval Advisory Staff in Paris produced another
memorandum for Benson reinforcing the Navy Department’s position. The
staff argued that the crucial test for the League would be its ability to restrain its
strongest member, Great Britain. The success of the League, then, would depend
on naval equality between the United States and Britain. The paper warned
darkly: “Every great commercial rival of the British Empire has eventually found
31
itself at war with Great Britain and has been defeated.”
Meanwhile, Cecil was urging the prime minister to moderate his position.
The crisis of the moment was Lloyd George’s refusal to support a Monroe Doctrine amendment to the League covenant without an Anglo-American naval
agreement. Cecil pressed Lloyd George to accept the amendment and thereby
keep the question of the League separate from the thorny naval question. In
Cecil’s words, however, “the little man was obdurate.” Finding him immovable,
Cecil appealed directly to House. He reminded House that “to inaugurate the
League of Nations by a competition in armaments between its two chief supporters would doom it to complete sterility or worse.” He admitted that the position was being complicated by Britain’s deep-seated popular sentiment about
sea power but pointed out that Britain was more vulnerable to a naval blockade
than any other power, while the United States could “laugh at any blockade.”
Cecil confided to House that were he the naval minister and saw Britain’s sea security threatened, even by the United States, he would “have to recommend to
my fellow countrymen to spend their last shilling in bringing our fleet up to the
point which I was advised was necessary for safety.” Cecil then suggested a compromise solution: Could the United States abandon or modify its new naval
building program as soon as the treaty with the League covenant was signed?
Cecil was confident his government would give corresponding assurances. The
two nations might consult one another from year to year about their naval pro32
grams. Here was a formula that “saved face” for both naval powers.
After gaining the president’s approval, House responded on the next day. The
United States could not alter the 1916 naval program but would readily abandon
the 1918 program, which was not yet authorized. House conveyed Wilson’s assurance that he understood Britain’s “peculiar position as an Island Empire.”
This was not enough for Lloyd George, who still hoped for a formal naval
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agreement that limited U.S. building, but further assurances on 10 April finally
won over the prime minister. Wilson pledged the United States had no intention
of entering a naval competition with Britain. Furthermore, ships from the 1916
program that had not yet been laid down would be postponed, pending an
Anglo-American naval agreement.
33
The “naval battle of Paris” had at last ended.
Josephus Daniels pronounced it a draw, as have most historians since. While
Lloyd George failed to gain formal American recognition of British sea supremacy, he did avoid the enshrining of the American principle of freedom of the seas
in the peace treaty. Belligerent rights in wartime remained intact. Moreover, the
door was left open for further negotiations that would eventually lead to the
Washington Conference of 1921. The Wilson administration secured British
support for Wilson’s peace program without acknowledging British sea suprem34
acy, and Congress could in the future still authorize “a navy second to none.”
But had the threat of a naval arms race been necessary to achieve Wilson’s program? Seth Tillman sees no evidence that the threat of U.S. naval competition
35
modified the fundamental British position. In any case, Wilson’s threat to Britain’s naval supremacy, however artificial it may have been, proved counterproductive. Britain had manifested greater enthusiasm than any other European
power for Wilson’s ideals. The only significant disagreement was over freedom
of the seas, which Wilson abandoned early in the game. Wilson could have taken
British support for most of his program for granted had it not been for the naval
competition he sponsored.
The “naval battle of Paris” demonstrates three lessons very well. One is that a
cooperative approach in the negotiations, enlarging mutual interests and developing collaboration, would have been more productive in the end. Negotiation
theorists have developed a number of principles that this historical case seems to
support. Woodrow Wilson’s and David Lloyd George’s “hardball” negotiating
styles, on the one hand, and House’s and Cecil’s search for mutually beneficial
solutions, on the other, represent the two major paradigms of negotiation theory—bargaining and problem solving. While bargaining characterizes most negotiations, it implies a zero-sum dynamic. For example, diplomacy between
Cold War rivals naturally took this form. Nevertheless, in an era of globalization
where mutual dependence characterizes the system, problem solving may be the
better approach. P. Terrence Hopmann insists that most research reveals that
problem solving produces “more frequent, efficient, equitable, and durable
36
agreements than bargaining does.” Most negotiations, however, are neither
purely competitive nor collaborative but what negotiation theorists call
“mixed motive” scenarios, involving both mutual dependence and conflict.
In his classic theoretical work on negotiation, Thomas Schelling notes that
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mutual dependence demands collaboration and mutual accommodation, although one party can exploit dependence for unilateral gain as Wilson attempted in 1919. Schelling also recognizes that threats (hard bargaining) can be
used to coerce an ally as well as deter an enemy. The difference is one of degree:
37
the degree of the threat must match the objective and be credible. By this measure, Wilson’s naval challenge to Britain was out of all proportion to his objectives at Paris. Furthermore, once it became apparent the Senate would not
approve Wilson’s 1918 naval construction program, the threat would be no longer credible. Although the 1916 program remained to cause the British anxiety,
the immediate threat to British naval supremacy had passed.
Another element the “naval battle of Paris” illustrates is axiomatic: the character and personality of the negotiator matters a great deal, especially in an era of
presidential diplomacy. Woodrow Wilson, more than any prior president and all
but a few presidents since, personally directed diplomacy. Wilson became estranged from his only trusted emissary, House, as soon as he showed initiative
beyond Wilson’s skittish tolerance. His secretary of state, Robert Lansing, had
had the temerity to disagree with his chief and was no longer a member of Wilson’s councils. Historians have noted Wilson’s arrogance and his inclination to
38
surround himself with sycophants. Margaret MacMillan, who has written the
definitive account of the Paris Peace Conference, quotes the French ambassador
to the United States as reporting that Wilson “does not have the slightest concep39
tion that he can ever be wrong.” Of course, other leaders have had these faults
yet managed to govern well. But Wilson’s arrogance made him unyielding, and
that unsuited him for the give-and-take of diplomacy. Seth Tillman concludes
that although the United States and Britain shared many common interests and
objectives at the peace conference, the “alienation of temperaments” between
Wilson and Lloyd George precluded close cooperation. He implies that Wilson
was the more at fault, because of his limited capacity for concession and accom40
modation. Perhaps Lloyd George summed up Wilson’s qualities best, when he
remembered Wilson as having embodied an “extraordinary mixture of real
41
greatness thwarted by much littleness.”
Finally, the “naval battle of Paris” is instructive in that it took place in the context of failed attempts to establish a system of collective security and to restore
global trade and prosperity. Two authors writing in this journal on the U.S. sea
services’ 2007 maritime strategy, Geoffrey Till and Robert Rubel, cite historian
Niall Ferguson’s thesis that the world was globalizing until the catastrophic
42
Great War destroyed the international order. The parallels with our own time
are obvious—an international system is developing that makes multiple great
powers mutually dependent on global trade. As in the era of the First World War,
globalization today is fragile. Great-power rivalry and the growing power of
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nonstate actors pose critical risks to the postmodern era of globalization. The
risks to the system demand cooperative multilateralism. In a recent article in
Foreign Affairs, Richard Haass predicts, “There will be a premium on consultation and coalition building and on a diplomacy that encourages
cooperation when possible and shields such cooperation from the fallout of in43
evitable disagreements.”
National security strategy documents already signal a shift toward greater
multilateralism. In language that harks back to Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric, The
National Strategy for Maritime Security promises to strengthen international
partnerships, advance global trade, and abide by the “principles of freedom of
44
the seas.” Likewise, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower stresses
45
the need to promote collective security and the rule of law. While these documents recognize the need to maintain naval strength and war-fighting capabil46
ity, they also assert that “preventing wars is as important as winning wars.” This
implies a marriage of sea power and effective diplomacy. Furthermore, these
strategies recognize that no single nation, not even the United States, has the resources to protect all the world’s seas. With the global economy slowing and revealing its weaknesses, the truth of this maxim is all the more apparent.
Interestingly, this same truth dawned on Great Britain in 1918–19, when the
British recognized that their economy could no longer sustain the ruinous expenditures required by global naval superiority.
Woodrow Wilson’s vision is perhaps more relevant than ever. Whether or not
a single international organization is the right vehicle, as Wilson assumed it was,
greater multilateral cooperation is imperative. Wilson’s peace program failed to
prevent a second Great War not because his vision of collective security
was unreliable but because his diplomacy was flawed. National chauvinism
was incompatible with Wilson’s internationalist peace program. The Wilson
administration created what Michael Simpson has called “an artificial naval rivalry” that continued for another decade and prevented close cooperation be47
tween the two great sea powers at a critical moment in history. We are likely
living in a similar epoch, and cooperation between sea powers could mean the
difference between peace and stability or the collapse of globalization.
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FUNDAMENTALS OF STRATEGY
The Legacy of Henry Eccles
Scott A. Boorman

M

any people have valuable insights regarding strategy. Much less widespread is a capability of generating fresh and important analytical insights
at will or on command as new strategic situations and problems arise.
Here we aim to capture the active ingredients of precisely such a capability
that took shape at the Naval War College shortly after World War II. Emanating
from efforts of the Spruance-era College to integrate analytically, and to codify
for the benefit of the United States in future conflicts, lessons learned from U.S.
military successes in the Pacific in a time of maximum naval effort, this body
of analytical thought and writing is exceedingly valuable. While much has
changed, many of the most basic realities of how logistics permeates strategy remain as true now as then. Because this military and intellectual legacy is now at
risk of being imperfectly remembered, when it is remembered at all, this article
also aims to bring to current attention some important early post–World War II
Naval War College writing on strategy.
The leader in these steps to codify relevant military lessons was then-Captain
1
Henry E. Eccles, USN (he retired in 1952 as a rear admiral). Starting during the
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Naval War College presidency of Admiral Raymond
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itary and logistics analysis in the tradition of Admiral
Eccles, his research interests include mathematical
served as founding head (1947–51) of the Departmodels of social structure and processes, network analyment of Logistics (later renamed Department of
sis, effects of information technology, complex statutes,
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Strategy and Logistics) at the College.2 In part reflecting strands of Eccles’s World War II experience in the
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Pacific, where he was eventually charged with planning
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coordination of all bases of all U.S. armed services for the planned invasion of Japan (projected to involve up to five million American military personnel),
Eccles’s written analytical work on war and logistics has a notably systematic
3
quality and an eye for structural issues. Eccles served at the heart of the Pacific
War U.S. naval effort, one of the major success stories in world military history,
and he knew in an unfiltered way the ingredients that made that success possible; the distinction between the militarily vital, the important, and the merely
desirable; what is military reality versus arrows on a map or word pictures in
smooth language. He had the insight, motivation, and tenacity to put this
knowledge down on paper—in the blunt, unvarnished language of U.S. naval
officers of his era, using few acronyms and without civilian jargon.
This work initially took shape in the form of numerous unpublished documents circulated in the Navy and beyond, augmented by extensive correspondence. Eventually, this military thought began to appear in journal articles and
4
books by Eccles. Supplemented at points by comments noting applications of
Eccles’s insights to twenty-first-century contexts, this article builds on research
with the Eccles Papers held in the Naval Historical Collection at the Naval War
5
College.
Two key observations—one substantive, one methodological—anchor and
orient the present inquiry. The first is that strategy, in both theory and practice,
is permeated and shaped by three sets of forces: logistical, psychological (partic6
ularly centering on the psychological aspects of command), and bureaucratic.
In modern war each of these forces is always present and always important.
Something of the complexity of the exercise of modern high command is suggested by the fact that the three sets of forces, viewed in dynamic systems terms,
exhibit very different operating characteristics yet coexist (often in tightly coupled ways) in the concrete conflict situations that commanders must navigate.
The second observation is more Clausewitzian: while the application of strategic principles to particular situations is infinitely variable and at times subtle,
the fundamentals of strategy are relatively few and simple. This means that it is
feasible to create a concise but carefully structured statement of these fundamentals that can be drawn on as a conceptual aid, or template, to help craft strategic approaches as current strategic conditions mutate and fundamentally new
7
situations arise.
Inevitably such a template of theory can reach only so far, and its central
use is creation of a sound starting point that more detailed analysis should
develop further in any given concrete context. Inevitably too, practical use of
theory can never be fully mechanized, and there is always a key element of interpretation—and therefore of intellectual craftsmanship—in moving from theory to application.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

98

Naval War College: Full Spring 2009 Issue

BOORMAN

93

The analytical discussion below is structured in three parts. The first is a definition (or description) of the concept of strategy. The second places strategy in a
larger context (an analytical activity that may also be conceived as exploring pertinent “boundary conditions” that shape strategy). The third elaborates, subject
to space constraints in this article, upon three specific interlocking themes: logistics, control, and flexibility. This third part is particularly conceived in the
spirit of helping strategists ask good questions and generate creative strategic
ideas. It is not intended to illuminate all dimensions of this many-dimensional
subject.
For analytic focus, our emphasis is primarily (though not exclusively) on
political-military affairs, which are the traditional heart of strategic studies—though in an ever more complex and civilianized world it is increasingly
clear that many twenty-first-century growing points of strategic theory and
practice will bear little surface resemblance to twentieth-century war. Here
again the legacy of the early post–World War II Naval War College shows its
tough intellectual fiber to advantage, since the tripartite emphasis on approaching strategy from the perspectives of logistics, command psychology, and bureaucracy that took shape in that era is well suited to encouraging clear thinking
about the conflict environments of the century we are now in.
WHAT STRATEGY IS
The roots of the present analysis lie in a terse memorandum, one of the best
short writings on strategy ever penned, written in 1955 by Herbert Rosinski, a
8
Nazi-era émigré German historian. Central to this document is its theme of
“strategy as control,” which (as importantly further developed by Eccles with an
9
eye to logistics) may be stated in shorthand form as follows:
Strategy = the comprehensive direction of power to
control situations and areas to attain broad objectives.

Given the game-theoretic focus that nowadays so often structures the discussion
of issues deemed “strategic,” it is important to note that the concept of strategy
10
advanced here is essentially a substantive, not a mathematical, one. This is as
it should be, since actual strategic problems are typically far too complex to be
reliably reduced to any single formalism. It is also important that the definition of strategy just given also combines well with further definitions of tactics
11
and logistics.
Each element of this definition—comprising the seven words or phrases listed
below—deserves careful scrutiny and exegesis. It is useful to be alert to ways in
which a particular word or phrase can be misused or misunderstood—thus illuminating roots of strategic error (a rich area for strategic analysis whose crucial
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99

94

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 2, Art. 1

importance Clausewitz intuitively grasped and that much game theory tends to
ignore or deemphasize).
Comprehensive orients one toward framing strategic calculation as broadly
as possible, missing no “level.” It is remarkable how often intelligent, educated
people fail to grasp this and by so doing fall short of thinking strategically.
Elaborating on “comprehensive” points to three broad classes of problems fac12
ing a strategist:

• Control of the external field of action, whose central focus is the adversary or
adversaries (but may also be expanded to include allies and neutrals).

• Control of the internal field of action, whose focus is the roots of power on
which the strategist draws (e.g., political, public opinion, producer logistics, industrial base, and other “upstream” sources of power, at times extending to the family and social network of a leader or commander).

• Control of the means of control. In the modern era, such means widely pivot
on the general staffs used to surmount cognitive and physical limitations
on any commander, but also come to involve other bureaucracies, complex
organizations, and social networks, many outside the traditional “defense
13
establishment.” Control of the means of control is far more complex than
it first appears, too commonly draining the creativity crucially needed for
the other two problems. Twentieth-century experience suggests two basic
insights: first, that there is a powerful dynamic by which machinery to exert
such control tends to become ever more elaborate, so that its use requires
14
more learning time and attention from commanders; second, that such
machinery is a breeding ground for organizational failures, perhaps multi15
ple, at times of low visibility.
Direction involves the standard sorts of “s/he thinks I think s/he thinks” calculations widely associated with “thinking strategically” in a world attuned to
modern game theory. It also involves many other things, including (for example)
less glamorous but exceedingly crucial logistics calculations as well as active use
of diplomatic skill sets to navigate the outer boundaries of the authority a
commander wields.
Power needs to be given very broad scope, subsuming many different species
of power, military and civilian alike. The complexity of twenty-first-century societies invites imaginative identification of new species of power. Because of the
universal dependence on some form of logistics support, the exercise of power
in practice is often much more complex and more decentralized than is power in
theory—which means that it is often productive to analyze particular types of
16
power through the prism of their logistics requirements.
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In strategic environments where certain types of power are “off the table” at a
given time (i.e., are not effectively usable to achieve given political ends), a basic
challenge for strategists is developing intuition for when a particular type of
power has moved, or is about to move, from an “effectively unusable” to an “ef17
fectively usable” category (or vice versa). Note that the dynamics here, centering around qualitative change in a conflict situation, are frequently more
psychological and at times bureaucratic than technical and accordingly may easily elude analyses based on rational-choice assumptions—with a concomitant
potential for strategic surprise, such as when foes come from very different
cultures.
Control—and focus on its implications and ramifications—is the active ingredient of Rosinski’s seminal 1955 contribution; as control’s antithesis he
points to a “haphazard series of improvisations.” Importantly, control is also a
highly developed engineering concept, a fact that can be used to facilitate conveying strategic ideas to military officers and relevant civilians whose professional roots often lie in engineering and allied areas. One key advantage of
conceptualizing “strategy as control” is the way it invites—as not all concepts of
“strategy” do—exploration of a natural agenda of questions concerning temporal
and other parameters of control (see below). In fact, the control that a strategist is
able to exert often amounts to little more than a “patch” on more basic ongoing
dynamics—for instance, political, economic, demographic, epidemiological.
The phrase situations and areas represents the contexts within which control is
sought. Note that the present definition of strategy steps beyond the geopolitical,
often deeply territorial focus of the world wars and much other warfare, giving
flexibility to subsume, say, bureaucratic warfare, “inner court” factional politics,
and other frequently bitter and protracted, yet not territorial, struggles.
Attaining objectives raises the challenge of defining the criteria of judgment
underlying this concept—and in a surprising array of strategic problems such
criteria are notably unclear.
Objectives refers to actual, not declaratory, strategy. In a world where public
relations has become a function of command often no less important than the
classic duties of a general staff, it is all too easy for strategists to let their declaratory strategies edit their real goals. In one limiting case of this kind of error, the
“objective” is replaced by a mere slogan—which may be accepted with little analysis within an inner circle of high command as well as circulated among a wider
public. High-level decision makers in totalitarian (and some authoritarian)
societies may be particularly prone to this sort of pitfall, sometimes opening
exploitable vulnerabilities because their decision support structures explicitly
lack the traditions of “airing” of alternative positions on issues and general intel18
lectual openness historically associated with the Naval War College.
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An interesting and increasingly important variant problem may arise when a
mission statement is frozen into statute, with all the legal ramifications that
brings with it.
The antidote for such pitfalls starts with sound, careful, even plodding analysis of actual strategic objectives—that is, clarification of what the strategist truly
must accomplish. Breadth of objectives, however—which is one of the true hallmarks of strategy, by contrast to tactics (a distinction game theory characteristically elides)—means that such analysis is rarely trivial, precisely because broad
goals are typically intangible, at times highly abstract, and therefore elusive. To
this problem of analysis, which lies at the heart of strategic tasks, we return
shortly.
STRATEGY IN A LARGER CONTEXT
There are three ways in which a larger context imposes structure on strategy and
strategic planning.
Strategic Objectives and Their Analysis
The purest form of strategic labor is the analysis of objectives. Although not sufficient by itself, the first (and often psychologically difficult) step in effective
analysis of this sort in concrete situations is recognizing that here lies a challenging, often deep, problem—one that certainly outstrips the capabilities of any
single formal or other “model.”
Concepts like “victory” and “defeat” (or indeed “war” and “peace”) are commonly of little help in analyzing objectives. The difficulty of this task (compounded if a strategic situation is rapidly changing) may be greatly magnified by
potent psychological and bureaucratic forces contributing to what is sometimes
19
known as “goal displacement.” Additional factors may also frustrate clear analysis of objectives. For example, too clear an analysis may tend to undermine the
roots of a strategist’s authority—or the glue that holds together a coalition.20
The task of analyzing objectives is frequently elided or otherwise underestimated by the intellectual traditions of “rational choice,” which widely posit that
objectives or their functional equivalents and proxies (e.g., payoff values assigned to game outcomes) have already been effectively analyzed and may there21
fore simply be treated as known parameters.
With the crucial proviso that strategy must always remain dominant—logistics exists to serve strategy, never the other way around—logistics analysis must
always accompany the strategic imagination. Such analysis includes continually
probing the boundary between what is logistically feasible and what is not, and
other logistics ramifications of strategic objectives. Logistics analysis may at
times advise changes of goals—because of logistics limitations on one’s own side

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

102

Naval War College: Full Spring 2009 Issue

BOORMAN

97

or an adversary’s exploitable logistics weaknesses. It should also be borne in
mind that logistics (from well functioning supply chains to the health of the
population) is the engine of the better peace that is the ultimate aim of most
wars—and that engine requires analysis, not just after the war but during it.
22
Language and semantic analysis have roles to play too. Part of the task in analyzing strategic objectives is to ferret out conceptual failures—because hazily envisioned future events are the focus—lurking beneath the smooth language in
23
which polished statements of high-level strategic objectives are so often framed.
Because quantification in high-level strategic matters commonly has limited
meaning or utility, as a practical matter the analysis of objectives commonly involves devising a hierarchy of qualitative goals, conjoined with a timetable for
their accomplishment. It is worth bearing in mind that there are many instances,
worldwide, where high-level strategies—and decisions highly relevant to U.S.
national interests—emanate from people who are not professional soldiers, who
may literally never have heard of a U.S. military operation order, and whose ap24
proaches to objectives differ fundamentally from those of the U.S. military.
Relationship between Strategy and the Type of War Being Fought
25
This is the second genuinely deep problem facing the strategist: correctly analyzing the social, political, and other dynamics that form the larger context of
FOUR FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURES: SELECTED RESEARCH FOCI

Notes:
a. Formal organizational tables of organization, plus command, control, and communications.
b. Multiple types of interlocking networks.
c. Shorthand for complex doctrine in a legal-administrative sense.
d. Information technology (IT)—including algorithms, software, computer networks, and implementation.
These structures, each a component of the twenty-first-century landscape presenting formidable control challenges, are marked by massive and growing complexity; are distinct but ever more interlocked; are new in significant aspects (symbolized by the bidirectional arrows); often have major but inconspicuous impacts; and require analysis, singly and in combination.
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war and peace, with an eye to identifying opportunities to piggyback strategic
control on more basic structural patterns and trends. More than an intelligence
problem, this is a task for broad and creative social observation and analysis,
26
commonly requiring a mix of qualitative and quantitative strands.
In a related spirit, the figure aims to help break strategists’ attentions out of
the grip of standard emphases in the lion’s share of twentieth-century writings
on war and strategy, focusing instead on analyzing four fundamental structures
that will, singly and jointly, do much to shape twenty-first-century conflict environments. Deleting any vertex in this figure, or collapsing any two vertices, risks
significant analytical distortion, because the operating characteristics of each
type of structure are different from those of the other ones.
In a world where markets with prices rule, an important Eccles caution merits
restating: the ability to carry out the relevant analysis effectively is “a rare intel27
lectual quality that cannot be made to order or purchased on the open market.”
Failure in this task of analysis portends perhaps the greatest controllable pitfall
facing any strategist—that of attempting to operate strategically in an imaginary
world!
A crucial strand of the analytic problem here lies in recognizing what Martin
Shubik has termed the “games within the game.” These are subsidiary games involving often extraneous political purposes whose existence greatly complicates
the main “game” in which the strategist is centrally involved, giving lasting,
nontrivial meaning to Clausewitz’s fundamental insistence on the primacy of
28
war’s political purpose.
Roots of Strategy in National or Other Human Values
The third deep way in which larger context impinges on the strategist is the need
to craft strategy to be in harmony with the fundamental values of the larger collectivity (nation, party, faction, or other) that the strategist serves. Such values
may include that collectivity’s concepts of victory and defeat, its affinity with
certain weapons or tools of conflict, and its affinity with certain overall styles of
conflict (e.g., short war versus protracted war, positional versus mobile versus
guerrilla warfare). Harmony with such fundamental, often tacit, values can be a
vast source of strategic strength. In some ways, such harmony is akin to an intangible logistics reserve—a reserve of strategic poise and stamina. In the World
War II era, U.S. strategy achieved and sustained notable harmony with fundamental values and aspirations of the American people. In Vietnam, there was
enormous—and ultimately insuperable—friction between the personal values
and goals of a large segment of the American population and war aims in a pro29
tracted land war in Asia.
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Of course, value harmonization issues face adversaries no less than one’s own
side. This fact creates an enduring niche for analysis geared to recognizing often
subtle strategic opportunities arising when an adversary’s course of action starts
to veer away from his fundamental values, with concomitant potential for exploitable adversary mistakes. Recognizing this kind of opportunity requires special alertness to pitfalls of “mirror imaging” often born of bureaucracy.
IN SEARCH OF PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY
What follows is an Eccles-inspired line of inquiry for orienting and structuring a particular strategic analysis project. The central themes of this line of
inquiry—logistics, control, flexibility—may also be interpreted as “probes” into
principles of strategy.30 Inevitably, given present space constraints, each basic
point below can be raised only briefly and may require imaginative analogical
thinking—or a translator’s instincts—if full benefit is to be derived in application to twenty-first-century conflict situations very different from World War II.
Advanced-base development work, where a major part of Eccles’s World War
II experience lay, was a distinctive and in many ways nontraditional brand of logistics—one marked by an integrative viewpoint spanning many functional logistics specialties while looking simultaneously forward to combat areas and
31
back across the Pacific to the continental United States. This viewpoint, in
which long-haul transportation issues held center stage and underlined key differences between short- and long-range amphibious operations, did much to
shape Eccles’s larger view of the logistics process in relation to strategy. As was
thoroughly appreciated by Eccles and other analysts at the early post–World
War II Naval War College, logistics in modern warfare is inherently a sophisticated concept with important pure and applied, as well as command and tech32
nical, levels.
Many of the logistics insights of the World War II era that Eccles codified have
been thoroughly assimilated and institutionalized by the U.S. military. Yet areas
of structural tension and debate persist, and some trade-offs defy permanent
33
resolution. To shed light on such issues, logistics lessons learned from U.S.
World War II success must be constantly restudied, restated, and retaught—in
ways, one hopes, that attract genuine interest, animated by a sense of curiosity,
from broad audiences of U.S. military officers plus relevant civilians. Application of the same basic lessons remains significantly less well incorporated in U.S.
logistics capabilities for supporting strategic action of nonmilitary types
(among them, capabilities for “nation building”). Meanwhile, a third application
of those lessons pertains to Liddell Hart’s “the other side of the hill”—i.e., the
situation of the adversary. U.S. adversaries have often not learned how to do
some basic part of their logistics quite right, so that a further strand of the living
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legacy of Admiral Eccles is to suggest ways of identifying and exploiting resulting
vulnerabilities.
For working purposes here, logistics—following Eccles—may be defined as
the creation and sustained support of weapons and forces to be tactically
employed to attain strategic objectives. Yet more simply: “Logistics is the means of
34
war.”
In the background of this description lies the concept that logistics is a dynamic system, one whose operating characteristics are a rich source of principles
closely related to, yet not the same as, directly strategic principles, specifically including those familiar from the rubric of the “principles of war.”35 In modern
warfare, this dynamic system is heavily implemented through an enormously
complex defense bureaucracy, yet it has an identity that is not simply reducible
to such bureaucracy. While logistics is closely related to economics, the logistics
process also importantly operates in many nonmarket contexts—including, of
course, combat environments. For related reasons, logistics analysis is not reducible to, even though it obviously overlaps with, standard economic analysis.
Logistics processes have important psychological dimensions (e.g., Eccles emphasized the role of social trust in the provision of logistics support in combat or
36
other wartime conditions). Such psychological aspects of logistics often
coexist awkwardly with standard rational-choice models of the sort that most
economists favor.
Logistics permeates military effort, and in many military contexts the true
contest, extending to both war and peace, is as much between two logistics systems as between two sets of tactical organizations (indeed, it is possible to parse
the Cold War from this viewpoint). To appreciate the true force of this point, it is
important to recognize that logistics factors and principles continue to operate—often with enormously potent effects—whatever those factors and principles may be called. Military terminology is often driven by bureaucratic “chop
lines” and other organizational compromises, so that much logistics structure
and process in modern warfare appear in other guises. Components of a military
establishment that are actually designated as “logistics” organizations are there37
fore frequently pale reflections of the true magnitude of the logistics process.
Building on this background, what follows may be treated as a candidate for
38
the “first principle of strategic logistics.”
In modern war, logistics is the soft underbelly of combat power, vastly more
vulnerable to effective attack—at times direct and obvious, at times indirect and
low-visibility—than is the combat power itself. Underscoring this proposition is
the enormous sweep of logistics activities, ranging over supply, transportation,
base development, weapons systems support, maintenance and repair, personnel, and medical and public health functions. Exploiting the consequences of
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the adversary’s logistics dependence, while defending against logistics depredations by an alert, aggressive foe, is therefore a pivotal ingredient of modern strategy as well as a fine illustration of the strategic necessity of a comprehensive
perspective that ranges far beyond standard combat operations.
Post–World War II analyses suggest that the Japanese missed many opportunities to attack the complicated and often fragile logistics on which U.S. offen39
sives in the Pacific depended. From that day to this it is not obvious that the
United States has ever faced a major adversary who has pushed as hard and as
imaginatively as possible to attack the logistics system on which U.S. military
strength depends. There exist strands of relevant U.S. military experience (e.g.,
Iraqi Scud missile attack on the port city of Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, during Op40
eration DESERT STORM); nonetheless, the nation may remain in some ways an
41
inexperienced superpower in “logistics war.”
By extension (although the terminology used is often different), logistics is
also a major source of vulnerability in nonmilitary types of conflict, with the
high connectivity and fragility of civilian society affording a combinatorial explosion of logistics targets. U.S. vulnerabilities to sabotage—including its more
subtle forms, such as “slow-down or misdirection of effort in certain key industries”—particularly caught Eccles’s attention during his years as head of the Na42
val War College Logistics Department.
But the dependence of strategy on logistics has further—and in some ways
yet more far-reaching and challenging—ramifications. Perhaps surprisingly for
some audiences, the heart of Eccles’s logistics thought, as documented by careful
reading of the Eccles Papers, actually points is a somewhat different direction
from that just explored.
Specifically, in much of modern warfare the most important (and difficult)
“game” confronting a commander may be that associated with the struggle to assert command and control over his own logistics (a struggle on which any ad43
verse effects of hostile action are an overlay). Central here is the principle of the
“logistics snowball,” which in Eccles’s classic formulation describes the tendency
of the logistics support of combat power to grow to a size out of all proportion to
that of the combat forces supported—until, like a snowball being pushed up a
hill, logistics becomes so massive and sluggish that further progress is barely
44
possible.
This is a fundamental insight into how logistics systems behave as dynamic
45
systems, as true in the twenty-first century as in the World War II era. Major
contemporary versions and generalizations of the “snowball” effect and its ramifications may be found in many of the structures on which twenty-first-century
societies rest (see again the figure on page 97): bureaucracy and complex organizations; social networks (comprising multiple types of network ties);
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algorithms, software, and computer networks; and complex statutes and administrative regulations—among them, procurement regulations.
To the extent that taming the snowball is not an impossible game, the feasibility of doing so crucially depends on application for strategic purposes of a further set of fundamental principles centering on command and control of the
46
logistics process. Here it is important that under peacetime conditions logis47
tics responsibilities tend to become diffuse. This means that when war or other
crises come, the “game” of taming relevant snowball(s) may easily have no outcome consistent with achieving a larger strategic purpose within the finite time
48
window allowed by such external forces as public opinion.
Under twenty-first-century conditions this may be an exceptionally important
principle, applicable to future uses of power by the United States. To anchor this
problem in recent U.S. military experience in Iraq, consider a question posed by
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates in his 29 September 2008 speech to a National
Defense University audience: “Why did we have to go outside the normal bureaucratic process to develop counter-IED [improvised explosive device] technologies, to build MRAPs [mine resistant ambush protected vehicles], and to quickly
49
expand our ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capability?”
The difficulty (and urgency) of controlling the logistics snowball naturally
begets a further principle: especially given the ultrahigh dimensionality of modern logistics, dependence of strategy on logistics also gives ample room for updated and expanded versions of the old saying “He who controls the spare parts
controls the operation.”
With the caveat that strategy must always remain dominant, enough has been
said to suggest a further principle: At sufficiently high levels of command—and
perhaps separately, at sufficiently deep levels of analysis—strategy and logistics
50
tend to coalesce.
Strategy-as-control is not about making no mistakes. The cold, pale light of
logistics reality alone makes this virtually impossible. Success tends to go to the
side that makes the fewest mistakes, or at any rate the fewest major ones. “Control” is, in short, often a highly imperfect construct—a point that many devotees
of mathematics in strategic analysis tend to miss.
One reason the strategy-as-control theme is so productive as a launching
point for the development of strategic principles is that it invites a range of
searching analytic questions in any given strategic context (consider, e.g., a context involving potential use of biological weapons or of weapons whose use has
long-term environmental implications).
One useful specific list of such questions appears in Eccles’s writings on strategy.51 This list follows (and note that the more seriously any of the questions on
it is pursued, the more logistics issues tend to arise):
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What to control [i.e., the object or objects of control; and note here that
strategy-as-control is commonly cumulative],
What is the purpose of this control,
What is the nature of the control,
What degree of control is necessary,
When the control is to be initiated,
How long the control is to be maintained,
What general method or scheme of control is to be used.

Perhaps most fundamentally, strategy-as-control clarifies the essential unity
of its subject matter across diverse spheres of human action. At the same time,
the concept also encourages analysis of interesting special cases—for example,
52
control directed at the self.
Grand strategy may be interpreted as a special case where either: (1) control is
sought with a distinctively deep time horizon (e.g., as in “grand strategy of the
53
Chinese empire”); or (2) the search for such control has a distinctively combinatorial aspect, bringing into play a mix of tools of many kinds—among them,
54
diplomatic, psychological, and economic, as well as purely military. The sheer
multiplicity of types of networks simultaneously in play in many twentyfirst-century conflicts is compelling more conflict actors than ever before—many of them nongovernmental—to attempt to think and operate as
grand strategists in sense (2). As the long twentieth-century century road to
55
building U.S. joint operations capability suggests by partial analogy, actually
56
achieving the integration of tools grand strategy requires is far from easy. Indeed,
such integration is in many ways harder than that involved in military joint operations, since nonmilitary tools are so diverse—often relative to each other no less
than to military ones—and are intertwined with comparably diverse organiza57
tions, logistics, and even basic assumptions about human nature and society.
Even beneath a level of grand strategy, the strategy-as-control theme valuably
deflects focus from any one tool or weapon of conflict (which, pushed to a logical limit, produces the pathology Eccles dubbed “weapon strategy”), instead expanding attention given to integrated employment of all available tools in
generating the desired extent and nature of control. Because so many military
officers and relevant civilian professionals have career backgrounds heavily invested in specific weapons systems, a strategy-as-control viewpoint can do valu58
able service in helping avert incipient “weapon strategy” traps. Here again it is
relevant to note that strategy-as-control connects on a basic level with themes of
control central to modern engineering theory and practice (note, for example,
the crucial importance of time and timing factors in strategy). A particularly
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important strand of the strategy-as-control theme—one that will be of
fundamental importance in many twenty-first-century contexts—is its profound connection with a world of ever deeper dependence on software and the
59
mathematical-logical algorithms that software embodies.
One major contrast case for strategy-as-control is “strategy as destruction,” a
60
false equation that received much currency early in the nuclear age. This false
equation finds more recent reflection in widespread tacit assumptions that biological or chemical attacks are necessarily geared to creating maximum feasible
destructive impact on a human group, as contrasted with more nuanced manipulations of political and social processes in target societies.61
Strategy-as-control is also a fine starting point for capturing, comparing, and
transposing the active ingredients of some of the most distinguished contributions to strategic thought spanning many cultures and historical eras. Among
these are (moving roughly from east to west): Chinese (here note not only Sun
Tzu and the Chinese military tradition but also lessons born of two millenniums
of imperial Chinese bureaucracy), Mongol, Indian subcontinent, Iranian (e.g.,
note mirrors-of-princes advice literature), Arab, Ottoman, and Byzantine. In
some cases non-Western strategic and other intellectual traditions may contain
important insights about control possibilities that are little known or developed
62
in Western contexts.
A focus on strategy-as-control leads naturally to a focus on strategic flexibility and its roots. In some contexts, strategy certainly demands decisive action or
some extremely carefully reasoned form of irreversible commitment of the sort
63
analyzed in the strategic writings of Thomas Schelling. Yet the fog of war,
fluidity of long-term situations, and ultimately the opacity of complex social
structure and process itself (perhaps the richest of all sources of uncertainty
facing a strategist) guarantee that strategic flexibility needs to be available when
desired—as it often will be.
In thinking about the roots of flexibility, or deficit thereof, it is helpful to distinguish two quite different classes of contributing factors, each having many
strands. In this regard, note also a basic asymmetry: producing strategic flexibility typically requires many ingredients, but inducing strategic inflexibility may
need only one.
The first set of factors centers around the mind of command and is essentially
psychological (or sociological, if one allows for the role of staff and others in the
commander’s environment, often amounting to a well defined social structure).
Psychological flexibility may be easy to attain in theory, but (as Clausewitz saw
clearly long ago) it is vastly harder amid the stunning emotional and physical
pressures of bitter conflict with deadly force. In particular, circumstances may
require juggling denial of the possibility of failure of strategic ends—even where
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1
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all evidence is to the contrary—while at the same time exhibiting the highest
level of virtuosity in shifting with poise and flexibility among choices of means.
Such pressures may be short-term (say, hours or days), or they may be long-term
(such as protracted revolutionary war), with quite different psychological contexts and consequences.
In addition, more subtle forms of flexibility loss, amounting to creeping institutional inertia, may accumulate as a largely unplanned by-product of the operation of institutions of command over a long period of time—via persistence of
flawed decisions that many recognize as flawed yet that no one seems to know
how to correct (even when, at times, those decisions far outlast the organizational tenure of those who made them). As institutions of command, including
bureaucracies, age through the course of the twenty-first century, these subtle
institutional flaws and the loss of strategic flexibility they entail may become
more pronounced.
The second set of factors returns to logistics and centers around the physical
substance of flexibility—the quality of a strategist’s logistics, especially transportation. One of the twentieth century’s most powerful examples of logistics
flexibility as foundation of strategic flexibility is the relationship between the
success in World War II of U.S. naval operations in the Pacific and the wartime
development of mobile logistics support and the strategic mobility it permitted.
It is well worth reflecting on the quality of logistics thought and leadership that
64
made such innovation possible midstream in a great war.
THE DUALITY OF STRATEGIC AND LOGISTICS ANALYSIS
Crafting high-level strategy is, and will remain, extraordinarily difficult. This is
because logistics, psychology, and bureaucracy are difficult, often counterintuitive
subjects—and few experiences (certainly in ordinary civilian life) adequately
prepare anyone to cope at a high level with their interacting complexities. Even
individuals who have been outstanding strategists in one strategic context may
easily reemerge as blunderers in a different one.65
Responding to these challenges, the analytic capability that took shape at the
Naval War College in the early post–World War II period was an unusual synthesis—in some ways without precedent—and an enduring U.S. national resource
that merits careful continuing study, with an eye both to its substance and to the
institutional and intellectual conditions that made such synthesis possible. Although there were numerous strands in the synthesis, at its heart lay the duality
of strategic and logistics analysis.66 Without the strategic level—whose principles this article has sought to retrieve and develop in updated form—logistics
tends to unravel into a formless sprawl of technical areas, lacking clear focus and
identity. Without constant reference to the logistics foundation, strategic
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
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analysis tends to become like much modern art—perhaps intellectually
stimulating but of unclear relation to the world as we know it.
With an eye to future applications of the key ideas, the body of theory and
principle developed in the present article is geared to three distinct, if related,
67
sets of tasks:

• Education for modern high command, centering around inculcating intuitive awareness of the natures and relationships of structural elements of
the full strategic problem the strategist must be prepared to tackle.

• Creation of a basic and lasting intellectual organization for the study of strategy, one that can serve as a “template” for the ongoing development of strategic topics and disciplined accumulation of strategic ideas—thus creating
a reserve of strategic and related logistics thinking that can be readily retrieved and consulted under often far-from-ideal crisis conditions, as well
as helping with strategic planning more broadly.

• Creation of a conceptual environment conducive to disciplined forms of strategic creativity, an environment whose hallmark is fundamentally original,
68
valid, and valuable insights.
While each generation must revisit these tasks with fresh eyes, there are few
better starting points for their successful accomplishment than active institutional memory of the pioneering analytic contributions of the U.S. Naval War
College in the age of Admirals Raymond A. Spruance and Henry E. Eccles.

NOTES

The author would like to thank, for their
comments on earlier versions of this article,
Professors Kenneth J. Arrow, Howard L.
Boorman, and Sir Michael Howard. For his
sustained interest in the substance, as well as
invaluable editorial advice, special thanks are
owing to Frank Uhlig, Jr. In addition, thanks
are also owing to the Naval War College Naval Historical Collection and Dr. Evelyn M.
Cherpak, the curator there, as well as to the
trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London, and
the Liddell Hart Centre staff, directed by Patricia Methven. Any errors of fact or interpretation are the author’s responsibility alone.
1. For further background on Eccles’s career
contributions as a U.S. Navy line officer (Naval Academy ’22)—emphasizing Eccles’s

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

Navy Cross–winning command in combat in
the vicinity of Java early in World War
II—see the tribute to Eccles by Rear Adm. R.
F. Marryott, USN, “President’s Notes,” Naval
War College Review 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1986),
pp. 4–5. In June 1985 the library of the U.S.
Naval War College was named in Admiral
Eccles’s honor. See Admiral Eccles’s “Remarks at Dedication of Eccles Library at Naval War College,” Naval War College Review
38, no. 6 (November–December 1985), pp.
96–97.
2. The story of the founding of the Naval War
College Department of Logistics is told in
John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson III,
and John R. Wadleigh, Sailors and Scholars:
The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War
College (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College
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Press, 1984), p. 186. On Spruance see Cdr.
Thomas B. Buell, USN, The Quiet Warrior: A
Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1974).
3. Within worldwide traditions of military and
related strategic theory—holding aside the
game-theoretic tradition—the major theorists besides Eccles whose analytical work exhibits comparably systematic and codifying
instincts are Napoleon’s two leading interpreters, Clausewitz and Jomini. In effect,
Eccles’s writings are placeholders for
“thoughts on war” of a major part of the
World War II generation of senior U.S. Navy
leaders. Of course, full consensus across a
population of strong-minded professionals
can never be expected—a point on which
Eccles, for one, was thoroughly realistic. (To
illustrate, a specific conceptual disagreement
in Naval War College circles on the relation
of logistics to strategy is noted by Eccles, “Logistics and Strategy,” Naval War College Review 10, no. 5 [January 1958], p. 25.)
4. Eccles’s books were Operational Naval Logistics, NAVPERS 10869 (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of Naval Personnel, April 1950); Logistics in the National Defense, 1st ed. (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1959); Military Concepts
and Philosophy (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers Univ. Press, 1965); and Military
Power in a Free Society (Newport, R.I.: Naval
War College Press, 1979). Both the 1959 and
the 1965 books were written with support
from the Office of Naval Research (ONR)
through the George Washington University
Logistics Research Project. A further sampler
of Eccles’s published writings, augmented by
the limited but important set of his unpublished writings represented in the Naval War
College Library catalog, appears in Naval War
College Review 30, no. 1 (Summer 1977), pp.
26–27. This list is usefully supplemented by a
list of Eccles’s publications in the Naval War
College Review, contained in the Review index
(available online or on compact disc); most,
but not all, signed Eccles publications in the
Review appear on this list. In its “Author”
section this index—providing a profile of a
major U.S. military periodical published continuously since its founding in 1948—contains more single-authored entries under
Eccles’s name than under that of any other
individual author.
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5. The Eccles Papers Project, which was initiated in 1986 at Admiral Eccles’s request and
invitation to the present author and Dr. Paul
R. Levitt (a mathematician who died in
1999), is announced and briefly described in
U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association
Shipmate 49, no. 9 (November 1986), p. 13.
Hereafter the notation “EP X.Y” refers to box
X, folder Y in the Eccles Papers in the Naval
War College Naval Historical Collection.
6. Two key Eccles observations help give unity
to these three topics of logistics, command
psychology, and bureaucracy. The first is that
the modern logistics organization is the home
of complex organization; see, for example,
comment in Operational Naval Logistics, p.
29, to the effect that logistics organizations
tend to be much more complex than tactical
ones. In many ways Operational Naval Logistics is a book about bureaucracy. The second
observation is that the perspective of command by its nature must reconcile conflicting
imperatives of strategy, logistics, and tactics—a task that involves many psychological
as well as bureaucratic challenges. The interconnectedness of strategy, logistics, and tactics is symbolized by the interlocking-rings
diagram in Eccles, “Theatre Logistic Planning,” U.S. Naval War College Information
Service for Officers 3, no. 2 (October 1950), p.
3. (This was the predecessor publication to
the Naval War College Review.)
7. Related “template making” instincts are already plainly apparent in Eccles’s “Basic Elements and Aspects of Logistics,” 27 August
1947, typescript of his lecture launching the
first year of the Naval War College Logistics
Course (EP 30.21). In much more highly developed form, Eccles’s structural approach to
modern warfare is presented in his Command
Logistics, submitted with foreword dated 8
February 1956 by Capt. K. E. Jung, USN,
Head, Strategy and Logistics Dept., and approved by Rear Adm. Thomas H. Robbins,
Jr., USN, Chief of Staff (Newport, R.I.: Naval
War College, 1956) (EP 44.3, copy identified
as “Issue to Naval Warfare Class, 1956”; also
held in the Eccles Library of the Naval War
College).
8. See Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy,
p. 313 note 4, identifying this memo, “New
Thoughts on Strategy,” as “written by Dr.
Herbert Rosinski in September, 1955,
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following informal discussions with the President of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral
Lynde McCormick, and his chief of staff,
Rear Admiral Thomas H. Robbins, Jr.” Text
of Rosinski’s memo appears in this 1965 book
of Eccles, pp. 46–47, and is also reproduced
in Eccles’s Military Power in a Free Society,
pp. 60–61. For further background on
Rosinski’s thought see The Development of
Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski, ed.
and with an introduction by B. Mitchell
Simpson III (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1977).
9. The basic early reference is Eccles, “Notes on
Strategy as Control: Its Influence on Logistics
and Organization” (first draft of working paper prepared under sponsorship of the
George Washington University Logistics Research Project, under contract N7 ONR
41904, n.d. [1957]) (EP 82.23).
10. Without minimizing the many contributions
of game theory to fundamental strategic analysis, it is important to keep in clear analytic
focus substantive issues of logistics, command psychology, and bureaucracy that game
theory applications often elide or miss. This
task is increasingly important given the numerous civilians in high policy-related roles
who are economics trained—training that
nowadays widely encourages them to equate
“strategic analysis” with game theory.
11. See Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy,
p. 69 (presenting coordinated definitions of
strategy, logistics, and tactics as a unified
package). As Eccles here defines it, tactics is
“the immediate employment of specific
forces and weapons to attain strategic objectives”; Eccles’s corresponding definition of
logistics is reproduced on p. 100 of this
article.
12. This three-way distinction builds on Eccles,
Military Power in a Free Society, p. 70.
13. For a valuable study of basic principles pertaining to general staffs, one that deserves to
be much better known today, see Maj. Gen.
Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and the
General Staff (Washington, D.C.: Infantry
Journal Press, 1946). Eccles’s review in U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 73, no. 6 (June
1947), pp. 720–21, provides a useful, terse introduction to Nelson’s massive book. Organizational struggles to surmount “control of the
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means of control” problems exist under
many other rubrics too (e.g., budget control,
surveillance, inspection, internal audit, program evaluation, etc.). As Chinese history can
attest, some of these are old—much older, in
fact, than the modern general staff.
14. The General Staff Act of 1903 created a general staff for the U.S. Army. It has been commented that by midcentury the United States
had acquired, with perhaps characteristically
American enthusiasm, no fewer than ten kindred entities (military plus civilian Navy staff;
ditto, Army; ditto, Air Force; Marine Corps
staff; staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense; National Security Council staff; staff of
the Bureau of the Budget, later Office of
Management and Budget). Although there
were also earlier versions of a joint staff, the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 crystallized
what was has been called “a real joint staff.”
With the early twenty-first century has come
Homeland Security, plus the new intelligence
bureaucracy.
15. A telling example, from a recent biography of
the World War I British Expeditionary Force
(BEF) commander in chief, Douglas Haig, is
that—in context of a great war on whose
outcome the British Empire’s fate turned
—“Haig could not hope to control every aspect of the working of the BEF; he did not
even have complete control over his closest
staff.” See Gary Mead, The Good Soldier: The
Biography of Douglas Haig (London: Atlantic
Books, 2007), p. 239 [emphasis supplied].
16. As Eccles noted in 1960: “In modern conflict
the man who understands and controls the
capabilities and location of electronic command equipment can in effect decide who
will wield actual command authority.” See
Eccles’s review of Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History,
U.S. Army Dept., 1953 and 1959), vol. 2, in
Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 7, no. 1
(March 1960), p. 97.
17. See Eccles, Military Power in a Free Society, p.
56.
18. The case of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq comes to
mind. See, for example, Jill Crystal, “Authoritarianism and Its Adversaries in the Arab
World,” World Politics 46, no. 2 (January
1994), p. 279.
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19. See Robert K. Merton, “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality,” Social Forces 18, no. 4
(May 1940), p. 563. Pitfalls of goal displacement arising when a strategic situation is
changing rapidly may be illustrated by the
later stages of some successful coalition wars,
when a coalition partner (e.g., the United
States as World War II was ending) persists
in thinking strategically when it should be
thinking grand strategically—that is, about
how to position for the upcoming postwar
situation. Note also the case of post-9/11 U.S.
involvement in Afghanistan, whose objectives
started with a focus on “Osama Bin Laden
dead or alive” and subsequently evolved into
versions of nation building there. For some of
the complexities of the latter—further illustrating just how difficult the analysis of objectives can be—see Francis Fukuyama,
“Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory,” in Nation-Building: Beyond
Afghanistan and Iraq, ed. Francis Fukuyama
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
2006), pp. 1–16.
20. For an illustration of the stresses that thorough analysis of objectives may impose on
even a strong coalition, note the difficulties
arising in the work of the Anglo-American
Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War
II—in particular, the challenges faced by
Adm. E. J. King and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff “to get the British to commit themselves
in writing.” See Thomas B. Buell, Master of
Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), p.
338 [emphasis supplied].
21. As a working approximation, the phrase “traditions of rational choice” refers to majority
strands of microeconomics, decision theory,
and game theory. Eccles’s long-standing intellectual attention to alternatives to rational
choice is clear from his analytical work. That
attention is well illustrated by Eccles’s review
in Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 10, no. 4
(December 1963), pp. 383–87, of an important work by Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of
Government (New York: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1963). For further work along related lines, see Scott A. Boorman, Alternatives
to Rational Choice: Analytical Outline of Substantive Area—Part I, Preliminary Paper
001013 (New Haven, Conn.: Cowles Foundation, 13 October 2000), and Alternatives to
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Rational Choice: Analytical Outline of
Substantive Area—Parts II & III, Preliminary
Paper 030116 (New Haven, Conn.: Cowles
Foundation, 16 January 2003). Both papers
were produced under the auspices of the
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
22. Eccles’s focus on semantic dimensions of
strategy, and on language issues more
broadly, at times drawing inspiration from
Alfred North Whitehead, makes Eccles unusual—indeed, perhaps unique—among
logistics-minded analysts of strategy.
23. In this connection, the work translators do
merits consideration as an oft-neglected factor in grand strategy. A paper by Eccles analyzes translation problems, among other
challenges, facing staff work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the
crucial formative years of the alliance; see
Eccles, “Allied Staffs,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 79, no. 8 (August 1953), pp.
859–67. Although not usually thought of in
this way, reliance on acronyms presents a
kind of translation problem, one that at times
may also severely hamper clear analysis of
objectives.
24. Illustrating some of the possibilities, for
certain actors emotions may enter in
tie-breaking roles when no uniquely “optimal” course of action presents itself. See, e.g.,
Jon Elster, “Emotions and Economic Theory,” Journal of Economic Literature 36, no. 1
(1998), pp. 59–60.
25. It is hard to overstate the extent to which
many strategic debates boil down to disagreements over one or another version of the underlying “what kind of war” question (which,
of course, was classically posed by Clausewitz:
see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and
trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret
[Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press,
1984], pp. 88–89). An example of a strategic
argument pivoting on a “what kind of war”
issue is Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad,
Thinking Saigon,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2
(March/April 2006), pp. 2–14.
26. For precisely this reason, the center of gravity
of much insightful strategic analysis lies in
empirical work “upstream” of the kinds of
game-theoretically motivated calculations
widely associated with “thinking like a
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strategist.” For example, shrewd social observation underlies Eccles’s sharp-edged
role-playing exercise in strategy in Eccles,
“Allied Staffs,” p. 867—beginning, “As a Russian, I would attempt . . .” In this kind of analytic work there remains room for more
sophisticated blending of mathematical and
empirical analytic capabilities (possibly
drawing on some types of social network
analysis).
27. See Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy,
p. 201. For a larger context see Lyman B.
Kirkpatrick, Jr., “Eccles on Strategy,” Naval
War College Review 30, no. 1 (Summer 1977),
pp. 10–17.
28. See Martin Shubik, A Game-Theoretic Approach to Political Economy (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), pp. 643–53. A further relevant direction of analytic work stems
from “garbage can” interpretations of organizational choice. See, e.g., James G. March and
Roger Weissinger-Baylon, eds., Ambiguity
and Command: Organizational Perspectives on
Military Decision Making (Marshfield, Mass.:
Pitman, 1986).
29. On the Vietnam War case see Eccles, “The
Vietnam Hurricane,” Shipmate 36, no. 7
(July–August 1973), pp. 23–26.
30. The potential value of multiple “probes” into
the principles of strategy finds support in
Rear Adm. J. C. Wylie, USN, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1967), a
work also influenced by Rosinski. An enlarged set of “probes” (seven, not three)—
combining strands of Eccles’s and Wylie’s
work, along with that of other modern strategic theorists like Capt. Sir Basil H. Liddell
Hart (1895–1970)—is contained in a longer,
unpublished version of the present article.
31. See Eccles’s major 1945 report—rich in concrete examples—to Commander, Service
Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “The Establishment
of Advanced Naval Bases in the Central Pacific Area, as Seen by the Advanced Base Section, Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet,” 10
December 1945 (EP 85.2–4; EP 85.3 copy is
further identified as “Collateral Reading for
Correspondence Course in Logistics,” Department of Correspondence Courses, U.S.
Naval War College).
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32. Already apparent in Eccles’s 1947 lecture,
“Basic Elements and Aspects of Logistics,” the
distinctively multilevel nature of logistics as a
military concept is further developed in his
“Logistics: What Is It?” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 79, no. 6 (June 1953), pp. 645–53
(perhaps Eccles’s best-known published paper). For a full-scale, book-length development, see Eccles’s Logistics in the National
Defense. A Russian perspective on Eccles’s
work may be found in a 1963 “pirated” Russian translation of this book containing a detailed analytical preface by a Soviet Navy rear
admiral, V. I. Andreyev (a preface in turn
translated into English by the Office of Naval
Intelligence [EP 11.24]). See EP 64.5 for
translated copy.
33. Illustrating continuing analytic challenges,
see David Moore and Peter D. Antill, “Focused Logistics: Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice?” RUSI Journal 144, no. 5 (October 1999),
pp. 28–33, itemizing eight potential advantages and ten potential disadvantages of this
concept (also alluding, in a context of disadvantages, to Wylie’s theme that “the ultimate
tool of control in war is the man on the scene
with a gun” [Military Strategy, p. 87]).
34. The more compact of the two definitions
here is derived from Pure Logistics, a pioneering work of Lt. Col. Cyrus Thorpe, USMC,
first published in 1917 and later “rediscovered” and brought to the attention of U.S.
military circles by Eccles. The slightly lengthier definition crystallized somewhat later but
is thereafter used with high consistency in
Eccles’s work—paralleling in this regard his
similarly consistent usage of the term
“strategy.”
35. Historical analysis of “dynamics of logistics”
is the focus of two unpublished manuscripts
by Eccles providing some seventy-five pages
of commentary on volumes 1 and 2, respectively, of Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the
Armies (see EP 45.4 and 46.4). A highly condensed version of his commentary on volume
1 appeared in book-review form in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 80, no. 7 (July 1954),
pp. 813–14. That on volume 2 appeared in
two distinct condensed forms: one book review cited in note 16 above, another in U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 86, no. 5 (May
1960), pp. 108–11. Dynamic systems aspects
of logistics are further documented in James

116

Naval War College: Full Spring 2009 Issue

A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics,
1775–1953 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1966).
This work specifically credits Eccles’s pioneering analysis of the logistics snowball
principle (see p. 659).
36. For military analysis quoting work of Nobel
economist Kenneth J. Arrow on trust in a social sense, see Donald Chisholm, “Negotiated
Joint Command Relationships: Korean War
Amphibious Operations, 1950,” Naval War
College Review 53, no. 2 (Spring 2000), pp.
65–124. Related emphases permeated Eccles’s
thinking in the 1940s and ’50s about many
logistics problems. See, e.g., Eccles’s discussion of “unnecessary followup” (in context of
the requisition system in naval supply depots) in Logistics in the National Defense, pp.
187–89. In one of his reviews of Ruppenthal’s
volume 2, cited in note 35, Eccles writes of
the need for “mutual confidence between superior and subordinate,” in whose absence
the logistics “pendulum can make wide
swings between acute shortage, true privation, and reckless overestimates and wastage”
(p. 109). Beyond the social trust theme alone,
Eccles’s analytical work starting in the 1940s
allocates substantial attention to “logistic psychology.” This topic is approached not
merely as a technical area but also as a province of command—epitomized by the struggle to integrate conflicting demands of
strategy, logistics, and tactics in the mind of
command.
37. Expanding on a related analytical point,
Eccles (Military Power in a Free Society, p. 63)
says: “The word ‘logistics’ can disappear from
all organizational titles and directives, from
all curricula, and, in fact, from the military
vocabulary itself without in any way influencing the nature of war, the nature of the problem of war, or the problems of command and
command decision. The forces of ‘military
economics’ will continue to work regardless
of the words and titles used to describe
them.”
38. Although space does not permit elaboration
here, this principle harmonizes with the classic concept of the “indirect approach” to
strategy formulated by Capt. Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart (who corresponded with Eccles
from the early 1950s until shortly before Liddell Hart’s death in 1970).

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009

BOORMAN

111

39. See Eccles, “Pacific Logistics” (presentation,
Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 30 March
1946 [delivered while Eccles was serving in
Washington as a member of the Joint Operations Review Board]) (EP 30.18). Text of this
presentation, along with other analytic writings by Eccles, is cited by Samuel E. Morison,
History of United States Naval Operations in
World War II, vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and
Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951), p. 100.
40. On 16 February 1991 there was a Scud missile
impact in the immediate vicinity of an
ammunition-laden pier at Al Jubayl. Importantly, a postwar evaluation observes that
“initially, this event received a considerable
amount of attention. However, the initial
surge of interest diminished over time because
no personnel injuries and no equipment
damage occurred as a result of the missile’s
impact” [emphasis supplied]. See “Case Narrative: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia,” Final Report,
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of
Defense (Personnel and Readiness) for Gulf
War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments, U.S. Defense Dept., 25
October 2001, available at www.gulflink.osd
.mil/al_jub_iii/. Compare historian Alfred W.
Crosby’s “An Inquiry into the Peculiarities of
Human Memory,” chap. 15 in America’s Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989),
pp. 311–28. Crosby forcefully stresses the
puzzling fact that this pandemic was so
quickly largely forgotten and had little impact
on most organizations and institutions (p.
323). If such collective forgetting could occur
in the case of a pandemic that (by Crosby’s
estimate) in ten months killed more Americans than the “combined battle deaths of personnel of the United States Armed Forces in
World War I, World War II, and the Korean
and Vietnamese conflicts” (and may have
sickened 40 percent of U.S. Navy personnel
in 1918), it is reasonable to wonder about the
durability in collective memory of lessons in
logistics war.
41. Perhaps especially with the fading of World
War II memories, it may be easy for American decision makers to become overconfident
about the immunity of the superb U.S. logistics capabilities with which they are so familiar. Consider, e.g., David Greenberg,
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“Just-in-Time Inventory System Proves Vulnerable to Labor Strife,” Los Angeles Business
Journal, 7 October 2002, p. 13.
42. See Eccles, “Logistics in a Future War” (seminar lecture for Naval Reserve Officers, Third
Naval District, U.S. Navy Receiving Station,
Brooklyn, N.Y., 18 January 1949 [from which
the words quoted in the main text are
drawn]) (EP 31.2). See also Eccles’s statement, again with an eye to future war, in Operational Naval Logistics (p. 151): “Sabotage,
in the past never more than a nuisance, may
well be serious.”
43. Amplifying relevant challenges, Eccles wrote:
“Economic capabilities limit the combat
forces which can be created. At the same time,
logistic capabilities limit the forces which can
be employed in combat operations” (Logistics
in the National Defense, p. 41 [emphasis in
original]). These two kinds of limitations are
clearly intertwined, but they are conceptually
distinguishable. Together, they form background to a statement of Robert B. Carney
(then vice admiral, USN, and future Chief of
Naval Operations): “There you have the meat
of the matter: Logistics actually control the
Nation’s foreign policy by reason of the limiting effect of the Nation’s potential in resources.” Address to the Naval War College,
12 July 1947, quoted in Eccles, Operational
Naval Logistics, p. 1.
44. The importance and sheer complexity of
never-ending struggles by commanders to exert control over their own logistics is a major
theme throughout Eccles’s writings. His “logistics snowball” insight emerged as a generalization from logistics experience in World
War II in the Pacific, which Eccles knew in
great depth. Factors underlying the growth of
the snowball are analyzed in his Logistics in
the National Defense, pp. 102–14. A useful
picture of how things have been working
quite recently comes from Col. Bradley E.
Smith, USA, “The Mandate to Revolutionize
Military Logistics,” Air & Space Power Journal
21, no. 2 (Summer 2007), p. 91: “As Federal
Times reported on the initial tip of the iceberg, ‘During the first month of major combat operations in Iraq two years ago, the
Defense Department lost track of $1.2 billion
in materials shipped to the Army, encountered hundreds of backlogged shipments, and
ran up millions of dollars in fees to lease or

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

replace storage containers because of backlogged or lost shipments.’” See also p. 93 of
Colonel Smith’s article: “Currently in Iraq,
millions of dollars in penalty costs are
assessed each month for a multitude of reasons, many of which can be traced back to a
fundamental difference of opinion between
strategic-level logisticians and tactical-level
combat commanders concerning the use of
containers. (At the national level, logisticians
were leasing and procuring containers as if
they were transportation commodities to be
quickly returned from Iraq. But tactical-unit
commanders did as they always have in combat and held on to containers to be used for
mobile storage, bunkers, security walls, and
work space.)”
45. Many of the basic problem areas identified by
Colonel Smith’s 2007 article are reminiscent
of problems analyzed forty years earlier by
Maj. (later Maj. Gen.) Graham W. Rider,
USAF, “Logistics: The Bridge,” Air University
Review 19, no. 1 (November–December
1967), pp. 93–97, whose title is from Eccles’s
1959 book. Those problem areas include bureaucracy doing its thing in ways that fail to
harmonize logistics efforts across strategic,
operational, and tactical levels, a somewhat
confused organizational structure, and above
all a vital unmet need to integrate information better, all set against a backdrop of failures to apply what we already know—itself a
key challenge for logistics education.
46. Working in a supply- and repair-centered
context, a pair of RAND Corporation analysts clarify why the quest for improved formulations of basic logistics principles should
never cease: While Marine Corps initiatives
propose “to reduce the ‘iron mountain’ using
information technology, some part of that
mountain will always remain. . . . Indeed, the
smaller the mountain, the more critical it will
be to manage it effectively.” See Ronald D.
Fricker, Jr., and Marc L. Robbins, Retooling
for the Logistics Revolution: Designing Marine
Corps Inventories to Support the Warfighter
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000), p. xvii
[emphasis supplied]. For a classic statement
of Eccles’s insights into basic logistics principles, see his Logistics in the National Defense.
Because many of the ideas there reflect
Eccles’s distinctively integrative, multidisciplinary, logistics background from his
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Pacific War experience, Eccles’s ideas merit
careful study in contexts ranging beyond supply—and perhaps even beyond traditionally
recognized logistics functions altogether.
47. Structural forces—many of them essentially
bureaucratic—underlying such tendency to
diffuseness are analyzed in Eccles, “Logistics,”
pp. 650–51.
48. A terse, forceful analysis appears in Eccles,
“Some Logistics Concepts,” Logistics Spectrum 11, no. 1 (Spring 1977), pp. 5–8. This
paper—importantly anchored in the U.S. logistics experience in Vietnam—was reprinted
under the title “How Logistics Systems Behave,” Logistics Spectrum 16, no. 2 (Summer
1982), pp. 31–34. Eccles’s analytical contributions in support of the U.S. naval logistics effort in Vietnam are positively noted by Vice
Adm. Edwin Bickford Hooper, USN (Ret.),
Mobility, Support, Endurance: A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War,
1965–1968 (Washington, D.C.: Naval History
Division, U.S. Navy Dept., 1972), p. viii.
49. Text of this 29 September 2008 speech by the
secretary of defense is available at www
.defenselink.mil/speeches/.
50. Eccles, “Logistics and Strategy” (cited in note
3 above), p. 25; Eccles, Command Logistics, p.
8.
51. See, e.g., Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy, p. 48.
52. An example of a challenging problem of
self-control—involving the inner circle of
high command at the height of a major crisis—is the case, during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, of the Executive Committee, whose
fifteen members sought to preserve the secrecy of key impending U.S. strategic steps
by, for example, keeping “routine appointments where possible.” See Theodore C.
Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and
Row, 1965), p. 698.
53. For an illustration of strategic thinking aiming to look more than a human generation
ahead—the context being an estimate of how
long communism was likely to survive before,
in Eccles’s words, “failing under its own
faults”—see Eccles, “The World Outlook of
Communism (a Comparison between Communist Philosophy and American Philosophy)” (seminar lecture for Naval Reserve
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Officers, Third Naval District, U.S. Navy Receiving Station, Brooklyn, 19 October 1948)
(EP 29.2). Counting in slightly different
units, it is said of Bismarck that he thought in
terms of the war after next.
54. A related acronym in current circulation is
DIME (“diplomacy, information, military,
and economics”). One pitfall with any such
acronym, of course, is that it may encourage
thinking to stop with the received categories.
Such a stopping rule may work at some lower
levels of action but not in true grand strategy—where opportunities may arise from being early to recognize and exploit some
coherent, perhaps emerging, set of tools that
is not “one to one” with any of the given categories and may in important respects scramble them. (It is also worth noting that an
online source, Acronymfinder.com, last visited 11 October 2008, identifies no fewer than
fourteen other meanings of “DIME”—some
slightly different from that just given, others
very different.)
55. In the background stands the timeless challenge of achieving genuine integration of
planning and decision processes. This is a
problem, having both specifically military
and wider strategic facets, where Eccles’s strategic thinking provides much valuable insight, building in part on his Joint Operations
Review Board background mentioned in note
39; his 1951–52 role, in a challenging period
early in NATO’s history, as Assistant Chief of
Staff, Logistics, for Commander, Allied
Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH);
plus relevant analytical work (see, e.g., Eccles,
Logistics in the National Defense, pp. 79–101).
56. Well after the events of 9/11, a basic related
problem—one whose impact permeates the
U.S. defense establishment from a grandstrategic down to a tactical level—remains
continuing insufficiency of personnel with
appropriate capabilities in critical languages.
See, e.g., Will Bardenwerper, “For Military,
Slow Progress in Foreign Language Push:
Struggle Persists over a Training Objective,”
New York Times, 22 September 2008, p. A20.
57. Note a French army officer’s well informed
account, based on his command experience
as a junior officer in France’s Algerian war, of
two contrasting mentalities in counterinsurgency warfare—whose exemplars he terms
“warriors” and “psychologists.” See David
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Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958,
with new foreword by Bruce Hoffman (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2006), pp. 64–68. To
the extent that doctrine can help bridge diverse mentalities, one idea—inspired in part
by work with the Eccles Papers, in part by
recent advances in network analysis—is
“seeding” carefully chosen imaginative
cross-references to connect doctrine statements whose subject matters would usually
be regarded as unrelated or largely so. The
goal of doing so would be to help encourage
disciplined but creative intellectual
cross-fertilization and analogical thinking.
58. A particularly forceful—in part because it is
so very terse—comment by Eccles directed
against weapon strategy stands the test of
time so well as to merit quotation here: “A
great danger lies in the possible domination
of strategy by weapons rather than by national objectives. National objectives ultimately are developed by the aspirations,
character, and sense of values of the people,
not by a technological triumph.
“If one becomes committed to a strategy
which is based on a weapon rather than upon
national objectives, a sense of frustration is
bound to ensue. Frustration frequently leads
men of high spirit to commit acts of reckless irresponsibility” (Eccles, “The Great Debate,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 80, no. 7
[July 1954], p. 809, [emphasis supplied]).
The context for these words was, of course,
nuclear weapons and strategic airpower; the
substance could extend to other weapons systems—or to systems or capabilities of other
kinds, civilian as well as military.
59. Certain relevant military possibilities, importantly including possibilities of algorithm
sabotage suggested by a (nonsabotage) naval
warfare example from the 1982 Falklands
War, are analyzed in Scott A. Boorman and
Paul R. Levitt, “Deadly Bugs,” Chicago Tribune Magazine, 3 May 1987, p. 19ff. See also
Scott A. Boorman and Paul R. Levitt, “Software Warfare and Algorithm Sabotage,” Signal 42, no. 9 (May 1988), p. 75ff.
60. See Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality
in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and
American Ideas about Strategic Bombing,
1914–1945 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ.
Press, 2002), especially the discussion of the
“industrial fabric theory” on pp. 163, 296–97.
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61. In fact, al-Qa‘ida “strategy” invites thorough
critical analysis along related lines. A key (if
perhaps long-term) limitation, and possibly
exploitable vulnerability, of al-Qa‘ida may
grow out of its apparent basic preoccupation
with strategy-as-destruction rather than
strategy-as-control.
62. Illustrating some of the intellectual possibilities, Karl W. Deutsch noted ancient Parthian
modes of warfare involving attacks directed
“at first not so much against the principal
material resources but rather against the
decision-making capacity” of an adversary.
See Nerves of Government, pp. 62, 274–75;
Eccles, “Strategy: The Essence of Professionalism,” Naval War College Review 24, no. 4
(December 1971), p. 50.
63. See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press,
1960), p. 36ff., and his Arms and Influence
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1966),
p. 35–91.
64. See Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and
Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944, pp. 100–13.
Still an important source, by virtue of its author’s key pioneering role in wartime creation of a mobile logistics support capability,
is Rear Adm. Worrall R. Carter, USN (Ret.),
Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1953).
65. Consider Mao Zedong as strategist of revolution versus the Mao who later led the People’s Republic of China into the Great Leap
Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
66. The relevant spirit of strategy/logistics synthesis is captured by former Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) Adm. Robert B. Carney,
USN (Ret.): “Some General Observations and
Experiences in Logistics,” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 3, nos. 1 and 2 (March–June
1956), pp. 1–9 (building in part on Carney’s
World War II background as Adm. William
Halsey’s chief of staff, plus his postwar role as
Deputy CNO for Logistics).
67. A good set of approaches to all three tasks
should be crafted to meet the needs of both
strategic planners and strategic analysts—two
different roles that are often confused. The
crux of the difference is clarified by Eccles,
Military Concepts and Philosophy, p. 44: “A
strategic analyst can contribute greatly to the
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understanding of strategy without necessarily
being qualified to originate and develop a
specific national or military strategy. On the
other hand, there have been excellent strategists who have not made major contributions
to the historical or theoretical analysis of
strategy. For example, the maxims of Napoleon were gleaned from his notes and letters,
while Admiral Spruance has never written
any comprehensive statement of his own
concepts of strategy.”
68. The spirit of a counterpart in strategic studies
to the “endless frontier” of science concept of
Vannevar Bush is captured by an unpublished Eccles document, “Control of the Sea”:
“No single person can ever say everything
about control of the sea nor should we expect
agreement in all that is said by competent authority. Nevertheless, from time to time deep
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thinkers will express their thoughts on fundamental truths with such insight and clarity
that their words should be carefully preserved
and repeatedly referred to. A specific example
of this is contained in Admiral Spruance’s
discussion of control of the sea. The excellent
expressions of fundamental truth should not
be considered as a rigid and final formulation
but rather as a sound basis upon which men
can establish their own line of thinking and
ideas. The development of further ideas on
this basis is important and many novel interpretations and expressions can be usefully developed. However, the search for novelty and
fresh formulations should not go on without
periodic reference back to the classic
thought.” A copy bearing the dates 25 October 1956 and 14 December 1965 is in EP
82.23 in the Eccles Papers.

121

Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 2, Art. 1

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

122

Naval War College: Full Spring 2009 Issue

BOOK REVIEWS

THE AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAS
Reid, Michael. Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ.
Press, 2007. 384pp. $30

Anyone taking up duties related to
Latin America or otherwise wishing to
understand current realities in the region should read Michael Reid’s assessment of contemporary Latin America.
Editor of the Americas section of The
Economist, Reid has lived or traveled in
Latin America since 1982 and credits
his Peruvian wife for important insights
in this volume. Writing with the clarity
and color of an accomplished journalist, Reid has produced a book that is sophisticated enough to satisfy a specialist
on Latin America but accessible and
comprehensible to a neophyte in the
subject.
The subtitle refers to the tension between populist politicians with statist
agendas, like Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez,
and the liberal democracies that have
undertaken market-oriented reforms in
the past two decades. Not bound by this
dichotomy, Reid engagingly presents
the full complexity of Latin America,
where politics, economics, ethnicity,
and history create a mixture in which
simple explanations and facile prescriptions fall short. While not a policy manual per se, the book reinforces the view
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of policy makers who favor a multidisciplinary approach.
Reid notes that “the region has been
relatively free of the interstate conflicts
that have dogged so many other parts of
the world” and suggests that as one reason why “for much of Latin America’s
history, regional integration was not a
priority,” unlike Europe during the
Cold War. Perceived security threats
also help explain U.S. attitudes toward
the region. Reid observes that “while in
the past they had condemned Yanqui
interventionism, many Latin American
politicians came to lament what they
saw as a lack of U.S. engagement with
the region”—thus the title Forgotten
Continent. In fact, U.S. attention to the
region usually has peaked when Americans have felt a security threat, whether
it was the European involvement that
prompted the United States to adopt
the Monroe Doctrine or more recent
fears of the spread of the Cuban revolution or Sandinista insurgency. The war
on drugs has also driven U.S. interest
and policy in Latin America, to the annoyance of those who live there. The
current paucity of serious state-to-state
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military threats does give Latin American countries the advantage of not having to devote hefty resources to external
defense, unlike much of the rest of the
world.
Why then has Latin America not done
better economically? Reid provides
good answers. Latin American countries have prospered recently by meeting rapidly rising global demand for
foodstuffs and raw materials, and a tenfold increase in the price of petroleum
enabled Hugo Chávez to expand his influence abroad and fuel his authoritarian tendencies at home. However, now
that contractions in global demand
have reduced the price of oil by
two-thirds from its high, Chávez may
find his wings trimmed.
Whatever the economic future, Latin
Americans will continue to debate how
best to organize their affairs, and Michael Reid’s expert analysis will help
outsiders understand the issues.
PAUL TAYLOR

Naval War College

Percival, Bronson. The Dragon Looks South:
China and Southeast Asia in the New Century.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2007. 200pp. $31.25

Bronson Percival has written a compelling book that is a must-read for any student or practitioner of national security
in Southeast Asia. His work, unlike that
of many others on the same subject, strives
to understand the China–Southeast Asia
relationship from an Asian perspective.
As a career diplomat with extensive experience in Southeast Asia, he explains
the key nuances that characterize the
complex and iterative nature of China’s
security relationships with its southern
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neighbors. Unlike the United States,
which considers the ten countries that
constitute Southeast Asia as a homogeneous group, China has shown a deeper
understanding of the “extremely complex” nature of the region, reflected by
its varied approaches to each country in
Southeast Asia. As a consequence,
China appears to be steadily achieving
its security goals, while the United
States has been less successful in realizing its own objectives.
Percival approaches his subject starting
with a historical overview of Chinese
strategic goals in Southeast Asia and the
policies they have used to achieve them.
He argues convincingly that, in pursuit
of its strategic aims, China has demonstrated a better appreciation of those
that comprise the maritime countries of
Southeast Asia.
In one of the most important chapters
of his work, “How to Think about
China and Southeast Asia,” the author
dispels some of the more disingenuous
analytical approaches that have been
used to explain the security dynamics in
East Asia. Key among them has been
the realist perspective founded on
power relationships that assumes the
countries in Southeast Asia at some future point will need to choose between
China and the United States. He argues
that this perception is wholly unsuited
given the “asymmetry” of power and
influence each country brings to the table. In his view, traditional notions
about what constitutes power and influence in Southeast Asia are much more
nuanced than many U.S. security analysts have appreciated. His comprehensive analyses of “soft power” and its role
in Chinese relations with Southeast Asia
are especially compelling. Significantly,
the author contends that China’s power
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and influence in Southeast Asia are not
predicated upon military or economic
prowess but rather on its “restraint in
requesting adjustments in Southeast
Asian policy,” and its support to existing ruling regimes that often come under intense pressure from the United
States. Finally, Percival argues U.S.
credibility problems in Southeast Asia
arise from American “reluctance” to
commit to a set of priorities and an
unwillingness to devote the resources
needed to achieve America’s strategic
goals. As a result, U.S. policy has fallen
victim to competing constituencies in
the United States, which results in an ad
hoc decision-making process that
poorly matches means to desired ends.
The Dragon Looks South provides a clear
and succinct analysis of complex issues
and relationships that exist in a strategically critical region for both China and
the United States. As such, it is a mustread for anyone wanting to gain a better
appreciation of the issues that confront
American security policy in Southeast
Asia.
RON RATCLIFF

Naval War College

Flanagan, Stephen J., and James A. Schear, eds.
Strategic Challenges: America’s Global Security
Agenda. Washington, D.C.: National Defense
Univ. Press, 2008. 415pp. $35

From time to time it is extremely useful
for senior military and political leaders
to take stock of the international landscape, rise above the incessant demands
of the day, and think about where the
currents of change are bearing their
ships of state. This book takes a hard
look at seven distinct security
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challenges with which U.S. leaders can
reasonably be expected to wrestle in the
future.
In many ways, Strategic Challenges is exactly the sort of solid work that one expects scholars associated with the
National Defense University (NDU)
and the Institute for National Strategic
Studies (INSS) to produce. Its genesis
was a two-year study of the international environment undertaken by
NDU in response to a tasking from the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This is a thoughtful work, well organized, well written, and well supported
by cogent analysis. In short, Strategic
Challenges is a gateway book that both
illuminates important security issues
and at the same time leaves the reader
wanting to explore some of its topics in
greater depth.
Strategic Challenges opens with an overview of the emerging global security environment, dedicating subsequent
chapters to the issues of dealing with
global terrorism, combating the threat
of weapons of mass destruction, protecting the American homeland, defusing conflicts in unstable regions,
engaging other major powers, and
adapting alliances and partnerships.
The final two chapters examine how the
United States might transform its defense strategy and posture and secure its
future. Each chapter makes a worthwhile contribution to the total volume;
the chapters on “engaging other major
powers” and “transforming defense
strategy and posture” are particularly
good. Indeed, the latter chapter provides an excellent thumbnail review of
the history of transformation in the
George W. Bush administration and the
evolution of capabilities-based
planning.
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If there is a drawback to Strategic Challenges, it is that for all its high-caliber
writing, the challenges it evokes seem
oddly comfortable and familiar. This is
not to imply they are not valid but
rather there is widespread agreement
that these are issues that will task future
U.S. presidents. It would have been illuminating if the authors had taken a
deeper look at more unusual challenges,
such as the growth of feral cities, the
ability of the international community
to respond to pandemics, the security
implications of global warming, and the
impact of clearly established demographic trends. Some of these issues are
mentioned, and others are actually examined to some degree, but a deeper
look at each would have been welcome.
Strategic Challenges would seem destined to become required reading for
students in the security studies field. It
is suited for both the undergraduate
and graduate level as well as lay readers
looking to gain an overview of security
threats in a minimum amount of time.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Lieber, Keir. War and the Engineers: The Primacy
of Politics over Technology. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
Univ. Press, 2008. 226pp. $21

Keir Lieber, a recent graduate of the Political Science Department at the University of Chicago, is presently an
assistant professor and faculty fellow at
the University of Notre Dame. This is
Lieber’s first book.
One of the first books to examine and
criticize directly the current political
science analysis on “offense-defense
theory,” this work is an analysis of the
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debate as well as a well crafted refutation of the theory as a whole. The title,
however, could have been a better fit
with the content––this is not a book
about war itself, or about engineers.
In the introduction Lieber outlines the
foundations of current theory. Offensedefense theory, broadly, states that war
and peace are dependent on technology
and perceived power. If a country has
offensive capabilities, it will attack and
expand, overthrowing the status quo.
When defense predominates (ideologically, technologically, or otherwise), cooperation and peace are more likely.
Lieber questions this theory. To refute
it, in later chapters he considers both
military outcomes and political outcomes
(italics original) in specific case studies.
By analyzing offense-defense theory using its own vocabulary and definitions,
he is able to deconstruct it persuasively.
Using two case studies on “offensive”
mobility (trains in the wars of German
unification and tanks in World War I),
and two on the evolution of “defensive”
firepower (small arms in World War I
and the “nuclear revolution”), Lieber
turns the theory against itself. He effectively argues that neither offensive nor
defensive capabilities pushed or prevented war during the periods in
question.
In his conclusion Lieber offers an alternative argument, “technological opportunism,” with just enough information
to lead readers to look forward to his
next project.
Lieber’s use of sources, both primary
and secondary, is extensive, and his bibliography provides a wealth of information. His book is well written, well
argued, and concise. However, it is sure
to cause controversy, outlining as it
does both the offense-defense theory as
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well as Lieber’s refutation of it. This
work is the latest in the debate within
political science circles on the causes of
war. I highly recommend this book to
historians, political scientists, military
officers, and analysts, who should all be
familiar with offense-defense theory
and objections to it.
S. MIKE PAVELEC

Naval War College

Scheuer, Michael. Marching toward Hell: America
and Islam after Iraq. New York: Free Press, 2008.
364pp. $27

Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer
offers an assessment of the war on terror, providing in varying proportions
the history, an estimate of the global
situation, recommended tactics, and a
polemic against what he believes has
both provoked al-Qa‘ida and impaired
Washington’s ability to fight it successfully. Scheuer was chief and then special
adviser to the chief of the CIA’s Bin
Laden unit from 1996 to 2004.
Scheuer’s core argument is twofold.
First, he argues that al-Qa‘ida’s attacks
America because of U.S. foreign policies
in the Islamic world, and not because of
any objection to the nature of American
society. In Scheuer’s estimate, while
jihadists do have contempt for American values, it is only Washington’s
interference in Muslim lands that motivates them to target Americans and
their allies. Second, he argues that this
misunderstanding has led Washington
to underestimate them and thus remain
superficial in its responses.
Scheuer is fairly convincing in his first
argument, primarily using statements
by al-Qa‘ida leaders to illustrate how
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they focus attention on U.S. policies
and how they use sophisticated strategies to attack (or spare from attack)
other Western nationals in proportion
to their support for those policies.
However, he also shows how ineffective
the U.S. response has been toward these
attacks, arguing that the central premise
of American strategy in the Muslim
world is flawed. That is, whether or not
America is a prosperous, free, tolerant,
and generous country is beside the
point; many Muslims may agree and yet
still believe that America deserves punishment for its policies. He then delivers stinging critiques of other U.S.
policies since 9/11—for example, deploying too few troops to Afghanistan
and deposing a natural ally against
al-Qa‘ida, Saddam Hussein.
Some of his critiques are less convincing than others. It is frustrating that the
author does not critically evaluate the
veracity of al-Qa‘ida’s accusations
against the United States or logically explain how U.S. policy failures flow directly from its failure to comprehend
al-Qa‘ida’s true motives. The book is
also riddled with run-on sentences
and strings of four-or-more-wordsconnected-by-hyphens, which better
editing could have reduced.
The value of the book for the national
security community is its identification
of eight future hot spots in the global
war on terrorism. Scheuer identifies
one of these regions, the northern Caucasus, as particularly dangerous and
well positioned to provide al-Qa‘ida
with nuclear weapons.
Because the book’s virtues, insights, and
provocative ideas are mixed with logical
gaps and woeful underdevelopment,
this reviewer cannot give it his
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unqualified endorsement. If you read
only one book on the global war on terrorism, do not make it this one. If,
however, you read several books on the
subject or your job involves long-term
planning for the war on terror, this
work is certainly worth a look, as it will
make you aware of many of the mind
sets and biases that shape government
rhetoric and conventional commentary
on terrorism and national security.
ROBERT HARRIS

Burke, Virginia

Cull, Nicholas J. The Cold War and the United
States Information Agency: American Propaganda
and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989. New York:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008. 533pp. $125

Public diplomacy today is a topic of
global conversation. Books on the “new
public diplomacy” of state and nonstate
actors appear with increasing frequency. Memoirs by practitioners and
monographs on cultural diplomacy and
international broadcasting abound. Until now, however, there has been no
in-depth scholarly treatment of the U.S.
Information Agency (USIA), the government organization primarily responsible for America’s international
information, broadcasting, and educational and cultural exchange activities
during the Cold War.
Nicholas Cull, a historian who teaches
public diplomacy at the University of
Southern California’s Annenberg
School for Communication, provides
this much-needed scholarship, with a
well written account grounded in
twelve years of archival research and
more than a hundred interviews with
practitioners. Beginning with the
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development of information and cultural programs during World War II,
Cull’s narrative, organized in chapters
on presidential administrations and
USIA directors, deals principally with
the decades between USIA’s creation in
1953 and the end of the Cold War in
1989. He concludes with a brief epilogue on USIA’s final decade, years that
saw consolidation of U.S. international
broadcasting services under the independent Broadcasting Board of Governors and the transfer of USIA’s
information, exchange, and foreignopinion-research programs to the
Department of State in 1999.
Cull assesses with remarkable evenhandedness the priorities, decisions, and organizational struggles of political leaders and USIA’s practitioners. There is
no ideological tilt in his examination of
sharply contested approaches to winning the Cold War struggle for “hearts
and minds.” The book is not a lament
for USIA’s demise or a call for its restoration. Cull brings a scholar’s discipline, a wealth of empirical evidence,
and arm’s-length perspective to his
analysis. Nevertheless, Cull does have
strong opinions. He renders critical
judgments on USIA’s successes and failures. In so doing, he frequently prefers
to show rather than tell.
On foreign-policy issues and USIA’s
domestic political context, Cull’s account is strong on the McCarthy era,
the Soviet launch of Sputnik, the civil
rights movement, and the Vietnam
War. He provides insights into USIA’s
marginal role as an adviser to the president, State Department, and National
Security Council on implications of foreign public opinion in policy formulation and communication. He deals at
length with tensions between USIA and
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the Voice of America over missions,
“firewalls,” journalism norms, and
organizational independence.
Yet the book has limitations. He problematically conflates the generic and
constituent elements of public diplomacy––listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and
international broadcasting––in the
book’s framework of underlying
themes. He gives (as he recognizes) disproportionate attention to Washington,
USIA’s directors, and broadcast media.
The author ends with a brief look at lessons for the future, such as the need to
include public diplomacy in foreignpolicy planning and for the United
States to listen as well as speak. These
are valuable insights. But new forces are
shaping twenty-first-century diplomacy. Networks challenge hierarchies.
Attention––not information––is the
scarce resource. Globalism, nonstate actors, a mix of secular and religious “big
ideas,” digital technologies, and new
media are transforming the old order.
Cull is sensitive to these forces and to
the ways in which they are changing diplomacy. Perhaps one day he will write
another book that completes his history
of USIA and explores the evolution of
public diplomacy in a world that is
vastly different from the Cold War. In
the meantime, Cull’s masterful history
will be the gold standard in scholarship
on USIA.
BRUCE GREGORY

George Washington University

Macrakis, Kristie. Seduced by Secrets: Inside the
Stasi’s Spy-Tech World. New York: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2008. 370pp. $28
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Michigan State University professor
Kristie Macrakis provides an interesting, if somewhat disjointed, look into
one part of the former East German
Ministry for State Security, the department commonly known as the “Stasi.”
In its time, the Stasi was one of the
most effective intelligence and security
organizations on the planet. The book
under review provides a look into a key
aspect of Stasi operations. Its author,
Kristie Macrakis, has written several
books on modern Germany and conveys a deep understanding of German
thought and attitudes, but her lack of
knowledge on intelligence matters unfortunately limits her understanding of
her chosen topic. However, the professional who is willing to dig past the
discrepancies will find value.
The book is divided into two parts,
“High-Tech” and “Spy-Tech.” The latter section focuses on “spy technology”
and will fascinate the dilettante and inform the professional. It is in this section that Macrakis appears more
comfortable and writes with greater
confidence and insight. If your favorite
James Bond character is Q, you will
love this section. Secret writing, spy
cameras, and other surveillance gadgets
abound.
Unfortunately, the first section is not as
well written as the second. It provides
valuable information for intelligence
and policy professionals, focusing on
the Stasi’s quest to steal high-technology
information and hardware from the
West, primarily West Germany.
Macrakis describes economic espionage
as a major role for the Stasi’s foreignintelligence arm, backed by an extensive
organization within the ministry and
throughout the East German state.
However, an inadequate understanding
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of intelligence prevents her from presenting real insights, which readers
must find for themselves. Still, the
depth of the author’s research and her
superior understanding of the German
psyche are definite enablers for an astute reader.
On the basis of extensive archival research as well as interviews with former
officers, the author describes how the
Stasi succeeded in stealing technical
plans, equipment, and software. Attempting to gain an economic edge on
the West, East Germans spent thousands of marks to steal millions of
marks’ worth of technology. Macrakis
also describes the ultimate futility of
this effort: East Germany could not incorporate the technology faster than the
West could innovate and thus lagged
farther and farther behind. Stealing
technology is relatively simple, but incorporating that technology and making it an effective part of a national
economy is not.
Another major challenge for the Stasi
was Western technology-control regimes. While imperfect and implemented long after the Stasi had begun
its operations, these regimes significantly increased the effort required.
Eventually, the cost of stealing and the
inability of East Germany to integrate
what it took doomed the Stasi’s efforts
to failure.
Contemporary critics of current
technology-control regimes should note
that many nations have learned from
the Stasi’s mistakes and now make the
transfer of “know-how” a key element
of their technological-industrialeconomic espionage programs. Those
charged with enforcing technologytransfer laws can also learn lessons from
this work.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

JOHN R. ARPIN

Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Virginia

Winkler, Jonathan Reed. Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War
I. New York: Harvard Univ. Press, 2008. 358pp.
$55

In March 1921, the U.S. subchaser SC154 fired on a cable ship attempting to
land a transoceanic cable near Miami,
Florida. The cable to South America
would have been operated under foreign control. While the ship was undamaged, the cable never reached land.
The lessons of World War I had left the
United States willing to use force rather
than allow a new foreign-controlled
communications link to North America. In his excellent study, Jonathan
Winkler recalls these episodes, describing the international and naval communications structures of the era, their
influence on the war, and America’s
recognition of its dependence on foreign communications systems. The
Navy, with a cadre of technical experts
and the need to command and control
a worldwide fleet, played a central role
in shaping a U.S. communications
policy intended to reduce these
vulnerabilities.
The years before World War I represent
the start of our networked world.
Trade, overseas news, colonial administration and the coordination of far-flung
military forces all became dependent on
a web of undersea communications cables, supplemented by a limited number
of long-range radio stations. Understanding this dependence, both Great
Britain and Germany entered the war
with contingency plans to cut enemy
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cables at sea. However, British naval superiority ensured that damage from
German attacks could be quickly repaired. Despite later German successes
in using submarines to attack undersea
cables, geography and infrastructure
left Great Britain as the hub of the remaining international communications
system. While some of this story will be
broadly familiar to readers of Barbara
Tuchman’s classic study The Zimmerman
Telegram, Winkler moves well beyond
Tuchman’s work, describing how Britain’s information blockade emerged as
a coordinated effort that complemented
and reinforced its naval and economic
blockades of Germany.
Initially, many in the U.S. government
and Navy were sympathetic to British
efforts. Even while neutral, the U.S.
Navy cooperated, by closing German
wireless stations in the United States.
However, the British stranglehold on
German communications had the effect
of leaving the United States dependent
on British cables to Europe and Latin
America. British monitoring of cable
traffic, a valuable source of military intelligence, also yielded commercial information that was used to further
British trade––often against U.S. commercial interests. Reliable reporting of
news from Germany became impossible, leaving the neutral American press
dependent on British reporting of the
war. The divergence of American and
British interests forced the U.S. Navy’s
realization that control of communications had become an essential part of
control of the seas in the modern age.
In response, several U.S. government
agencies moved to build an American
cable network, but they were hampered
by British control of raw materials.
Others turned to emerging technology.
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Largely through Navy efforts, the
United States ended World War I with
the largest radio network in the world.
However, the lack of a coordinated U.S.
strategy and poor interagency coordination ultimately prevented the nation
from dominating the international
communications system after the war.
Winkler asserts that the lessons learned
from this failure provided the impetus
for American dominance of international communications in years
following the Second World War.
This is an excellent book with a compelling story. Winkler deftly handles a
complex topic that cuts across issues of
naval history, intelligence, economics,
and technological change. Nexus is well
worth the time of any naval officer contemplating the sources of American dependence in a networked age.
DALE C. RIELAGE

Commander, U.S. Navy
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S.
Seventh Fleet

Kershaw, Ian. Hitler, The Germans, and the Final
Solution. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press,
2008. 394pp. $35

This insightful collection of essays from
the leading scholar of the Third Reich is
a must-read for any serious student of
the Second World War. Kershaw’s mastery of the intricacies of the Nazi regime
is second to none, and he approaches
the historical controversies surrounding
its reign of terror in as calm and deliberate a manner as the topic permits.
Kershaw’s essays cover a variety of topics, but he frequently returns to the
questions surrounding Adolf Hitler’s
direct involvement in implementing the
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“Final Solution” and how a nation so
seemingly advanced could have carried
out such monstrous crimes. The crux of
Kershaw’s argument is that the führer’s
“charismatic domination” of the German people through a potent mix of
ideological zeal coupled with his great
skills in the art of propaganda paved the
way for the “Final Solution.”
On 30 January 1939, Hitler delivered a
lengthy speech in the Reichstag in
which he threatened the “annihilation
of the Jewish race in Europe” should
the Jews “succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war.” As
Kershaw notes, Hitler and his underlings would repeatedly cite that “prophecy” over the course of the next three
years, as planning for the “Final Solution” intensified. (Interestingly, as the
war dragged on, the date of the “prophecy” speech was deliberately altered by
the regime in its propaganda broadcasts
to 1 September 1939, to link it with the
onset of the war.) In 1942 alone, Hitler
referred to his “prophecy” in four nationally broadcast radio addresses designed to, as Kershaw puts it,
“condition the general population
against humanitarian sympathy for the
Jews” and, most disturbingly, signal
to the regime’s insiders Hitler’s
“knowledge and approval of the
genocide.”
Kershaw believes that one of the major
milestones on the road to a “comprehensive solution” of the “Jewish question” was Hitler’s declaration of war
against the United States on 11 December 1941. The propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, noted in his diary on 13
December that “the Führer is determined to make a clean sweep. . . . The
world war is here. The annihilation of
the Jews must be the necessary

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

consequence.” A little over five weeks
later, the infamous Wannsee Conference convened to plan, as SSObergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich
put it, “the coming final solution of the
Jewish question.” What had until that
point been a localized and somewhat
“inefficient” extermination effort was
transformed into a Reich-wide, comprehensive genocide. None of this, as
Goebbels noted in March 1942, was
possible without the führer’s presence
as the “unswerving champion and
spokesman of a radical solution” to the
“Jewish question.”
Kershaw is to be commended for this
collection of essays, which, coupled
with a reading of his two-volume biography of Hitler, should be required
reading for any serious student of Nazi
Germany and the Holocaust. We owe a
debt to Kershaw for the unpleasant but
essential enterprise of helping future
generations grapple with one of the
most squalid episodes in the history of
mankind.
STEPHEN KNOTT

Naval War College

Blake, John. Charts of War: The Maps and Charts
That Have Informed and Illustrated War at Sea.
London: Conway Maritime, 2006. 160pp. $50

John Blake’s book is a masterful short
course on the maritime history of Western civilization and chart making as it
has evolved through time. It traces the
history of sea charts from thirteenthcentury portolan wind charts to the
diagrammatic charts used to describe
pivotal phases of the sea operations
during the first Gulf war, in 1991. The
sea chart was particularly important to
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the maritime countries as they emerged
into national states. The objective of
this book is to study not war but the development of charts and their use in
warfare.

battles. Very few sea charts, however,
have survived that show the actual
planning or progress of a sea battle.
Most sea charts of war are illustrations
of past events.

The book is written for the general public, not for the specialist. Although laid
out in chronological order, it does not
provide an index of the charts, which
makes it difficult to locate a specific
one. The charts are in a large format,
and their reproduction is of high quality; however, it is often necessary to resort to a magnifying glass to see details.

The selection came from fifteen major
archives in the United Kingdom, Europe, and the United States. Blake’s research was extensive and goes into great
detail. The book covers eight specific
areas of chart making: ancient world;
the Renaissance; the Spanish and Portuguese empires; seventeenth-century
European, American, and Asian wars;
American independence; the French
Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars;
the American Civil War; and modern
warfare.

Blake has selected a series of original
and printed charts seldom seen by the
public; they are highly appealing and
are considered secondary art in their
own right. Blake states that they were
chosen to show “how the chart can illustrate, inform and comment on maritime history.” Each has a description
that sets it in its historical context, the
specific objective for which it was constructed, its originator (when known),
and its current location.
There are over 185 charts, maps, and
sketches, covering the development of
sea charts from the beginning, as well as
their design and content, with the overall intent of showing their importance
to the planning and execution of sea
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John Blake has written two other excellent books on sea charts. He was an officer in the Royal Navy for seventeen
years, with twelve years’ active service.
In 1996 he and his wife initiated the licensing of maritime cartography in the
United Kingdom Hydrographic Office.
He was educated at Brighton and
Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, and is a fellow of the Royal Institute of Navigators.
RALPH C. WEISS

Commander, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Newport, Rhode Island
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“THE MYTH OF AN ISOLATED SCENARIO”

Sir:
In his “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” in the Summer 2008 issue of Naval
War College Review, Professor William Murray argues that in a complete surprise scenario, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could launch a long-range
precision bombardment to quickly cripple or destroy the Republic of China
(ROC) navy and air force; the subsequent invasion and blockade by the PLA
could then neutralize the island republic’s resistance on the ground and achieve
success before the United States could intervene. Accordingly, Murray suggested
that Taiwan should not heavily invest in its navy and air force because neither is
likely to survive such a surprise attack; rather, it should adopt a “porcupine strategy” and “concentrate on development of a professional standing army armed
with mobile, short-range, defensive weapons.” He believes that such a policy
would enable Taiwan to resist the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) offense
for weeks or even months and allow the United States time to deliberate whether
intervention is warranted.
The article hinges upon the scenario of a “complete surprise.” In reality, however, this scenario is selectively isolated and hardly tenable. First of all, in an envisioned campaign across the Taiwan Strait, the PLA would never base its
invasion on guided missiles alone. Before it launches a long-range precision
bombardment with its overwhelming guided missiles, the PLA will conduct an
access-denial strategy in advance, deploying its numerous submarines between
the first and the second island chains so as to prevent the intervention of the U.S.
Navy. At the same time, the PLA will assemble a huge number of combat troops
of the three services along the southeast coast for subsequent invasion and
blockade. At this juncture, the numerous advanced spy and reconnaissance satellites of the United States will come into play and prove themselves. Although
the PLA has antisatellite missiles, it is impossible for the PLA to eliminate all
such U.S. satellites instantaneously. That is, the deployment of numerous
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009

135

130

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 2, Art. 1

submarines and the assembly of vast numbers of PLA combat troops will definitely be picked up by the U.S. satellites, which will then provide strategic and
tactical warnings to the United States and Taiwan. A Western proverb goes as follows: forewarned is forearmed. Once alerted, the United States and Taiwan will
respond accordingly. Consequently, there is no room for a “complete surprise”
to occur across the Taiwan Strait realistically. In short, a critical but implicit assumption of the “complete surprise” scenario—the PLA conducts vital deployment without being detected—is untenable at all. This makes the article
fundamentally flawed.
The argument that neither the Taiwan navy and air force is likely to survive
such a long-range precision bombardment is also seriously flawed. At present,
the ROC navy has two operational Dutch-built submarines. If the ROC acquired
the additional eight submarines which the Bush administration has promised to
sell to Taiwan in 2001, its navy would have altogether ten operational submarines. As prescribed by naval routine, at least three or four submarines would be
cruising under the sea. All ten would be ready for combat once the PLA’s critical
deployment was detected. These submarines cruising under the sea stand the
best chance to survive a dozen waves of saturation missiles attack by the PLA and
would be immediately ready for lethal revenge attacks. Their counterattack
might neutralize more than a third of the invading amphibious troops during
the shore-to-shore maneuver stage and force the PLA to abort its invasion.
Even though the PLA may still conduct a blockade against Taiwan, the fact
that the island sits on the chokepoint of quite a few vital sea-lanes may trigger international intervention right away. The international pressure may well soon
exceed the level Beijing could withstand. A prolonged blockade will prove an invitation to international intervention and may end up in failure. In short, the coherence of the scenario from a long-range precision bombardment to blockade
is fragile.
The so-called porcupine strategy puts emphasis on the conservation of army
forces rather than the building up of the navy and the air force of the ROC. This
strategy might lead to a disastrous result. When in power, both the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) have claimed that Taiwan
is a maritime nation. Hence the ROC is meant to be a sea power. As shown by the
example of the United States, the U.K., and Japan, a sea power has to prioritize
the buildup of its navy and air force. Otherwise, it is giving up the struggle for sea
and air control. As an island republic, Taiwan would be vulnerable to external
threat without a strong navy and air force. Neglecting to build up its navy and air
force would invite PLA invasion.
If the PLA chose to invade Taiwan, it would very likely adopt an “access denial” strategy against the U.S. beforehand. That is, before invading Taiwan, the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1

136

Naval War College: Full Spring 2009 Issue

IN MY VIEW

131

PLA could establish a line, or even a double line, of defense, composed of submarines, between the first and the second island chains. If the PLA succeeds in
taking Taiwan, how long would it take the U.S. to break through the formidable
line(s) of defense to come to the rescue of Taiwan? If the PLA heavily reinforced
its combat troops and consolidated its anti-U.S. defenses right after taking Taiwan, the breakthrough and rescue operations of the United States would be further delayed. The longer the delay, the heavier the casualties for the United States
and the dimmer the chance of success. Facing the grim prospect of a miserable
war, heavy casualties, and prolonged confrontation with the formidable PRC,
will the U.S. Congress approve the dispatch of its soldiers to sacrifice their lives
for Taiwan, already in the firm grip of the PLA? Probably very few would be
optimistic about the answer.
If, then, the ROC government adopts the “porcupine strategy” and ignores
the buildup of its navy and air force, the PLA might be lured to take up an
access-denial strategy against the U.S. and launch a surprise attack against the
island simultaneously. Whatever the result of the PLA attack would be, it would
be a disaster for Taiwan. This kind advice from a friend might lead to catastrophe. The ROC government has to be careful with the “porcupine strategy.”
Professor Murray argues that facing the overwhelming military threat from
the PLA, Taiwan must rethink and redesign an asymmetrical defense strategy to
deny the PRC’s strategic objectives. There is more than one option in terms of
asymmetric defense strategy. Stressing the conservation of army combat power
is one option. Putting emphasis on the buildup of the navy and air force in a way
that yields strategic deterrence capacity, tenacious survival ability, and lethal revenge capability could be another. An asymmetric army can make [it hard for]
the PLA to swallow the island, while an asymmetric navy and air force may dissuade it from launching a surprise attack in the first place. It is not difficult to tell
which is superior.
Confronting the overwhelming superiority, and likelihood, of surprise attack
from the PLA, the ROC military should aim to promote survivability, revenge
capability, strategic deterrence, and asymmetric-warfare capabilities. In terms
of tangible options, the decision makers in Taipei and Washington, D.C., have to
abandon tribalism and answer the following question honestly: In a scenario
close to a complete surprise, is there any war-fighting platform that possesses
survivability, revenge capability, strategic deterrence, and asymmetric-warfare
capabilities superior to those of submarines? Actually, if the ROC has acquired
substantial submarines, the high survivability and fatal revenge capability of
submarines alone might dissuade the PLA from invading Taiwan in the first
place.
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The “porcupine strategy” urges that the combat-power-conservation measures of the army be consolidated so that Taiwan can resist PLA invasion long
enough for America to come to the rescue. The strategy serves the interests of the
United States. The argument expects the ROC to hold on and defend the critical
strategic point of the first island chain for the U.S. However, the ROC is not a
vassal state of America; rather, it is an independent maritime nation. It has its
own national goals to accomplish, including safeguarding the territorial integrity and maritime resources of the Senkaku Islands and the islands in the South
China Sea.
Many of the Asia-Pacific nations are pursuing naval buildup programs. The
ROC has territorial disputes with some of these nations. Such disputes involve
conventional security threats, and military power still plays a significant role for
resolution. Taiwan has to face the solemn issue of safeguarding the territorial integrity and maritime resources with military power, if necessary. The ROC simply cannot entrust the mission to any other country. As other Asia-Pacific
nations pursue military buildups, if we do not, shall we take the mindset of a
protectorate and look to the U.S. or some other big brother for protection? Such
mentality is dangerous and irresponsible. As an independent island republic,
Taiwan has to rely on its navy and air force to ensure the integrity of its territorial
sovereignty and maritime resources.
“Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy” shows concern about the security of
Taiwan. The scenario and suggestions it offers serve to help the ROC review its
vulnerability and look for ways for improvements; therefore, the writing as a
whole merits approbation from Taiwan. However, the paper is fundamentally
flawed. The basic assumption of the scenario of complete surprise is untenable;
the coherence of the scenario is fragile. The article has been, in effect, developed
in the interests of the U.S. and subconsciously treats the ROC as a vassal state
and a protectorate of America, which contradicts our commitment to Taiwan as
a sovereign maritime nation. The suggestions given by the article may further
deprive Taiwan of its aspiration to become a sea power. The ROC military, on the
one hand, appreciates the paper’s concern but, on the other hand, is cautious
about its suggestions.

WEN-LUNG LAURENCE LIN

National Defense University, Taiwan
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Sir:
William S. Murray wrote an intriguing, thoughtful article arguing that both Taipei and Washington needed to reexamine the island’s approach to defending
against an attack from the People’s Republic of China. Entitled “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Mr. Murray’s article contends that the pace and scope of
China’s military modernization—with its rapid introduction of precise
short-range ballistic missiles, advanced submarines, surface ships, aircraft and
surface-to-air missiles—has “fundamentally altered” the cross-strait security
environment by eroding Taiwan’s strategic depth and geographic advantage.
Mr. Murray concludes that Taiwan should forgo purchasing advanced military systems from the U.S. and stop developing its own offensive counterstrike
capabilities. Taiwan instead should adopt a “porcupine strategy” by hardening
its civil-military infrastructure and strengthening the Taiwan army to such an
extent that Taipei would deny Beijing all of its strategic objectives in attacking
the island. In short, he believes that this new strategy would show “demonstrable
Taiwanese resilience[,] would diminish Beijing’s prior confidence in success,
strengthen cross-strait deterrence, and reduce the risk of the United States being
dragged into a conflict with China.”
Professor Murray’s analysis of the relative PRC and Taiwan military capabilities and strategies during a full-scale conflict is largely sound. However, his conclusion that Taiwan is doing enough but just “not doing the right things” misses
some important strategic considerations. The right thing for Taipei to do now is
to ensure that its defense policy is free from partisan politics and that Taiwan
fully utilizes its acquired weapon systems toward a viable defense against
Beijing’s threats.
Taiwan’s acquisition of the recently announced $6.4 billion package (which
includes Harpoon missiles, PAC-3 missiles and firing units, AH-64D Apache helicopters, and upgrades for Taiwan’s E-2 early warning aircraft) will serve as another step toward maintaining a capable and resilient defense force. Moreover,
Taiwan’s purchase is also an important symbol of Taipei’s resolve to resist
Beijing’s coercion—a far more powerful symbol than Taiwan deploying offensive missiles or “hardening” alone. Despite limitations at the higher end of the
escalation ladder, Taiwan’s military capabilities play a central role in preventing
Beijing from intimidating the island (via force demonstrations, forward exercises, sea-lane disruptions, etc.) so as to force Taipei to negotiate under duress.
By Taiwan’s maintaining a modestly sized but potent force equipped with advanced weaponry, its military will have the capacity to confront these intimidations successfully and confidently. Faced with this resistance, Beijing will then
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need to either deescalate the situation or make the risky, costly choice China
does not want to make: full-scale war.
In the face of overwhelming Chinese force, however, a strong Taiwan military
is a necessary—but not sufficient—requirement for the island’s defense. Regardless of how “hardened” Taiwan becomes, it is unlikely that Taipei could resist a prolonged, full-scale assault alone—a point Murray readily concedes.
What complicates Beijing’s calculus—and therefore prevents China from undertaking such a gambit—is the risk of failure, a hazard made far greater by the
prospect of U.S. intervention that reinforces the island’s will to resist. Therefore,
Washington’s promise to keep Taiwan safe from attack and intimidation by, in
part, providing it appropriate defense articles and services is indispensable for
maintaining security and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The sale of defense
systems like PAC-3 and AH-64D Apache helicopters is a significant, tangible,
and responsible demonstration of Washington’s long-standing commitment to
Taipei, succinctly enunciated in President Bush’s pledge to “do whatever it takes
to defend Taiwan.”
Professor Murray is correct that it is important for the U.S. and Taiwan to reevaluate periodically the direction of their defense policies to ensure that they
are consistent with the changing security environment. His prescription that
Taiwan’s leaders should work to reduce its critical vulnerabilities is a sound one.
Making improvements in Taiwan’s civil-military infrastructure is especially important for an island prone to periodic natural disasters. So too is improving the
Taiwan army’s sustainability, training, and force protection.
Now, however, is not the time for Taiwan to abandon the primary features of
its current defense strategy in favor of Professor Murray’s “porcupine strategy”—a radical form of Taiwan’s previous “resolute defense, effective deterrence” doctrine. Instead, Taipei should look to develop all of its armed services
in ways that accentuate the geographic advantages the island continues to enjoy
despite Beijing’s improved capacity to coerce and intimidate. These may include
a more robust use of sophisticated decoys, wider use of alternative runways and
basing, or employing more redundant and joint logistics infrastructure as Mr.
Murray suggests. Nevertheless, these efforts should complement Taipei’s current
strategy, not replace it.
With the announcement now made in Washington, the hard part begins for
Taipei. It is incumbent on Taiwan’s authorities to provide the sufficient funding
to procure the $6.4 billion package in the near term and to prepare its forces to
employ them effectively over the long term. Taiwan’s political parties now need
to cooperate on their defensive needs and avoid politicizing defense policy. A
clear, long-range defense strategy that transcends party politics would best serve
the island’s security in the long term. Failing to do so will undermine
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1
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Washington and Taipei’s efforts to maintain cross-strait security and stability as
Beijing continues its rapid military modernization unabated.

MICHAEL CASSIDY

Analyst, U.S. Department of Defense

Professor Murray replies:
In his summary of my argument, and repeatedly in his subsequent analysis, Captain Lin claims that I advocate the negligence of Taiwan’s air force and navy, and
the buildup of its army in their place. This is incorrect. The complete sentence
from which he quoted (italicized portion) reads: “Rather than relying on its
navy and air force (neither of which is likely to survive such an attack) to destroy
an invasion force, Taiwan should concentrate on development of a professional
standing army armed with mobile, short-range, defensive weapons.” Maritime
powers, as Captain Lin rightly observes, have real needs for the capabilities an air
force and navy can provide. Taiwan is no exception. I don’t, however, think it is
prudent to count on either Taiwan’s navy or air force to apply combat power effectively after being subjected to a surprise bombardment. Consequently, it
would seem logical (and not parochial) to rely more heavily on a fully professional, properly equipped and trained army as an effective counter-invasion
force. This does not mandate or constitute a recommendation for the diminishment or disestablishment of either the Taiwan navy or air force, but it does suggest the need to rethink the missions they should be configured to perform.
Mr. Cassidy wrote that I feel “Taiwan should forgo purchasing advanced military systems from the U.S.” This is a misleading oversimplification of my argument. I contend instead that weapons systems offered by the United States
should be unambiguously defensive; that they should be able to survive an initial bombardment by large numbers of precision munitions; and that they
should directly assist in either defeating an invasion or preserving Taipei’s ability to prevent Beijing from obtaining control over the island’s airspace and adjacent waters. Weapons that satisfy these criteria can be simple or advanced, but
there are undeniable advantages to relatively simple weapons systems if they are
used in a manner that achieves a set of coherent strategic objectives.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009

141

136

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 2, Art. 1

Captain Lin bases a significant portion of his counterarguments on the assumption that Taiwan will receive strategic and tactical warning. I agree that
Taiwan should be able to discern strategic warning. Intelligence specialists
can better assess than I whether China can launch barrages of missiles
against Taiwan without providing unambiguous indicators of imminent attack. Nonetheless, I would imagine the benefits of being able to do so are
readily apparent to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and that China’s
military has trained to be able to do just that. I think it is also reasonable to
assume that Beijing’s operational plans are designed and sequenced to minimize the likelihood of providing Taipei tactical warning. The alternative
seems like a poor planning assumption and ignores the PLA’s history of
achieving tactical surprise. I’ll also observe that Taiwan’s runways and other
valuable fixed facilities and weapons systems remain vulnerable regardless of
the amount or type of warning received.
Captain Lin argues that Taiwan’s potential future submarines will survive a
Chinese bombardment and deter or defeat an invasion. I agree that correctly positioned submarines could probably sink several invading amphibious ships
near Chinese ports of departure or as they transit to an invasion beach. Yet even
a fortuitously positioned four-knot submarine will have limited attack opportunities against a fleet of twelve-knot amphibious ships and escorts. I do not understand how Taiwan could ensure these opportunities unless several of Taipei’s
submarines continuously patrolled in the very shallow waters near likely landing beaches or immediately outside the similarly shallow waters of Chinese
ships’ home ports (which would likely be defensively mined). Captain Lin wrote
that Taiwan could maintain three or four submarines in such positions, but this
assertion represents a very high submarine force operations tempo. Such a high
OPTEMPO would likely require an even larger inventory of submarines than
that to which Taiwan currently aspires. Regardless, China could defeat such a
concept of operations by building more amphibious ships than Taiwan’s
submarines could be expected to sink.
Mr. Cassidy notes that Taiwan’s weapons systems are important symbols of
Taipei’s resolve and that those systems would help the island resist coercion in
scenarios less severe than the existentially threatening example I posited. I agree.
Yet I remain concerned that many of Taiwan’s showcase weapons systems could
be destroyed or rendered unusable by an initial Chinese salvo of conventional
missiles. Symbolism based on vulnerable weapons systems is not a feature of an
effective deterrent and does little to lend stability to a crisis. For these reasons I
must disagree with Mr. Cassidy’s assertion that “Now . . . is not the time for Taiwan to abandon the primary features of its current defense strategy.” On the
contrary, I think Taiwan should, as a matter of urgency, honestly and openly
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/1
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debate its strategic options and determine how to reestablish a stable deterrence.
The United States should actively contribute to this debate.
Mr. Cassidy recommends that Taipei should ensure that its defense policy is
freed from partisan politics. I wonder if this is possible (since it doesn’t appear to
be in other democracies), yet I take his point. Taiwan’s defenses and defensive
strategy largely stagnated during the tumultuous years of the Chen administration, partly due to partisan politics. Simultaneously, China aggressively modernized its military and fundamentally altered how it could apply coercive force
against Taiwan and against any intervening forces. This created a worrisome and
deepening imbalance in what had been a relatively stable situation. I believe
there is a compelling need to reevaluate and reconsider what constitutes an effective defense strategy for Taiwan and how the United States should best support it. Toward that end, I have offered the ideas in the “porcupine strategy,” and
I maintain that they make sense, both for Taiwan and for the United States.
Finally, I am gratified by Captain Lin’s statement that my paper “Revisiting
Taiwan’s Defense Strategy” offers the potential to help Taiwan in some way. I am
sure he, Mr. Cassidy, and I would agree that continued deterrence across the
Strait is in everyone’s interest, even though we don’t yet agree on how that deterrence can best be maintained.

WILLIAM S. MURRAY

Naval War College
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Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s manager for the
Navy Professional Reading Program

A

s they responded to tasking in the fall of 2005 from the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) to establish the Navy Professional Reading Program
(NPRP), the program managers faced the rather daunting challenge of selecting
a mere five dozen books to be featured in the program from among the millions
of titles available on library shelves around the world. To help with the task, an
advisory group was established with representatives from the Naval War College, the Naval Academy, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Senior Enlisted
Academy, the Naval Historical Center, and other organizations. Hundreds of
titles were considered, and the books listed on a number of other “suggested
reading lists” were reviewed. After great discussion and debate, a final list of sixty
books was personally approved by the CNO. Subsequent feedback from the fleet
has indicated wide acceptance of the books chosen. Since the program was
launched in the fall of 2006, selections from the NPRP have also been cited on
other reading lists, which helps reinforce the notion that these are indeed books
of consequence. For example, the Defense Department’s Deputy Chief Information Officer recently published his list of ten books that he considered valuable
for information leaders. Included were three NPRP titles:

• Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done, by Larry Bossidy and Ram
Charan. Written by a highly successful business executive (at General
Electric and Honeywell, among other firms) and a Harvard educator and
consultant, Execution has been described as “the missing link between
aspirations and results,” and “making it happen” as the leader’s most
important job.

• The Tipping Point, by Malcolm Gladwell. One reviewer says about this
book: “Hip and hopeful. The book is like the idea it describes: concise,
elegant but packed with social power. A book for anyone who cares about
how society works and how we can make it better.”
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• The Innovator’s Dilemma, by Clayton Christensen. This business-focused
book, written by a Harvard faculty member, highlights the need to avoid
complacency and to be prepared for inevitable change. As a reviewer noted:
“This model has application far outside the business world. One can think
of many examples, such as generals preparing to fight the last war, while
innovators, like Erwin Rommel or Billy Mitchell, develop the weapons and
tactics that will win the next one.”
Although the Navy is not a profit-and-loss business, many of the challenges
faced by Navy leaders are similar to those faced by business line managers and
executives. The editors of U.S. News and World Report asked fourteen business
leaders to identify the five books they considered indispensable for managers/leaders. Five books from the NPRP were among their picks, including The
Tipping Point, The Innovator’s Dilemma, and Execution. The other two were:

• The Second World War: The Gathering Storm, by Winston Churchill.
One reviewer noted: “His detailed account of how we got into the
Second World War, and how we might have avoided it, is incisive and
persuasively argued. This is a book everyone interested in understanding
the Second World War—and everyone who enjoys the creative use of
the English language—should read.”

• The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century, by Thomas
Friedman. A reviewer noted: “The World Is Flat provides a very interesting
view that establishes the author’s contention that the world is becoming
more flat by getting interconnected through globalization. Outsourcing is
changing the world in every aspect. Increased globalization in forms of
better communication will allow poor and less industrialized countries to
compete equally with the more industrialized countries such as the United
States and Western Europe. Overall this is a must-read because of the
insight it provides into the new global order.”
We encourage you to pick up one of the books mentioned here, or any other
selection from the NPRP library, and, as the program’s motto urges, “Accelerate
your mind!”

JOHN E. JACKSON
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